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Introduction
Financial markets are an aspect of key importance for creation and protection of
financial wealth. It is therefore essential to study and, whenever possible, understand
their functioning both on aggregate and individual levels as to enable policy makers
as well as individuals to take appropriate and timely preventive measures against
adverse market events, such as financial crises and crashes.
Evolutionary finance, which is one of the modern approaches to analyse fin-
ancial markets, consists in application of Darwinian ideas to asset markets. The
approach itself roots back to the 19th century, but has been put in practice only
in recent behavioural finance works, e.g., Farmer and Lo (1999), Evstigneev, Hens,
and Schenk-Hoppe´ (2016). It views the market from a biological perspective as a
self-organized system of market participants, whose interaction and evolution in the
behaviour contributes to a dynamic nature of the market and explains innovations in
investment styles, market products as well as changes in the regulatory framework.
The Darwinian forces of selection and mutation take effect through the endogenous
price process, which determines the evolution of wealth. The adaptive nature of
decisions creates a bilateral relation between endogenous asset returns and actions
of market participants, and this relation cannot be disentangled.
Classical literature in the area of asset pricing and quantitative finance, on the
other hand, analyses markets from an individual investor’s perspective. An agent
enters into already operating financial market and yet has little or negligible effect on
its endogenous dynamics. The price therefore is perceived as an exogenous process
by the agent. Two common questions addressed in the literature in this context are
whether it is possible, and if so, how to use available price information to evaluate
market outcomes, and whether it is possible, and if so, how to use this information
to make predictions about current and future market developments.
This dissertation inherits from both classical and evolutionary finance approaches
to financial markets and contributes to both strands of the literature.
Chapter 1 introduces institutional details of margin trading into the evolutionary
finance model by Evstigneev, Hens, and Schenk-Hoppe´ (2016) and studies the ef-
fects of short selling and leveraging on equilibrium asset prices and market stability.
The main finding is that the asset pricing prediction from the evolutionary finance
is robust to margin trading, and there is an equilibrium relation between margin
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requirements and the interest rates on borrowing and lending.
Chapter 2 studies risk-neutral valuation in the context of option pricing. It
provides a unified framework for Edgeworth type density expansions (Corrado and
Su, 1997, Jarrow and Rudd, 1982, Necula, Drimus, and Farkas, 2016) and derives
a closed form option pricing formula applicable to heavy-tailed return distributions
characteristic of option markets. The model allows to efficiently recover the risk-
neutral density from market quoted option prices. It also provides an alternative
to the classical approach of approximating tails of the options implied risk-neutral
density by parametric fat-tailed distributions.
Chapter 3 investigates real-time applications of quickest disorder detection tech-
niques to stock market timing. The focus is on the stochastic disorder model and
the corresponding exit rule by Zhitlukhin and Ziemba (2016). The paper develops
a fully fledged investment strategy that employs signals from the exit rule to enter
and exit the market. It finds that the exit rule cannot be employed as a single in-
vestment instrument, but acknowledges its risk management abilities, in particular
during the fall of 1987 and the bear market of 2007–2009.
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Chapter I
Margin Requirements and Evolutionary Asset
Pricing
joint work with Klaus Reiner Schenk-Hoppe´ a
Abstract. We introduce an evolutionary equilibrium asset pricing model with het-
erogeneous agents who can either act as brokers or hedge funds. Hedge funds can
trade on margin, taking short or (leveraged) long positions in the assets. Brokers
provide asset loans and credit to margin traders. In any evolutionary equilibrium,
where growth rates of wealth under management are identical, assets are priced ac-
cording to expected relative dividends (the Kelly rule) and margin traders either
leverage long or short the Kelly portfolio. Margin requirements affect the equilib-
rium interest rates but not the level of asset prices. We also apply the model to
study the impact of margin requirements on the speed of price adjustment in the
presence of noise traders.
Keywords: Margin trading; short selling; brokers; evolutionary finance.
JEL classification: G11; G12.
aEconomics, School of Social Sciences, University of Manchester, United Kingdom, and Depart-
ment of Finance, NHH–Norwegian School of Economics, Norway
1 Introduction
The paper introduces margin trading into the evolutionary finance model by
Evstigneev, Hens, and Schenk-Hoppe´ (2016, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2011) to explore the
effect of short selling and leveraging on asset prices and market stability. The present
model captures the main institutional detail of margin trading by modelling the
relationship between margin traders (hedge funds) and brokers.
Hedge funds can sell short as well as leverage long. But they can only access the
market through a broker who executes orders on their behalf and enforces compli-
ance with margin requirements which determine the maximum size of a short or a
leveraged position relative to the amount of a margin trader’s equity. Brokers extend
asset loans and credit to margin traders. They also manage other clients’ wealth
but can invest long only. Brokers and margin traders collect fees proportional to the
value of their assets under management.
We show that in any evolutionary equilibrium assets are priced according to
expected discounted relative dividends. Margin traders either leverage long or short
the market portfolio. An evolutionary equilibrium is characterized by all of the
funds delivering the same net returns (after fees). In such a situation, clients have
no incentive to change funds and all of the different funds co-exist in the market.
The interpretation of this equilibrium is that it is the outcome of the process of
market selection. Market selection refers to underperforming funds losing wealth
(and clients) until they have no impact on the market. In an evolutionary equilibrium
therefore all of the funds have market impact and their investment decisions matter.
Our results on equilibrium asset prices are in line with previous work in evol-
utionary finance. The interesting observation here is that margin trading, through
which traders can amplify their impact on the market, does not have an effect on
equilibrium prices. In the paper by Gerber, Hens, and Woehrmann (2010), which
gives a similar extension of the evolutionary finance model but without any institu-
tional detail, short-selling is allowed but not practiced in equilibrium.1 But in our
paper, short selling and leveraging do occur and their extent changes with margin
requirements.
The reason for margin trading having no short- or long-term impact on equilib-
rium prices lies in the institutional structure. In the short term, margin traders’
demand resp. supply is offset by brokers because their equilibrium strategies are
the same: Leveraged long margin traders borrow money from a broker. This in-
creases the margin traders’ short-term demand for the asset but decreases that of
the broker. These two effects offset each other. Short sellers increase short-term
asset supply but have to deposit their short sale proceeds with the broker. This
increases the broker’s funds and therefore demand. Again this entails no net effect
1Although the absence of short-selling in equilibrium is not explicitly stated in Gerber et al.
(2010), this follows from the formula for λit0 in their Theorem 1 and the fact that 0 < βi < 1.
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in the short-term. This mechanism is independent of the margin requirement.
Long-term effects on prices can therefore occur only if there is a mismatch
between the dividend yield of the market portfolio and the cost of trading on mar-
gin. This cost is due to brokers charging leveraged long traders for margin loans and
paying interest (the so-called rebate rate) to short-sellers for depositing their short
sale proceeds. This makes leveraging long more costly and short selling cheaper
compared to a scenario without interest rates. Equilibrium interest rates are set
such that brokers do not lose or gain money on average. Thus the level of asset
prices is independent of margin requirements. But the model implies an equilibrium
relationship between margin requirements and the interest rates on borrowing and
deposits.
Coen-Pirani (2005) also finds that asset prices are independent of margin require-
ments but that the interest rate of a risk-free asset is not. In his general equilibrium
model, forced sales by leveraged-long margin traders are offset by a lower interest
rate which stimulates purchases by more risk-averse investors. The interest rate is
higher the higher the (binding) leverage constraint. In our model economic agents
have standard CRRA utility rather than recursive preferences. Margin requirements
and interest rate for borrowing are negatively related if, for instance, brokers are
more patient than margin traders but both have identical risk aversion. In gen-
eral, the equilibrium relationship is not necessarily monotone and depends on risk
aversions and time preferences. Our model suggests that (a) in margin trading the
interplay between traders and brokers is important and (b) the equilibrium relation-
ship between margin requirements and the interest rates on borrowing and deposits
is intricate.
Asset prices in an evolutionary equilibrium correspond to the Kelly rule2, and
the market portfolio (which is held leveraged long or short by margin traders and
long by brokers) is the growth optimum portfolio. Our findings therefore provide
an economic equilibrium justification for the use of this portfolio as a benchmark
in the mathematical finance literature, e.g., Long (1990), Platen and Heath (2006),
MacLean, Thorp, and Ziemba (2010).
We apply the model to study the impact of margin requirements on market
stability. To this end, we use the equilibrium investment strategies as primitives
in a heterogenous agent-based model (Hommes, 2013, Hommes and Wagener, 2009)
corresponding to our setting. Stability is measured by how quickly asset prices
converge to fundamental values (Kelly). Asset prices can become dislocated by
noise traders as well as mistakes made by margin traders. Our simulation analysis
shows that the market corrects mispricing quickly, and the faster, the less stringent
are minimum margin requirements. The main mechanism driving this result is the
2Assets are priced according to expected discounted relative dividends. If assets were short-lived
and Arrow securities, then the price corresponds to the probability of receiving a payoff from that
asset. This is the original Kelly rule (Kelly, 1956) for betting at the racetrack.
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increase in the relative amount of assets under management of those traders that
are overweight in underpriced assets resp. underweight in overpriced assets. Since
leverage multiplies the gains and losses associated with wrongly balanced portfolios,
the speed of convergence to fundamental values is faster if margin requirements are
weaker. However, in the presence of mistakes, long-term volatility is the higher, the
more leverage is possible.
This result holds a policy lesson at odds with views expressed by Shiller (2000).
If margin trading is mostly used by ‘smart money’ investors (here, Kelly investors),
then weaker margin requirements stabilize markets by correcting major mispricings
quicker. Smaller mispricings, on the other hand, are more frequent since noise
traders can also leverage more. However, if noise traders dominate the market, then
too loose margin requirements lead to market failure and crashes. This situation
resembles the account of the 1929 crash as given by Fortune (2000, 2001): Excessive
use of debt to buy common stocks led to a boom in stock prices which came to a
sudden stop when brokers had to issue margin calls after a dip in the market.
2 The model
We consider an infinite horizon financial economy in which a finite number of
heterogeneous agents trade a finite number of long-lived risky assets.
2.1 Assets, agents and investments
Time is discrete, t = 0, 1, 2, .... In each period t a state of nature st from a finite
set {1, ..., S} is revealed. The history of states up to period t is st = (s0, s1, ..., st).
Assets. There are K long-lived assets (stocks) that are risky in terms of future
dividend payments and prices. There is one unit of each asset and assets are infinitely
divisible. The dividend of each asset k is determined by a non-negative (exogenous)
processDt,k(s
t). In any period at least one asset pays a strictly positive dividend, i.e.,∑
k∈K Dt,k(s
t) > 0. Dividends are paid in a perishable consumption good (whose
price is taken as the nume´raire) before trade takes place in a period. Ex-dividend
asset prices are denoted by pt = (pt,1, ..., pt,K)
′. These prices are endogenously
determined by short-term equilibrium of asset demand and supply. Wealth can only
be transferred across time using the risky assets.
Economic agents are of two types: There are N ≥ 1 broker-dealers and
M≥ 1 hedge fund managers (margin traders). Brokers have direct market access
but can take non-leveraged long positions only. Margin traders can take both short
and (leveraged) long positions but have to use the services of a broker who acts
as an intermediary between the traders and the market. M(i) is the set of margin
traders with relationship to broker i. We further assume that all margin traders
have a relationship to some broker, but each margin trader can only be a client of
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one broker.
Both brokers and margin traders are fund managers and provide wealth manage-
ment services to individual investors (which have no market access). These wealth
management services are subject to fees. An operation fee rate fht (s
t) ∈ (0, 1) de-
termines the percentage of wealth under management wht withheld by fund h ∈
N ∪M in period t:
φht = f
h
t w
h
t .
This operation fee is spent by the fund manager exclusively on buying the consump-
tion good. The residual amount,
iht = (1− fht )wht , (2.1)
is re-invested by the fund manager on behalf of its clients.
Fund managers maximize discounted expected utilities from consumption over
the infinite time horizon. The utility derived from a consumption process (ct(s
t)) ≥ 0
is given by
Uh(c) = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtuh(ct(s
t))
(E0 denotes expected value at time 0) with β = βh the fund manager h’s discount
factor, 0 < βh < 1, and the CRRA instantaneous utility uh with risk aversion ηh3
uh(c) =
 11−ηh c1−η
h
, ηh ∈ [0, 1) ∪ (1,∞),
ln(c), ηh = 1.
Investment strategies are described in terms of the proportion of wealth al-
located to a particular asset. For margin trader j these proportions are a stochastic
process µjt (s
t) = (µjt,1(s
t), ..., µjt,K(s
t)) with
0 ≤
∑
k∈K
|µjt,k| ≤ 1/M. (2.2)
M with 0 <M≤ 1 is the margin requirement. His portfolio positions are
xjt,k := i
j
t
µjt,k
pt,k
, (2.3)
where the value xjt,k is the number of asset k ( i
j
t is the total investment of the fund).
A trader is long in the asset when µjt,k ≥ 0 and short when µjt,k < 0.4
Broker i’s investment strategy is a stochastic process λit(s
t) = (λit,1(s
t), ..., λit,K(s
t)),
3Agents can differ in risk aversion and time preferences, but they have homogeneous and correct
beliefs beliefs about the states of nature (perfect foresight).
4Equation (2.2) says that the trader can choose any effective margin (the ratio of equity to the
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such that ∑
k∈K
λit,k = 1 and λ
i
t,k ≥ 0 for all k ∈ K. (2.4)
Brokers’ positions are all long and not leveraged.
Margin trading. Brokers establish margin traders’ portfolios. To form a posi-
tion in assets, a margin trader has to open a margin account with a broker and post
collateral. These positions are subject to a margin requirement M. The fraction
M is the amount of equity in terms of the percentage of the market value of the
position needed to be placed into the margin account prior to the trade. The margin
requirement M determines how much the margin trader can leverage his position:
For every $1 paid into the margin account, the trader can take a position (long or
short) worth up to $1/M.5
Buying on margin is the purchase of an asset by paying the initial margin and
borrowing the remaining amount from the broker. All assets bought on margin are
kept in the account as collateral for the loan. Fully paid and excess margin securities
(securities carried out as margin collateral with a value in excess of percent ξ of
customers debit balance) are segregated, while the remainder can be lent out by
the broker for a short sale.6 A loan interest rate rt, charged on debit balances in
the margin account, increases the debt of the margin trader to the broker. Asset
dividends accrue to the trader.
Selling an asset short means borrowing the asset from the broker and sub-
sequently selling it in the market. Similar to buying on margin, the trader has
to deposit an initial margin into the margin account. The short-sale proceeds are
not available to the margin trader and retained by the broker as collateral.7 While
the asset is on the loan, the broker pays the short seller interest for the use of collat-
eral at the rebate rate bt (which accounts for the stock loan fee).
8 The margin trader,
in turn, pays the broker all the dividends on the asset. When the borrowed asset is
returned to the broker, the short sale position is closed and the trader receives any
remaining fund in the margin account.
purchase price of securities) so that
mjt := 1/
∑
k∈K
|µjt,k| = ijt/
∑
k∈K
|xjt,kpt,k| ≥ M.
If mjt =M, then the margin trader j’s portfolio is leveraged to the maximum; if mjt = 1 the trader
is non-leveraged (assets are paid in full); and if mjt = ∞, the trader deposits funds with a broker
but forms no position in the assets.
5Respectively, the maximum leverage allowed on the margin account is 1/M.
6While all margin securities remain on the broker’s street name, the broker can lend assets for
a short sale only either from his own holdings or non-segragated margin securities of his clients.
7Whereas short sale proceeds cannot be used as initial margin for another asset position, together
with the corresponding initial margin they are credited to the margin account, thereby reducing
the margin loan.
8The rebate rate bt is earned on any positive balance on the margin account; negative values
of the rebate rate may occur. Depositing funds with a broker is effectively a risk-free investment
which earns the interest rate bt.
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The minimum margin requirementM (which is constant and identical for lever-
aged long and short positions) and the segregation ratio ξ are given exogenously
to the model. The loan interest rate rt and the rebate rate bt are endogenous to
the model: while all fund managers are price and interest rate-takers, market com-
petition among brokers results in the most favourable for traders margin loan and
rebate rates, determined by the “zero profit” condition (see Definition 3.1 and the
discussion after).
Serving margin traders affects brokers by changing the funds available for invest-
ment on his own account. Rather than iit (period t wealth under management net
operation fees), the broker has
iit +
∑
j∈M(i)
Bjt
with
Bjt :=−
∑
l∈K:xjt,l≥0
(1−mjt )xjt,lpt,l +
∑
l∈K:xjt,l<0
(1 +mjt )(−xjt,l)pt,l
=ijt ·
(
1−
∑
k∈K
µjt,k
)
(2.5)
the balance in the margin account of trader j (it is negative if the trader uses a
margin loan and positive otherwise). Providing margin loans reduces the broker’s
funds, while serving short sellers increases it through the collateral. Given the
clients’ positions, the portfolio xit of assets bought by broker i on his own account
is determined by his investment strategy λit:
xit,k := (i
i
t +
∑
j∈M(i)
Bjt )
λit,k
pt,k
. (2.6)
The segregation rule prescribes that
xit,k −∆xit,k +
∑
j∈M(i):xjt,k≥0
(xjt,k −∆xjt,k) ≥
∑
j∈M(i):xjt,k<0
(−xjt,k) (2.7)
for all i ∈ N and k ∈ K such that {j ∈M(i) : xjt,k < 0} 6= ∅, where
∆xit,k :=
[ ∑
j∈M(i)
∑
l∈K: xjt,l<0
(−xjt,l)pt,l
]λit,k
pt,k
is a part of broker i’s portfolio xit,k financed by short-selling proceeds and ∆x
j
t,k ∈
[0, xjt,k] are the segregated margin securities (see Appendix A for an explicit expres-
sion). The term ∆xit,k appears in equation (2.7) because the short-selling proceeds
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get available to the broker only after the borrowed securities are sold on the mar-
ket. In presence of short-sellers, condition (2.7) also ensures that each broker has a
positive total demand for every asset.
2.2 Dynamics of wealth and asset prices
Wealth dynamics. In the initial period t = 0 fund managers are endowed with
consumption good (investments of individual clients into the fund). Future wealth
under management is determined by the fund manager’s operation fee and gains
and losses from his investment strategy (margin traders and broker-dealers) and/or
from brokerage services (broker-dealers).
A margin trader j with asset portfolio xjt and margin account balance B
j
t in
period t will have next period wealth:
wjt+1 =
∑
k∈K
xjt,k(Dt+1,k + pt+1,k) + (1 + rt) ·min(Bjt , 0) + (1 + bt) ·max(Bjt , 0), (2.8)
while a broker i’s wealth evolves as:
wit+1 =
∑
k∈K
xit,k(Dt+1,k +pt+1,k)−
∑
j∈M(i)
[
(1+rt) ·min(Bjt , 0)+(1+ bt) ·max(Bjt , 0)
]
,
(2.9)
given his portfolio xit and margin account balances B
j
t of clients j ∈ M(i). A
numerical example that illustrates these equations is given in Exhibit 2.1.
Inserting the expressions (2.3), (2.5) and (2.6) for asset portfolios and margin
account holdings into the above two equations, we obtain the wealth dynamics9
(given market prices, dividends and interest rates) of a margin trader as
wjt+1 = (1− f jt )wjt ·RMt+1(µjt ), (2.10)
9For the returns on the broker’s and margin trader’s investment strategies we have:
RBt+1(λ
i
t) :=
∑
k∈K
λit,k
Dt+1,k + pt+1,k
pt,k
,
RMt+1(µ
j
t) := R
B
t+1(µ
j
t) + (1 + rt) ·min(1− µjt , 0) + (1 + bt) ·max
(
1− µjt , 0
)
with µjt =
∑
k∈K µ
j
t,k. The term
Bit :=
∑
j∈M(i)
Bjt
is an inflow (outflow) of funds into the broker i’s investment strategy from providing brokerage
services in period t, while
Iit :=
∑
j∈M(i)
(1− f jt )wjt
[
(1 + rt) ·max
(
µjt − 1, 0
)
+ (1 + bt) ·min
(
µjt − 1, 0
)]
corresponds to the subsequent repayment of margin loans and return of collateral at t+ 1.
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and that of a broker as
wit+1 = [(1− f it )wit +Bit] ·RBt+1(λit) + Iit . (2.11)
Market clearing. Asset market equilibrium requires asset demand to be equal
to supply. The total demand for asset k from broker i in period t is
xit,k +
∑
j∈M(i)
xjt,k (2.12)
with xit,k assets bought on his own account, x
j
t,k ≥ 0 margin securities bought on
behalf of a margin trader j and −xjt,k ≥ 0 shorted assets, which are sold back on the
market.
Since brokers are the only market participants who actually hold and trade assets
and assets are in exogenous unit supply, the market clearing condition in period t is
given by: ∑
j∈M
xjt,k +
∑
i∈N
xit,k = 1, k ∈ K. (2.13)
Asset price dynamics. The market clearing condition (2.13) determines the
market clearing asset prices. By inserting expressions (2.3) and (2.6) for a margin
trader’s and broker’s portfolios and rearranging the terms, one gets:
pt,k =
∑
j∈M
ijtµ
j
t,k +
∑
i∈N
(
iit +
∑
j∈M(i)
ijt
(
1−
∑
l∈K
µjt,l
))
λit,k. (2.14)
If there are no margin traders, prices are given by pt,k =
∑
i∈N i
i
tλ
i
t,k, as in the
standard model.10 In this model, margin trading impacts asset prices. To quantify
the impact of margin traders on asset prices, we consider a small transfer of wealth
from a broker to a margin trader. This exercise in comparative statics yields insights
on the impact of margin trading.
Assume that at date t a fraction ∆wi of broker i’s investment is given to a new
margin trader j′, who is the broker’s client. Then the price of asset k changes by
∆pt,k = ∆w
iµj
′
t,k + ∆w
i
(
−
∑
l∈K
µj
′
t,l
)
λit,k.
If µj
′
t,k = 1/m
j′ , i.e., the margin trader’s portfolio consists only of a leveraged long
position in asset k, then the asset price increases by
∆pt,k = ∆w
i
1− λit,k
mj′
≥ 0.
10In the absence of margin traders, i.e., if wj0 = 0 for j ∈M , the asset price and wealth dynamics
reduces to the one considered in Evstigneev et al. (2006, 2008).
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Exhibit 2.1: Margin account of a trader and assets and liabilities of a broker.
Account positions
stock qty price value
ABC 100 $ 50 $ 5, 000
XYZ −50 $ 10 $ − 500
Market value $ 4, 500
Account balance $ − 1, 500
Equity $ 3, 000
a) Margin account of trader 1 at t.
Account positions
stock qty price value
ABC 100 $ 52 $ 5, 200
XYZ −50 $ 11 $ − 550
Market value $ 4, 650
Account balance $ − 1, 455
Equity $ 3, 195
b) Margin account of trader 1 at t+ 1.
Account positions
ABC −60 $ 50 $ − 3, 000
XYZ 100 $ 10 $ 1, 000
Market value $ − 2, 000
Account balance $ 6, 000
Equity $ 4, 000
c) Margin account of trader 2 at t.
Account positions
ABC −60 $ 52 $ − 3, 120
XYZ 100 $ 11 $ 1, 100
Market value $ − 2, 020
Account balance $ 6, 020
Equity $ 4, 000
d) Margin account of trader 2 at t+ 1.
Assets
Receivables $ 1, 500
Stocks
ABC 545 $ 50 $ 27, 250
XYZ 2725 $ 10 $ 27, 250
Total assets $ 56, 000
Liabilities
Payables $ 6, 000
Total liabilities $ 6, 000
Equity $ 50, 000
e) Broker’s assets and liabilities at t.
Assets
Receivables $ 1, 500
Interest $ 30
Stocks
ABC 545 $ 52 $ 28, 340
XYZ 2725 $ 11 $ 29, 975
Dividends $ 1, 907.5
Total assets $ 61, 752.5
Liabilities
Payables $ 6, 000
Interest $ 30
Total liabilities $ 6, 030
Equity $ 55, 722.5
f) Broker’s assets and liabilities at t+ 1.
NOTES: Margin accounts of trader 1, trader 2 and assets and liabilities of their broker in
periods t and t+ 1. Dividends Dt+1,ABC = $ 1 and Dt+1,XY Z = $ 0.5 per unit of stock, loan
interest rate rt = 2%, rebate rate bt = 0.5%, segregation ratio ξ = 140%.
a) Margin trader 1 invests i1t = $ 3, 000 to buy 100 ABC and sell short 50 XYZ (strategy
µ1t = (5/3,−0.5/3), margin equity m1t = 54.55%). 58 excess margin securities ABC segregated, 42
ABC lent out to trader 2 for a short sale. Shorted XY Z borrowed from the broker.
b) Margin loan interest of $ 30 charged and $ 100 ($ 25) dividends from ABC (XYZ) credited
(debited) to trader 1’s margin account.
c) Margin trader 2 invests i2t = $ 4, 000 to buy 100 XYZ and sell short 60 ABC (strategy
µ2t = (−0.75, 0.25), margin equity m2t = 100%). 100 fully paid margin securities XYZ segregated.
Shorted ABC borrowed from trader 1 (58 stocks) and broker (2 stocks).
d) Interest of $ 30 accrued and $ 50 ($ 60) dividends from XYZ (ABC) credited (debited) to
trader 2’s margin account.
e) Broker issues margin loan of $ 1, 500 to finance position of trader 1 and receives $ 6, 000 from
trader 2 as collateral. Investment funds $ 56, 000 (portion iit = $ 50, 000 of own equity) spent to
buy 545 ABC and 2725 XYZ (strategy λt = (0.5, 0.5)). 2 ABC and 50 XYZ lent out to traders 1
and 2 for a short sale.
f) Trader 1 repays broker margin loan $ 1, 500 and pays margin loan interest of $ 30. Broker
returns trader 2 collateral ($ 6, 000) with accrued interest ($ 30). Stocks ABC and XYZ deliver
dividends of $ 545 and $ 1, 362.5 respectively.
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If, conversely, the margin trader sells the asset k short, i.e., µj
′
t,k = −1/mj
′
, then
∆pt,k = ∆w
i
λit,k − 1
mj′
≤ 0,
i.e., his trade has a negative effect on the asset k’s price.
The impact of margin traders on asset prices is realized through the change in
the effective asset supply: the left-most term in (2.13) is the adjustment of effective
supply of asset k in response to margin trading. Therefore, an increase in leveraged
long positions has the same effect as a reduction in supply: it increases the price.
Short selling has the opposite effect increasing the supply and, thus, reducing the
asset price.
2.3 Interest rates and inflation
Proposition 2.1 below shows that aggregate consumption in any given period
equals aggregate dividends paid by risky assets in this period. This implies that if
$1 has a buying power (in terms of consumption good) of 1/Dt in period t, it would
have a buying power of 1/Dt+1 in the next period t+ 1 with
Dt :=
∑
k∈K
Dt,k.
That means, purchasing power falls at the growth rate of aggregate dividends:
gDt+1 := Dt+1/Dt.
Proposition 2.1 In every period t ≥ 0 the following holds:∑
h∈N∪M
fht w
h
t = Dt. (2.15)
Proof of Proposition 2.1: Summing up equations (2.8) and (2.9) over j ∈M and
i ∈ N gives
wt+1 =
∑
k∈K
∑
h∈M∪M
xht,k(Dt+1,k + pt+1,k) = Dt+1 + pt+1
with wt+1 :=
∑
h∈N∪M w
h
t+1 and pt+1 :=
∑
k∈K pt+1,k, where the last equality fol-
lows from the market clearing condition (2.13). Further, summing equations (2.14)
over k ∈ K and using that ∑k∈K λit,k = 1, we obtain
pt =
∑
h∈N∪M
iht =
∑
h∈N∪M
(1− fht )wht . (2.16)
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Inserting this term into the previous equality completes the proof.11 
To account for inflation in the cost of borrowing and lending, the following
assumption on the interest rates is imposed throughout the remainder of the paper.
Assumption 2.1 There are constants r, b > −1 such that
1 + rt(s
t+1)
gDt+1(s
t+1)
= 1 + r,
1 + bt(s
t+1)
gDt+1(s
t+1)
= 1 + b
for all t ≥ 0, st+1.
The interest rates set by brokers on margin loans and deposits are adjusted to
inflation when Assumption 2.1 holds. In real markets these rates are referred to as
(short) rebate and margin rate and are typically quoted as (positive or negative)
percentage points relative to some base rate such as the Fed Funds rate. In the
current model we consider these rates as floating, i.e., when taking a margin loan
the exact amount of interest to be paid is not known and benchmarked to the market.
Assumption 2.1 implies that the real interest rates (nominal interest rates accounted
for inflation) are constant.
3 Evolutionary equilibrium
For given asset prices and interest rates, fund managers choose their investment
strategies and operation fees so as to maximize their discounted expected utility
from consumption
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct(s
t)). (3.1)
[M] Margin trader j ∈M maximizes (3.1) with β = βj and u = uj by choosing
(f j , µj) subject to
0 ≤
∑
k∈K
|µjt,k| ≤ 1/M (3.2)
and
ct = f
j
t w
j
t , 0 < f
j
t (s
t) < 1 (3.3)
with
wjt+1 = (1− f jt )wjt ·RMt+1(µjt ).
[B] Broker i ∈ N maximizes (3.1) with β = βi and u = ui by choosing (f i, λi)
subject to ∑
k∈K
λit,k = 1 and λ
i
t,k ≥ 0 for all k ∈ K
11 In period t = 0 the equality holds by virtue of choice of dividends D0. Without loss of generality
dividendsD0 can be set arbitrarily because the paymentsD0,· enter neither into the wealth dynamics
of margin traders (2.8) and brokers (2.9) nor into the market clearing prices (2.14).
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and (3.3) with
wit+1 = [(1− f it )wit +Bit] ·RBt+1(λit) + Iit .
Denote by ght the growth rate of wealth under management of fund h in period t:
ght := w
h
t /w
h
t−1.
The growth rate ght is effectively the net return, which an individual investor receives
at date t per $1 invested in fund h in period t− 1.
Similar to the Miller and Modigliani (1961)’s “fundamental principle of valu-
ation” approach (under perfect certainty), we consider equilibria with balanced
growth rates, i.e., when net returns of all funds are identical. Otherwise, clients of
low net return funds would increase their welfare by withdrawing from these funds
and investing into ones that offer higher rates of net return. This process would
tend to either drive the low net return investment funds out of the market (i.e.,
discontinue their line of business because of lack of wealth under management) or
force them to lower the operation fee rates to compensate for low returns generated
by their investment strategies. This motivates the following definition:
Definition 3.1 A collection of operation fee rates fht (s
t), h ∈ N ∪M , investment
strategies λit(s
t), i ∈ N , and µjt (st), j ∈M , together with interest rates rt and bt, is
an evolutionary equilibrium, if
(i) the market clearing prices given by (2.14) are strictly positive, brokers have
positive total asset demand (2.12) and the segregation rule (2.7) is satisfied;
(ii) given prices and interest rates, each margin trader’s decision (f j , µj) solves
the optimization problem [M];
(iii) given prices, interest rates and clients’ decisions, each broker’s decision (f i, λi)
solves the optimization problem [B];
(iv) all economic agents’ growth rates of wealth, ght , h ∈ N ∪M , are identical.
The equilibrium is in a steady state if operation fee rates and investment strategies
are constant.
The property of constant operation fee rates and investment strategies in a steady
state means that all investment funds charge a certain (percentage) wealth man-
agement fee and hold certain portfolio weights for a long period. If asset prices
fluctuate, the fund manager has to adjust the number of shares in the portfolio as
to keep the proportions constant. The fee that an individual investor has to pay to
his fund manager is proportional to the market value of the purchased portfolio and
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therefore depends on the overall performance of the fund’s investment strategy. In
fact, many institutional investors follow these rules, among other things, in order to
increase credibility and reduce monitoring costs.
The assumption of constant operation fee rates and investment strategies is
neither that restrictive from the general equilibrium point of view as it might seem.
Hakansson (1966, 1970), for instance, considers a related infinite horizon portfolio
optimization problem with CRRA utilities, borrowing/lending and non-capital in-
come stream but without margin trading. He finds that the optimal consumption
(an equivalent of operation fees in the current model) is linear in wealth and the
present value of non-capital income stream, while the optimal investment strategies
depend on asset returns, being constant if these returns are stationary. Accordingly,
as the agents’ optimization problems in the present model are, to a certain degree,
generalizations of the Hakansson’s decision problem, one would expect its equilibria
to inherit the property of constant optimal strategies and operation fees rates.12
3.1 Kelly in prices and strategies
Let us assume that the margin trader is either long only or short only in all
of the assets, i.e., M = ML ∪MS with ML ∩MS = ∅ such that µjt,k ≥ 0 for all
j ∈ ML and µjt,k < 0 for all j ∈ MS . This assumption simplifies the presentation
by avoiding to deal with corner solutions in the first-order conditions which would
require distinguishing many different cases. We take a closer look at whether a
trader prefers to leverage or to sell short in Section 3.2.1.
We further assume that all margin traders make full use of their margin. Thus,
influence of each individual trader’s strategy on asset prices would be most pro-
nounced as it is amplified by high leverage used: any change in the level of margin
requirements would be directly reflected in equilibrium prices, realized through in-
vestment strategies of margin traders (see the pricing equation (2.14)). The more
general case when agents’ effective margin can be lower than the maximum is con-
sidered in the subsequent Section 5.
The following assumption on asset dividends is imposed throughout the re-
mainder of the paper.
Assumption 3.1 (i) There are no redundant assets, i.e., the S × K dimensional
matrix Dt,·(st−1, ·) has rank K;
(ii) Relative dividend payments have constant expected values:
Etdt+1,k = Et
Dt+1,k
Dt+1
= dk
with dk > 0 constant, k ∈ K;
12Brokerage service and margin trading are effectively borrowing, lending (both funds and stocks)
and receiving (possibly negative) non capital income stream in every period.
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(iii) The growth rate of aggregate dividends gDt is weakly stationary
13 and bounded,
i.e.,
gDt (s
t) ≤ G for each t > 0, st
with a constant G < minh∈N∪M : ηh<1 β1/(η−1) <∞;
(iv) (gDt )
1−ηh and dt are uncorrelated for every h ∈ N ∪M , t > 0.
In the case of two risky assets, a dividends process satisfying Assumption 3.1
may be given as follows. Let ξt ∈ (0, 1) be an i.i.d. process and 0 < gDt ≤ G another
process independent of ξt. Then define the aggregate dividends by Dt = Dt−1 · gDt
and the dividend of asset 1 as Dt,1 = ξt ·Dt (asset 2 pays dividend Dt,2 = Dt−Dt,1).
The common factor gDt can be interpreted as a shock to the aggregate production,
whereas proportions ξt and 1−ξt as sensitivities of different stocks (economic sectors)
to this shock.
Let rht denote the market share of agent h in period t by
rht := w
h
t /wt
with wt =
∑
h∈N∪M w
h
t the aggregate wealth at t. As a direct implication of balanced
growth, in any evolutionary equilibria these market shares are constant, i.e., rht ≡ rh0 .
Proposition 3.1 In any steady state evolutionary equilibrium the following holds:
1. Asset prices pt are proportional to the Kelly rule, i.e., for all k ∈ K
pt,k
pt
= Etdt+1,k; (3.4)
2. The total market capitalization pt is given by
pt = Dt · βB/(1− βB) (3.5)
with a constant βB ∈ (0, 1) such that βB = βi · Et(gDt+1)1−η
i
for all i ∈ N ;
3. Each broker with price impact, i.e., if
(1− f i)ri0 +
∑
j∈M(i)
(1− f j)rj0
[
1−
∑
l∈K
µjl
] 6= 0, (3.6)
invests according to the Kelly rule, i.e.,
λi = Etdt+1,
otherwise his strategy is arbitrary;
13The assumption of stationarity can be replaced by a weaker condition of constant conditional
expectations Et(gDt+1)1−η
h
for each h ∈ N ∪M .
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4. Each margin trader either invests according to the Kelly rule or shorts it, i.e.,
µj =
Etdt+1
M or µ
j = −Etdt+1M .
Proof of Proposition 3.1: Follows from Theorem 3.1. 
Proposition 3.1 states that the relative market capitalization is proportional to
the Kelly rule and is independent of the level of margin requirements. Margin
traders follow the Kelly rule either by leveraging it long or shorting it. The broker
also follows the Kelly (if his decision has price impact) and holds it non-leveraged
long.14
Kelly prices are the only asset prices that can happen in a steady state evol-
utionary equilibrium. To understand this phenomenon, let us first consider the
implications of the wealth of every agent growing at the same rate. We have the
following result.
Proposition 3.2 In any steady state evolutionary equilibrium:
ght = g
D
t and pt,k/pt−1,k = g
D
t
for all h ∈ N ∪M , k ∈ K and t > 0.
Proof of Proposition 3.2: For all h ∈ N ∪M , ght = gt and fht = fh. There-
fore (2.15) implies
Dt =
∑
h∈N∪M
fhwht =
∑
h∈N∪M
fh(gtw
h
t−1) = gtDt−1,
which proves the first equality. Since λit and µ
j
t are constants, the market clearing
condition (2.14), similarly, gives pt,k = gtpt−1,k, completing the proof. 
The requirement of balanced growth rates entails, on the one hand, that the
growth rate of the aggregate dividends is for each fund manager a benchmark net
return to be delivered to clients. On the other hand, balanced growth puts some
structure on the asset prices: the relative market capitalization is constant, whereas
the total market capitalization increases at the rate of the aggregate dividends (which
is the result of Proposition 3.2). For such asset prices, the only uncertainty an
investor faces originates from unknown future dividend payments. Given that there
are no redundant assets, the market portfolio is the unique portfolio that is riskless
relative to the aggregate dividends, hence it is chosen by each fund manager. The
Kelly prices then turn out to be the only asset prices such that the market portfolio
solves both the optimization problem [M] of a margin trader and [B] of a broker.
14A broker has no price impact if the term in round brackets in pricing equation (2.14) is zero.
This is the case for t = 0 when (3.6) is satisfied. In a steady state evolutionary equilibrium it also
holds for subsequent t > 0 as market shares, fees and strategies are constant.
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The argument above holds also for an evolutionary equilibrium with choice of
leverage. This means that the result (3.4) on equilibrium Kelly pricing holds inde-
pendently of whether or not the margin is used to the full.
That relative market capitalization is independent of margin requirements might
seem unexpected at first sight. But the result immediately follows from the market
clearing condition (2.14). While stricter margin requirements (higherM) reduce the
asset demand of margin traders by limiting their access to margin loans, they also
increase the asset demand from brokers. Namely, when serving less margin loans,
brokers are left with more funds for their own active investment. These two effects
cancel each other in equilibrium. To prove this observation formally, it suffices to
insert λik = Etdt+1,k and µ
j
k = Etdt+1,k/M into (2.14) and check that the terms
containing M disappear.
Another interesting feature of a steady state evolutionary equilibrium is its ability
to accommodate any number of long as well as short margin traders without changes
to market clearing asset prices. This follows from the fact that a broker i’s asset
demand xit+
∑
j∈M(i) x
j
t does not depend on his clients’ j ∈M(i) choices, as long as
the clients all follow the same investment strategy as the broker (but long, leveraged-
long or short). Indeed, assume that for every i ∈ N and every j ∈M(i), µj = δj λiM
with δj = 1 or δj = −1. Then, using (2.3) and (2.6), we find that
xit,k +
∑
j∈M(i)
xjt,k =
(
iit +
∑
j∈M(i)
ijt
)
λik
pt,k
.
The market clearing condition (2.13),
∑
i∈N x
i
t,k +
∑
j∈M x
j
t,k = 1, implies that the
market clearing asset prices
pt,k =
∑
i∈N
(
iit +
∑
j∈M(i)
ijt
)
λik
are independent of the individual choices δj = ±1 of margin traders.
3.2 Equilibrium fees and interest rates
While Proposition 3.1 provides information on asset prices and portfolio choice of
agents in a steady state evolutionary equilibrium, the next Theorem 3.1 completes
the characterization of these equilibria and determines the optimal operation fee
rates and equilibrium interest rates.
Theorem 3.1 The set of steady state evolutionary equilibria is uniquely character-
ized by the following conditions:
1. Investment strategies are as in Proposition 3.1;
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2. Operation fee rates of margin traders are given by
f j = 1− βj · Et(gDt+1)1−η
j
(3.7)
and there are constants fS , fL ∈ (0, 1) such that
fL = f j for all leveraged long traders j ∈ML, (3.8)
fS = f j for all short sellers j ∈MS ;
3. Operation fee rates of brokers are given by
f i = (1− βB) + 1
ri0
∑
j∈M(i)
rj0(1− βB − f j) (3.9)
with βB defined in Proposition 3.1;
4. If ML 6= ∅, then
1 + r =
1
1−M
1
βB
− M
1−M
1
1− fL (3.10)
(otherwise r is arbitrary) and if MS 6= ∅, then
1 + b =
1
1 +M
1
βB
+
M
1 +M
1
1− fS (3.11)
(otherwise b is arbitrary);
5. For all i ∈ N , if M(i) ∩MS 6= ∅, then
ri0 ≥
(
1− fL
MβB ·max[1− (1−M)ξ, 0]− 1
)
ri,L0 +
(
1− fS
MβB − 1
)
ri,S0 (3.12)
with ri,L0 =
∑
j∈M(i)∩ML r
j
0 and r
i,S
0 =
∑
j∈M(i)∩MS r
j
0.
Proof of Theorem 3.1: See Appendix B. 
Theorem 3.1 ascertains that equilibrium operation fee rates of both margin
traders and brokers do not depend on the level of margin requirementsM. This find-
ing implies that also the aggregate market capitalization is independent of margin
requirements. Any change in margin requirements is absorbed by the equilibrium
interest rates.
Wealth management fee rates of margin traders are determined by their discount
factors, risk aversions and the growth rate of the aggregate dividends. They are
identical within the class of leverage long margin traders (ML) as well as across
short sellers (MS). An operation fee rate of a broker is determined by the balanced
growth rates condition and depends on the market shares and fees of traders who
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have an account with this broker. Equation (3.9) implies that higher fee rates of
margin traders are paired with lower operation fees of their brokers. This is a
consequence of margin traders depositing their wealth under management net fees
with brokers: if a trader increased an operation fee rate, he would deposit less funds
with a broker. Hence the broker, who is left with less money for active investment
given the same wealth under management (from his individual investors), would be
forced to decrease his operation fee in order to compensate for the lost proceeds and
maintain the net return at the promised rate gDt .
That the aggregate market capitalization is independent of margin requirements
can already be conjectured from result (3.5) of Proposition 3.1. Though, since the
dividends D0 are levered so that equality (2.15) holds, i.e.,
∑
h∈N∪M f
hwh0 = D0,
an additional step to come to this conclusion is needed. Substituting an operation
fee rate f i of a broker by its explicit expression (3.9) in (2.15), we obtain that
D0 = (1−βB)w0 with w0 the aggregate initial endowments. Consequently, the total
market capitalization,
pt = Dt · βB/(1− βB) = D0 · gD1 · . . . · gDt · βB/(1− βB) = w0 · gD1 · . . . · gDt · βB,
indeed is not affected by the exogenous margin requirements. It is remarkable that
the prices of risky assets depend on time and risk preferences of brokers only. They
are the same as in the case without margin trading. In fact, the equilibrium asset
prices can be obtained solely from the optimization problem [B] of a broker, who
invests into the market portfolio.15
Whereas margin trading has no impact on the equilibrium prices of risky assets, it
affects the equilibrium interest rates. These rates are determined by the “zero profit
condition” (balanced growth rates) and set competitively so that neither brokers nor
margin traders can persistently deliver higher net returns to their individual clients.
Leverage gives margin traders an opportunity to amplify profits from a successful
investment strategy. This advantage of traders over brokers has to be compensated
by a sufficiently high interest rate on margin loans set in the market. Whether the
equilibrium margin rate needs to increase or decrease in response to a higher margin
requirement M is a priori unclear. Stricter margin requirements, on the one hand,
decrease potential profits of traders by limiting the allowed leverage, and, on the
other hand, reduce the total cost of their investment, as less funds are borrowed
at (unchanged) margin rate. At the same time, the corresponding drop in margin
loans affects brokers, who collect less interest on margin loans, but are left with
more funds for their own investment.
To assess analytically the effect of the level of margin requirements on the equi-
15The first order condition (B.15) on the broker’s investment strategy restricts the relative asset
prices to be the Kelly prices, and the first order condition (B.14) on his operation fee rate determines
the dividend yield of the market portfolio as a function of aggregate dividends growth rate and the
broker’s time and risk preferences.
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librium margin rate r, we calculate the partial derivative
∂r
∂M =
1/βB − 1/(1− fL)
(1−M)2 .
Accordingly, since βB = βi ·Et(gDt+1)1−η
i
for all i ∈ N and 1−fL = βj ·Et(gDt+1)1−η
j
for each j ∈ ML, the sign of ∂r∂M is determined by the time and risk preferences
of brokers and leveraged long margin traders. For instance, if agents have identical
risk attitude, i.e., ηi = ηj for all i ∈ N and j ∈ML, we have ∂r∂M > 0 if and only if
βj > βi, i.e., if traders are more patient than brokers. Analogously, if agents have
identical time-preferences (βi = βj for all i ∈ N and j ∈ M) and markets grow
(gDt ≥ 1), then stricter margin requirements imply higher borrowing costs ( ∂r∂M > 0)
if and only if brokers are less risk-averse than margin traders, i.e., ηi < ηj .
Selling short, in turn, gives margin traders an opportunity to benefit from market
depreciations, whereas brokers would consistently lose on their long-only investments
if prices fall. This disadvantage of brokers is compensated in equilibrium by suffi-
ciently high fees on asset loans, or equivalently, a sufficiently low rebate rate b (as
it incorporates the stock loan fee).
Whether the equilibrium rebate rate increases in response to higher margin re-
quirements, as in the case of the margin rate, is unclear. Higher margin requirements
reduce short selling volume. This limits potential profits of traders in bear markets,
but at the same time lowers their costs. Simultaneously, the decline of short selling
volume affects negatively brokers: they collect less stock loan fees and are left with
depreciating securities in hands. Analogously to the case with the margin rate, the
ultimate effect of margin requirements on the equilibrium rebate rate can be ex-
amined by checking the sign of the partial derivative ∂b∂M , which is determined by
the discount factors and risk aversions of brokers and margin traders that sell short.
Explicit expressions (3.10) and (3.11) for the equilibrium interest rates reveal
their dependence on agents’ time and risk preferences. These characteristics have
an effect on the equilibrium interest rates through their implicit impact on demand
and supply of margin and asset loans. For instance, if brokers became more patient
and/or less risk averse, then more margin loans and more asset loans would get
available in the market. Consequently, both margin rate r and rebate rate b would
decrease. Analogously, if, e.g., margin traders became more patient and/or less risk-
averse, they would decrease there operation fees as to have more funds for active
investments and/or would take riskier positions. The latter would raise the demand
both for margin loans and deposits (recall that short sale proceeds are deposited on
a margin account as collateral for the asset loan), resulting in an increased cost of
borrowing r and fallen rebate rate b.
Expressions (3.10) and (3.11) also imply that the equilibrium interest are co-
moving with the dividend yield of the market portfolio: when interest rates raise,
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the dividend yield does too, and vice versa. This follows immediately from (3.10)
and (3.11) since 1
βB
= Dp + 1 by equality (3.5).
3.2.1 Choice of business line: Whether to be a broker or a margin trader
Until now we studied evolutionary equilibria in a framework where each fund
manager adheres to a certain business model, i.e., brokerage or margin trading, and
makes his/her investment decisions conditional on this choice. We now examine the
determinants of the choice whether to be a broker or a margin trader as well as
whether to leverage or sell short for a margin trader.
Fund managers’ incentives to operate in the market originate from maximizing
expected utilities from consumption. In an evolutionary equilibrium the optimal
consumption of an agent of any given type (a broker N , a leveraged long trader ML
or a short-seller MS) is determined by the operation fee rate fh with
cht = f
h · wht = fh · gD1 · . . . · gDt · wh0 ,
where we used that wht /w
h
t−1 = Dt/Dt−1 (Proposition 3.2). Accordingly, a fund
manager who could choose between various business models would prefer the one
with the highest operation fee rate. Consequently, for an evolutionary equilibrium to
accommodate both leveraged long traders and short sellers, the condition fL = fS
has to hold. If, additionally, a broker had an option to discontinue his line of business
and become a margin trader with another broker, brokers and margin traders would
coexist only if fL = fS = f i for all i ∈ N . Summing (3.9) over i ∈ N and rearranging
the terms, this condition gives fL = fS = f i = βB. Since βB =
(
1 + Dt/pt
)−1
,
we observe that operation fees in this case are inverse proportional to the dividend
yield of the market portfolio. The result is intuitive. Indeed, the higher the dividend
yield, the more profitable the investment in risky assets, hence lower operation fees
may be charged to maintain the same level of consumption.
The condition fL = fS on coexistence of leveraged long margin traders and
short sellers may be rewritten in terms of equilibrium interest rates. From (3.10)
and (3.11) it follows that fL = fS if and only if
b · (1 +M) + r · (1−M) = 2 · D
p
.
Thus, when the brokerage market is perfectly competitive, i.e., r = b = Dtpt
, both
leveraged long margin traders and short sellers are present. Otherwise, a higher
margin rate rε = Dtpt
+ εr > Dtpt
should be paired with the lower rebate rate bε =
Dt
pt
− εb < Dtpt with ε
b = 1−M1+Mε
r. The latter means that when borrowing funds
gets more costly for a trader, depositing funds with a broker should deliver less
interest too. If, however, the relation b = bε is violated, one of the trader types
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disappears. When b < bε, short sellers do not receive sufficient interest on deposited
short sale proceeds, hence brokers are forced to lower the operation fees as to deliver
the benchmarked net return to the clients. Analogously, when b > bε and fL = fS ,
selling short gives higher net returns than leveraging long. This means that short
sellers can increase their operation fees without losing individual investors, hence
consume more than rival leveraged long traders.
Margin rates exceed the rebate rates in real markets. This also holds in the
present model. For example, when fL = fS , we have r > b if and only if βj ·
Et(gDt+1)1−η
j
> βi · Et(gDt+1)1−η
i
for every j ∈M and i ∈ N .
3.2.2 Existence of evolutionary equilibria
Theorem 3.1, which characterizes all evolutionary equilibria, also implies that
exogenous parameters of the economy (e.g., discount factors, risk aversions, initial
endowments) must satisfy certain conditions for an evolutionary equilibrium to exist.
Firstly, equality (3.8) implies that the discount factors and risk aversions of
margin traders j, j′ who are of the same type (ML or MS) may differ, although these
two characteristics are related by the condition βj ·Et(gDt+1)1−η
j
= βj
′ ·Et(gDt+1)1−η
j′
.
For instance, in a bull market (gDt > 1) this implies that β
j > βj
′
if and only
if ηj > ηj
′
. Comparing two margin traders of the same type, we find that more
patient traders are also more risk averse. The result (3.5) gives the similar condition
βi · Et(gDt+1)1−η
i
= βi
′ · Et(gDt+1)1−η
i′
on the discount factors and risk aversions of
two brokers i, i′ ∈ N .
Secondly, equation (3.9), in conjunction with inequality (3.12), restricts the set
of feasible initial endowments in an evolutionary equilibrium. Applying f i ∈ (0, 1)
to (3.9) leads to:
ri0 ≥ max
( 1
βB
∑
j∈M(i)
rj(1− βB − f j),− 1
1− βB
∑
j∈M(i)
rj(1− βB − f j)),
giving a lower bound on the size of a broker relative to his clients. Inequality (3.12),
which arises from the segregation rule (2.7), in turn, limits market shares of long
margin traders and short sellers relative to their broker. Specifically, it implies that
given a stricter margin requirement M, a broker with a specified market share ri0
would be in the position to serve more traders of any type. This comes from the fact
that stricter margin requirements, on the one hand, reduce the demand for money
and asset loans from traders, and on the other hand, (by means of higher initial
margins) provide the broker with more funds both for issuing margin loans and for
own active investment (consequently, increasing supply of asset loans). Similarly, a
higher segregation ratio ξ would allow the broker to serve more short-sellers given a
fixed market share of leveraged long traders: an increase in ξ means that less margin
securities need to be segregated, therefore more assets (from leveraged long margin
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traders) become available for short sales.
Thirdly, equality (3.7) adds further conditions to Assumption 3.1 on asset di-
vidends. By definition f j ∈ (0, 1), therefore (3.7) implies that the growth rate of
the aggregate dividends should be such that βj · Et(gDt+1)1−η
j
< 1 for all j ∈ M .
For margin traders with ηj ≤ 1 this holds by Assumption 3.1 (iii). For traders
with ηj > 1 it would be true, if, e.g., the process gDt satisfied condition
max
j∈M : ηj>1
β1/(η
j−1) < G ≤ gDt (st) for each t > 0, st.
Finally, it is worth discussing the significance of Assumption 3.1 itself. This
technical assumption, on the one hand, accounts for the existence of an evolution-
ary equilibrium, and, on the other hand, allows to construct it in an explicit form. In
particular, time-independence of conditional relative dividends and stationarity of
the growth rate of the aggregate dividends are necessary for the existence, whereas
boundedness of the latter guarantees that the agents’ utilities are well defined. In
principle, all of these assumptions could be relaxed, and another competitive equi-
librium would potentially still exist. In this general case, however, one cannot expect
to find a solution in closed form. Then numerical techniques need to be employed.
The numerical solution can be difficult because of the broker’s optimization prob-
lem. His decisions depend on unknown and uncertain orders from the margin traders
with whom he has a relationship. Conversely, if Assumption 3.1 is satisfied, then
an evolutionary equilibrium that admits an explicit representation can be found
analytically.
Example. The following example is an illustration of an evolutionary equilib-
rium. It will be further used in the simulation study on stability of evolutionary
equilibria in Section 4.
Three fund managers, a broker B, a leveraged long margin trader L and a short
seller S, operate in the market. The three agents have logarithmic preferences, i.e.,
ηB = ηL = ηS = 1, and identical discount factors βB = βL = βS = 99.99% daily
(respectively, 98% annually). The leveraged long trader and the short seller have
margin accounts with the broker. The margin requirement and the segregation ratio
are given by M = 50% and ξ = 140% respectively.16 The agents share an initial
endowment of $1m in proportions 8 : 1 : 1 (wB0 = $800, 000, w
L
0 = w
S
0 = $100, 000).
Two assets (K = 2) are traded daily in the market. Each period (day) there are
two states (S = 2), which are equally likely and i.i.d. The S ×K matrix of relative
dividends is given by
d =
(
0.55 0.45
0.35 0.65
)
16These margin requirement and the segregation ratio are currently imposed by the Regulation T
by the Federal Reserve and the customer protection rule (17 CFR Section 15c3-3) by the Securities
and Exchange Commission in the USA.
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with D0 = $195.51 the total dividends paid at day t = 0 and g
D
t = Dt+1/Dt =
100.0117% the daily gross growth rate of aggregate dividends (respectively, 103%
annually).17 The margin rate and the rebate rate are set so that conditions (3.10)
and (3.11) are satisfied with rt = (1+r) ·gDt −1 = 0.0197% and bt = (1+b) ·gDt −1 =
0.0197% daily (respectively, 5.10% yearly).
Given the Kelly prices (3.4)–(3.5), the investment strategies and operation fees
defined in Theorem 3.1 solve the optimization problems [B] and [M] of the broker
and the margin traders.18 Conversely, given these operation fees and strategies,
the Kelly prices are the market clearing prices and the growth rates of wealth are
balanced. In other words, an evolutionary equilibrium is observed.
4 Stability of evolutionary equilibria: A simulation study
Evolutionary equilibrium entails a unique asset pricing forecast: relative asset
prices are given by the Kelly rule. The relative market capitalization of each asset
is given by the expected relative dividends, hence determined by asset fundamentals
only. The outcome is rather unusual for standard asset pricing models, where equilib-
rium asset prices can take any positive values in response to changing characteristics
of agents (“anything goes” theorem by Sonnenschein, Debreu and Mantel).19
Uniqueness of price forecast in evolutionary equilibria is an implication of bal-
anced growth of wealth. The requirement that growth rates are balanced, on the
one hand, prevents flows of investment money between funds (as all funds appear
equally alluring to individual investors) and, on the other hand, ensures that wealth
invested in a fund grows at the rate congruent with that of the average investor.
For each fund manager it means that the market share under management is invari-
able: an investment fund formed at t = 0 would maintain the same market share
at any future date t. This, in turn, has an implication for the market clearing asset
prices: given that all agents have constant market shares, an investment decision
of each particular fund manager has time-invariant degree of impact on prices.20
Consequently, when all fund managers adhere to certain operation fee rates and
investment strategies, the asset prices are stable: while absolute prices can fluctuate
(due to uncertain dividend payments), the relative prices remain Kelly.
An evolutionary equilibrium however is fragile: equilibrium operation fees, in-
vestment strategies, interest rates and asset prices are related by several equality
17 We assume that there are 252 equally spaced trading days in a year. The dividends D0 are set
so that $50, 000 of total dividends is paid in the first year.
18 For the operation fees we obtain: fL = fS = fB = 1 − βB = 0.01% daily, or equivalently,
2.05% yearly (where we accounted for wealth under management growing at gDt = 103% yearly).
The Kelly prices (3.4)–(3.5) imply the 5.00% annual dividend yield of the market portfolio.
19See Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995) for the complete market case. Similar results for
incomplete markets can be found in Hens and Pilgrim (2002).
20From equation (2.14) it follows that the bigger is the market share of an agent, the more
influence his investment decision has on the prices.
26
conditions. This means that minor changes to its constituents may take the eco-
nomy out of the evolutionary equilibrium. For instance, if one agent would deviate
from the Kelly investment strategy, the market clearing prices would no longer be the
Kelly prices and, as a consequence, investments into the market portfolio would no
longer be optimal. While even small changes to, e.g., agents’ investment strategies,
can perturb the evolutionary equilibrium, it is unknown, whether this woud have a
persistent effect on market shares and the Kelly pricing rule. The following simula-
tion study aims to address this issue.
Prices and wealth dynamics without utility optimization. When running
simulations, we deviate from the general equilibrium framework and focus merely
on the dynamics of market clearing prices and agents’ market shares given that fund
managers adhere to certain wealth management fees and investment strategies.
For any specified investment strategies, operation fee rates, margin loan and
rebate interest rates, the wealth dynamics (2.8)–(2.9) and the market clearing con-
dition (2.14) generate a (non-autonomous) random dynamical system:
Φw0(t, s
t+1, p, w) : (pt, wt)→ (pt+1, wt+1)
with st+1 the history of states up to date t+1 (see Appendix C). The initial state of
the system is given by endowments w0 and market clearing asset prices p0 determ-
ined by equation (2.14) with ih0 = (1− fh0 )wh0 . The mapping (pt, wt)→ (pt+1, wt+1)
is defined well if market clearing prices pt+1 exist, are strictly positive and no bank-
ruptcies happen (i.e., wht+1 ≥ 0 for all h ∈ N ∪M). In general, this condition may
be violated: e.g., a margin trader with a large market share could potentially drive
the prices negative when taking a large short position in one of the assets. In the
empirical study we control existence (and positivity) of prices as well occurrence of
bankruptcies numerically and terminate the simulation paths where the transition
from t to t+ 1 cannot be made.21
Three representative agents. Though an evolutionary equilibrium can ac-
commodate any number of agents, the corresponding asset prices may be obtained
by considering only three representative agents with logarithmic utilities. Proposi-
tion 4.1, following from Theorem 3.1, states this result formally.
Proposition 4.1 For any steady state evolutionary equilibrium, the same prices
and interest rates are obtained in an steady state evolutionary equilibrium of a rep-
resentative heterogeneous agent economy with the three agents:
(i) a broker B with βB given in Proposition 3.1, ηB = 1 and wB0 =
∑
i∈N w
i
0,
(ii) a leveraged long trader L with βL = 1− fL, ηL = 1 and wL0 =
∑
j∈ML w
j
0,
21As shown in Appendix C, existence of market clearing asset prices is equivalent to invertibility
of a K ×K matrix. This can be controlled by, e.g., calculating the matrix determinant. It is then
straightforward to check prices positivity and presence of bankruptcies.
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(iii) a short seller S with βS = 1− fS , ηS = 1 and wS0 =
∑
j∈MS w
j
0.
Each of the three agents’ portfolios are the same as the aggregate portfolios of the
agents of the same type in the original economy.
4.1 Stability of Kelly pricing
We employ the example from Section 3.2.2 as a starting point of our qualitative
analysis. The evolutionary equilibrium is perturbed by adding mistakes to invest-
ment strategies of the three agents and populating the market by noise traders.
Mistakes in Kelly strategies and randomness of noise traders’ investment decisions
trigger deviations of market clearing prices from the benchmark Kelly pricing, both
forces amplified by extensive leverage used. These price deviations, in turn, create
opportunities for noise traders to benefit from mispricing and, when earning greater
market shares, push the prices even further from fundamentals.
Formally, we model mistakes in strategy ξ by generating a vector of noise δ =
(δ1, . . . , δK) with δk > −1 sampled from the centered normal distribution with vari-
ance σ2m.
22 The variance σ2m determines the size of mistakes. We then replace the
strategy ξ by vector ξ˜ = (ξ˜1, . . . , ξ˜K) with ξ˜k = κ(ξ) · ξk(1 + δk), where κ(ξ) is a
normalization coefficient that guarantees that the perturbed strategy has the same
effective leverage and is short and long in the same assets as the original strategy ξ.
To model the noise trader’s strategy, we sample proportions µt,k, k ∈ K from stand-
ard normal distribution and then rescale the vector µt so that to achieve full usage
of margin. The operation fee rate of the noise trader is set identical to other fund
managers.
The simulations are conducted for two levels of margin requirements: “low”
M = 40% and “high”M = 60%. The initial market shares are set to 65%, 15%, 15%
and 5% for the broker, the leveraged-long trader, the short-seller and the noise-trader
respectively; agents make 5% mistakes in strategies. Table 4.1 collects the data on
market characteristics calculated based on 10,000 simulations of daily trades over a
1-year horizon. The reported numbers are the average annualized trading volume,
the average relative asset prices, the average absolute mispricing in relative prices
(and the corresponding standard deviations), the volatility of annualized logarithmic
asset returns, the average market shares, the average annualized net growth rates
of wealth, the total number of market crashes and the total number of broker’s
bankruptcies.23
We find that Kelly pricing is robust to noise trading and mistakes in strategies:
though prices deviate from Kelly (there is absolute mispricing in relative prices),
these deviations cancel out on average. The average relative prices are the Kelly
22If δk ≤ −1, we resample it until δk > −1.
23The average annualized net growth rate of wealth (analogue of annualized net return) is calcu-
lated as e252·g−1 with g = 1
n
∑n
i=1 log(rt1,i/rt0,i)/(t1− t0) the average 1-period exponential growth
rate of wealth (computed from n simulations of daily market shares between t0 and t1).
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prices both in the case of “low” and “high” margin requirements, or respectively,
“high” and “low” maximum leverage allowed, and over the whole observation hori-
zon.
Absolute mispricing in relative prices decreases with time and is higher when
more leverage is allowed. Starting with 9.03% and 6.81% after 1 trading day for
M = 40% and 60% respectively (asset 1), it falls more than twice to 3.51% and
3.80% after one month of trading and stabilizes to approx. 2.5% after 1 year. The
degree of market mispricing is determined by the market share of the noise trader:
mispricing is highest when the market share of the noise trader is largest. Long-
term convergence of mispricing (to 2.58%–2.71% and 2.11%–2.22% for assets 1 and 2
respectively) is due to vanishing of noise trading, and the mispricing which remains
after 1 year is caused by mistakes in strategies.24
Margin requirements have a clear effect on the speed of price adjustment. While
relative mispricing is almost identical after one trading day (9.03% vs 6.81% for
asset 1 and 7.39% vs 5.57% for asset 2), it diminishes much faster when more leverage
is allowed. A similar pattern is observed in volatilities of logarithmic asset returns.
The reason is that given more leverage, noise trading has more effect on the market
clearing asset prices (hence we see significant mispricing and market volatility after 1
and 5 trading days), but leverage itself is destructive for noise trading. Namely, given
lower margin requirements a noise trader can buy/sell more assets (trading volume
is always higher when maximum leverage is higher), hence the noise trader is hit
harder in case of adverse market movements. In general, the results are coherent
with Friedman (1953)’s market selection hypothesis: investors trading on noise lose
their money to ‘smarter’ traders, and thus their wealth and their impact on aggregate
demand declines.
Margin requirements also affect the frequency of crashes. Over a time horizon
of 1 year and 10,000 simulation runs there are no crashes when M = 60%, and 35
crashes when M = 40% (the latter corresponds to one crash every 285 years on
average). As recorded in Table 4.1, most of the crashes occur in conjunction with a
broker’s bankruptcy and happens within a period of 3 months. The probability of a
crash is the higher, the more leverage is allowed and the more noise trading occurs
on the market. This is because high leverage hastens the death of noise traders,
whose losses in case of a bankruptcy are absorbed by the broker. The bankruptcy
of the broker, in turn, leads to a negative asset demand from the broker, creating a
downward pressure on the prices.
24Whether long-term mispricing (and market volatility) is higher for “low” or “high” margin
requirements depends on the relative market shares of the agents: only mistakes in the strategies
of margin traders may be amplified by leverage (the broker cannot leverage). When the market
is dominated by margin traders, higher margin requirements are associated with higher market
volatility and mispricing. On the other hand, the bigger is the market share of the broker, the less
pronounced is the effect of margin requirements on mispricing and volatility.
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Figure 4.1: Market dynamics in the presence of noise traders and mistakes.
NOTES: The plotted values are the relative price of asset 1 (relative prices of assets 1 and 2
complement to 1) and the market shares of the broker (B), the leveraged long trader (L), the
short seller (Sh) and the noise trader (N). X-axis is time in days. B, L and Sh make 5% mistakes
in investment strategies. The initial market shares are given by 65%, 15%, 15% and 5% for B, L,
Sh and N respectively. The margin requirement is 50% and the segregation ratio is 1.4. The
relative expected dividends (Kelly rule) are (0.45, 0.55).
The average mispricing relative to the Kelly is 0.15% for asset 1 and −0.12% for asset 2.
4.1.1 Market dynamics
Figure 4.1 illustrates the market dynamics for a margin requirement of 50%. It
shows a time series of the relative price of asset 1 (top panel) and the wealth shares
of the agents (bottom panel). Coherent with the results in Table 4.1, we see that
along the simulated timeseries the average relative asset price matches that implied
by the Kelly rule. The average mispricing of individual assets (relative to the Kelly
rule) is 0.15% and −0.12% for asset 1 and 2 respectively.
We also observe that the noise trader and the short seller consistently lose wealth
relative to the broker and the leveraged long trader, with the noise trader having
less than 1% of the market after only 10 days (Table 4.1 reveals similar patterns
for M = 40% and 60% levels). Accordingly, the impact of noise trading on asset
prices diminishes with time. In the long term only mistakes in strategies contribute
to mispricing: with 50% margin requirement, the 5% mistakes in strategies lead to
a (1/50%) · 5% = 10% mispricing. For asset 1 this means that the relative price
is within the interval [0.405, 0.495] almost all of the time – exactly what we see in
Figure 4.1.
The broker and the leverage long margin trader consistently gain wealth at the
expense of the short seller because asset mispricing is in favour of agents that hold
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the Kelly portfolio long and to the disadvantage of whose who short it. Indeed,
given the market clearing prices pt,k with
(pt,1, . . . , pt,K)/pt = λ˜ 6= (Etdt+1,1, . . . ,Etdt+1,K),
the return from holding the Kelly portfolio long, RKellypt , is on average higher than
if the market prices are Kelly:
Et
(
RKellypt
)
:= Et
(∑
k∈K
Etdt+1,k · Dt+1,k + pt+1,k
pt,k
)
=
(∑
k∈K
(Etdt+1,k)2
λ˜k
+ 1
)
· EtgDt+1 ≥ 2EtgDt+1 = Et
(
RKellyEtdt+1
)
, (4.1)
where we used Assumption 3.1 (iv) on dividends (gDt+1 and dt+1 are uncorrelated)
and Jensen’s inequality.25
The observed advantage of the broker and the long trader relative to the short
seller implies that the equilibrium margin loan and rebate rates r and b are too low
for the market where the Kelly pricing holds only approximately. Recall that the
interest rates in evolutionary equilibria are set so that the growth rates of wealth
of the three agents are balanced. Given identical operation fees, this balance is
equivalent to
R˜Kellypt − (1−M)(1 + r) =
[
M− r
L
rB
(1−M) + r
S
rB
(1 +M)
]
R˜Kellypt
+
rL
rB
(1 + r)(1−M)− r
S
rB
(1 + b)(1 +M)
= −R˜Kellypt + (1 +M)(1 + b), (4.2)
where R˜Kellypt = R
Kelly
pt · M/gDt+1, the values rL, rB and rS are the market shares of
the leveraged long trader, the broker and the short seller, and the far-left, middle
and far-right terms in (4.2) correspond to their net returns respectively. When the
market prices are exactly Kelly, the two equalities in (4.2) hold and no comparative
advantage is present. In turn, when the prices deviate from Kelly, the average return
R˜Kellypt on the Kelly portfolio increases (equality (4.1)), leading to persistent losses
of the short seller relative to the leveraged long trader and the broker. Raising both
interest rates r and b would bring the market back into balance: wealth surplus ge-
nerated by the leveraged long trader would be transferred to the short seller through
interest payments between the broker and the margin traders.
25By Jensen’s inequality we have
∑
k∈K
(Etdt+1,k)2
λ˜k
≥ 1/(∑k∈K λ˜kEtdt+1,k · Etdt+1,k) = 1.
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5 Evolutionary equilibria with choice of leverage
In Section 3 we studied evolutionary equilibria under the assumption that margin
traders make full use of their margin. We now relax this assumption and look more
closely into evolutionary equilibria with choice of leverage, i.e., when margin traders
decide whether to leverage and, if so, to what extent.
We find that the Kelly asset pricing rule remains valid in this general case. As in
the case where margins have to be used to the full, the condition of balanced growth
of wealth together with the assumption of no redundant assets imply investments
into the market portfolio, while CRRA utilities then limit relative market prices
to Kelly (see thee discussion after Proposition 3.2). The choice of effective margin
(i.e., effective leverage) has no effect on the aggregate market capitalization (absolute
asset prices) either: marginmj disappears from pricing equation (2.14) when trader j
follows the same (maybe leveraged or short) investment strategy as his broker.
5.1 When is it optimal to leverage to maximum?
Whether it is optimal to leverage to maximum can be seen from the margin
trader’s optimization problem [M]. Recall that fund managers are concerned about
the expected utility from consumption, hence the effective leverage is chosen so as
to maximize this utility. Since both optimal investments (Kelly rule) and optimal
operation fees are independent of the margin requirements (Proposition 3.1 and
Theorem 3.1), the problem reduces to:
mj = arg max
m∈[M,1]
{
1m∈[M,1) ·
[
1
m
(1 +D/p)− (1 + r)(1−m)
m
]
+ 1m∈[1,∞) ·
[
1
m
(1 +D/p) + (1 + b)
(m− 1)
m
]}
(5.1)
for a long trader j ∈ML and
mj = arg max
m∈[M,∞)
{
− 1
m
(1 +D/p) + (1 + b)
(1 +m)
m
}
(5.2)
for a short seller j ∈ MS , where expressions in curly brackets correspond to one-
period returns on Kelly investment adjusted for dividends growth gDt .
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Figure 5.1 illustrates the objective functions in (5.1) (dashed line) and (5.2)
(dotted line) when the rebate rate b does not exceed the margin rate r.27
The results on the optimal choice of leverage by the two types of agents when
b ≤ r are summarized in Proposition 5.1 below.
26As the dividend yield Dt/pt is constant, the index t is omitted for simplicity of presentation.
27In this section we restrict our attention to the only sensible case when the interest on short sale
proceeds does not exceed the cost of borrowing.
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Proposition 5.1 In any steady state evolutionary equilibrium with choice of lever-
age, when b ≤ r the following holds:
1. A long margin trader is
– indifferent about size of leverage, m ∈ [M,∞], if b = D/p ≤ r,
– leveraged, m ∈ [M, 1], if b < r = D/p,
– leveraged to the maximum, m =M, if D/p ≤ b ≤ r or b ≤ r ≤ D/p,
– paying assets in full, m = 1, if b < D/p < r,
– not invested in risky assets, m =∞, if D/p < b = r.
2. A short seller is
– indifferent about size of leverage, m ∈ [M,∞], if b = D/p,
– leveraged to maximum, m =M, if b > D/p,
– not invested in risky assets, m =∞, if b < D/p.
Proof of Proposition 5.1: The results follow from the first-order conditions of
optimization problems (5.1) and (5.2). 
In both cases the choice of effective leverage is determined by the relation between
interest rates and the dividend yield of the market portfolio. A short seller would
leverage to the maximum if b ≥ D/p, i.e., when the rebate rate equals or exceeds
the market dividend yield. The result is very intuitive as the short seller effectively
shorts the market dividend yield and profits from the interest earned on the deposited
margin and the short selling proceeds. An increase in effective leverage, on the one
hand, increases the short seller’s adverse exposure to the market, and on the other
hand gives more short sale proceeds for collecting interest on it. Accordingly, only
when the interest earned on short sale proceeds is sufficiently high to compensate
for losses from shorting the market portfolio, it is optimal to leverage.
In the case of a long trader, both the rebate and the margin interest rates matter
for the optimal decision on how much to leverage. This is because a long trader has
to pay the cost of borrowing funds r when leveraging long (mj ∈ [M, 1]) and collects
the interest b on the funds that are not used in investment and deposited with a
broker when mj ∈ [1,∞). Accordingly, there is a tradeoff between investment
into risky assets, investment into the risk-free asset (depositing funds) and usage of
leverage (leverage amplifies return on investment but is subject to fees).
Formally, the optimization in (5.1) can be solved in three steps: first searching
for the maximum for a nonleveraged long trader (m ∈ [1,∞)), then for a leveraged
long trader (m ∈ [M, 1]) and finally choosing the solution which gives the highest
objective function. Looking at the first order conditions of (5.1) for m ∈ [M, 1]
one finds that a fully invested (m ≤ 1) long trader would leverage to the full if
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Figure 5.1: The choice of effective margin.
NOTES: The plotted values are objective functions of a long trader (dashed line) and a short seller
(dotted line) as functions of effective margins. r stands for the margin rate, b for the rebate rate and
y for the dividend yield of the market portfolio. A long margin trader would leverage to maximum
(mj =M) if b ≤ r ≤ y. A short seller would leverage to maximum if y ≤ b. A trader who decides
whether to leverage long or sell short would use margin to the full for all b ≤ r except b < y < r.
r ≤ D/p, i.e., when the benefit from using leverage (expressed in collecting more
returns on investment) is sufficiently high to cover the cost of borrowing. On the
other hand, if r > D/p, then it is optimal not to leverage at all. The trader then
needs to decide whether to make a risk-free investment instead of entering a position
in risky assets, which depends on whether the rebate rate b or the market dividends
yield is higher. For instance, when the rebate rate b is “low” (b < D/p), there is
no advantage in a depositing funds with a broker, hence the trader would stay fully
invested in risky assets, collecting the market dividend yield. If, on the contrary, the
rebate rate is “high” (b ≥ D/p), depositing funds with a broker becomes equally or
more profitable than entering the market for risky assets. How much wealth should
remain invested in risky assets then depends on the relation between r and b: e.g.,
when D/p < b = r, a long trader would deposit all the funds with a broker and have
35
nothing invested in risky assets, whereas when D/p < b < r, he will spend all the
funds on purchasing the market portfolio.
Comparing the maximums in optimization problems (5.1) and (5.2) of a long
margin trader and a short seller, one can also derive the optimal decision of a margin
trader on whether to stay (leveraged) long or short. We have the following result.
Proposition 5.2 In any steady state evolutionary equilibrium with choice of lever-
age, when b ≤ r the following holds:
- if D/p < b, margin traders sell short and leverage to maximum, i.e., m =M;
- if D/p = b, margin traders either sell short with m ∈ [M,∞) or stay unlevered
long with m ∈ [1,∞);
- if b < D/p < r, margin traders buy long but do not leverage, i.e., m = 1;
- if D/p = r, margin traders leverage long with m ∈ [M, 1];
- if D/p > r, margin traders buy long and leverage to maximum, i.e., m =M.
Proof of Proposition 5.2: Make use of Proposition 5.1 to compute the utility
functions (5.1) and (5.2) of a long trader and a short seller respectively. Whether
for given market conditions (interest rates and the market dividend yield) a margin
trader prefers to short or (leverage) long is determined by which of the two utilities
is higher. 
Corollary 5.1 In an evolutionary equilibrium with choice of leverage, both leveraged
long margin traders (m < 1) and short sellers coexist if and only if r = b = D/p.
Proof of Corollary 5.1: Follows from Proposition 5.2. 
Figure 5.2 illustrates the results of Proposition 5.2 and Corollary 5.1. If b =
r = D/p, the brokerage market is perfectly competitive and a margin trader is
indifferent on whether to buy long or short and how much leverage to use. When
the rebate rate is higher than the market dividend yield, i.e., D/p < b ≤ r, only
fully leveraged short sellers are present in the market: the rebate rate is sufficiently
high to cover any potential losses from a short sale position, while leveraging long
is too expensive. When the rebate rate falls below the market dividend yield, i.e.,
b < D/p, a long investment into the market portfolio becomes more profitable than
the risk-free investment (depositing funds with a broker) as well as short selling,
hence we observe long traders only, with the range of leverage depending on the
ratio of r to D/p.
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Figure 5.2: Decision of a margin trader whether to leverage and whether to
short.
NOTES: Optimal decision of a margin trader whether to buy long or sell short and whether to
leverage depending on the margin rate r, the rebate rate b and the dividend yield of the market
portfolio. X-axis corresponds to different values of the market dividend yield. Y-axis is the optimal
margin. The sign of the margin defines the decision to buy long (positive) or sell short (negative).
5.2 Why do margin traders both leverage long and sell short in
real markets?
Corollary 5.1 implies that leveraged long traders and short sellers would coexist
only in a perfectly competitive brokerage market, i.e., when b = r = D/p. This is
however not the case for real markets: brokerage is not perfectly competitive, yet
we still observe all types of margin traders. Within the framework of the present
model, this phenomena can be explained by heterogeneity of traders’ expectations
regarding the (future) dividend yield of the market portfolio.
Assume that margin traders have subjective beliefs regarding the future dividend
yield of the market portfolio, Ejt (Dt+1/pt+1), but agree on the future relative market
capitalization, i.e, Ejt (pt+1,k/pt+1) = Et(pt+1,k/pt+1) for all j ∈M and k ∈ K. Then,
with minor changes in the proof of Proposition 3.1, one can show that the Kelly
pricing and the Kelly investments hold in this general case too.
Subjective beliefs, though, do affect the optimal choice of leverage as well as the
decision whether to short or long. This happens because margin traders effectively
disagree on the future expected return of the market portfolio:28
Ejt
(
Dt+1 + pt+1
pt
)
= Et(gDt+1) · Ejt
(
Dt
pt
+
Dt
pt
/
Dt+1
pt+1
)
.
Accordingly, when trader j ∈ M has correct beliefs, i.e., Ejt = Et, his decision to
short and/or leverage is determined by the relation between the market dividend
yield and the two interest rates (Propositions 5.1 and 5.2). On the other hand, when
the beliefs are wrong, i.e., Ejt = Et, these decisions are determined by the relation
between
y˜j = Ejt
(
Dt
pt
+
Dt
pt
/
Dt+1
pt+1
)
− 1 (5.3)
28For simplicity of representation we assume that gDt+1 and Dt+1/pt+1 are independent.
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and the market interest rates (Propositions 5.1 and 5.2 hold with change from D/p
to y˜j).29
Consequently, a margin trader j would sell short if and only if y˜j ≤ b and leverage
long if and only if b ≤ y˜j ≤ r. This means that when b < D/p (hence margin traders
with correct beliefs would never short), short sellers believe that the current market
is overpriced and trade in hope to benefit from future price declines.30 Analogously,
when D/p < r (hence margin traders with correct beliefs would never leverage long),
leveraged long traders are convinced that the market is underpriced, therefore start
borrowing funds immensely to amplify the returns that they expect to achieve.
6 Conclusion and outlook
The paper introduces institutional detail of margin trading into the evolution-
ary finance model Evstigneev, Hens, and Schenk-Hoppe´ (2016, 2006, 2008, 2009,
2011). The model is used to give insights into the effects of margin requirements
on (a) equilibrium asset prices and (b) market stability. We find that the Kelly
pricing prediction of the evolutionary finance is robust to margin trading: margin
requirements matter neither for total nor for the relative market capitalization in
equilibrium. Instead there is an equilibrium relationship between margin require-
ments and the interest rates on borrowing and lending.
We also find that margin requirements affect the speed of price adjustment. On
the one hand, when margin trading is mostly used by ”smart money”, the weaker
the margin requirements, the quicker the correction of major mispricings and the
more stable the market. On the other hand, if noise traders dominate the market,
looser margin requirements lead to more market crashes and failures.
There are several aspects that are beyond the scope of this paper. Firstly, one
could try to relax the assumption of balanced growth rates and replace it by, e.g., a
weaker assumption of identical expected growth rates. This would most likely require
a numerical search of an equilibrium as the extended model is rather complicated.
The conjecture is that equilibrium prices might deviate from Kelly prices in the
short- to medium-term but not in the long-term.
Secondly, the model does not address the issue of asset-specific margin require-
ments (which are common in real markets where less liquid instruments or assets
with more volatile prices have higher margin requirements). In principle, it might
happen that traders would decide to employ different leverage ratios across the as-
sets. In that case investment into the market portfolio might no longer be optimal,
hence the Kelly might fail in equilibrium.
29 That a margin trader has subjective beliefs regarding the future market dividend yield induces
changes in his optimization problems (5.1) and (5.2): the term (1 +D/p) gets replaced by y˜j .
30From (5.3) it follows that when y˜j ≤ b and b < D/p, we have Ejt
(
Dt
pt
/
Dt+1
pt+1
)
< 1. Similarly,
when r ≤ y˜j and D/p ≤ r, we have Ejt
(
Dt
pt
/
Dt+1
pt+1
)
> 1.
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Thirdly, in real markets there is a liquidity problem associated with short selling.
Having an account with a broker is not always sufficient to sell short: a trader
(broker) might need to search for an asset that incurs additional costs. Moreover,
illiquid assets (e.g., mortgage) can be used as collateral. In this regard, it would
also be interesting to explore the relation of the present model to general equilib-
rium models with collateral, e.g., Brumm, Grill, Ku¨bler, and Schmedders (2015a,b),
Geanakoplos and Zame (2014).
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Appendix
A Segregation
The segregation rule requires that fully paid and excess margin securities are se-
gregated. Formally, under the assumption that assets are segregated proportionally
to their market value in the portfolio,
∆xjt,k =

xjt,k ·max
(
1 + ξ · 1−
∑
k∈K µ
j
t,k∑
k∈K max(µ
j
t,k,0)
, 0
)
, if xjt,k ≥ 0 and Bjt < 0,
xjt,k, if x
j
t,k ≥ 0 and Bjt ≥ 0,
0, otherwise
(A.1)
units of asset k ∈ K must be segregated.31
Condition (A.1) can be deduced as follows: When the balance of the margin
account is positive (Bjt ≥ 0), all margin securities xjt,k ≥ 0 are considered fully paid,
hence must be segregated. When the margin balance is negative (Bjt < 0), only
excess margin securities ∆xjt,k ∈ [0, xjt,k] with xjt,k ≥ 0 and the total value of
∑
k∈K
∆xjt,kpt,k = max
( ∑
k∈K:xjt,k≥0
xjt,kpt,k + ξ ·Bjt , 0
)
need to be segregated. Assuming that assets are segregated proportionally to their
value in the portfolio, i.e., ∆xjt,k = κ
j · xjt,k, we obtain the result in (A.1).
B Evolutionary equilibria with full margin used
B.1 Restrictions on asset prices and interest rates in equilibrium
Proposition 3.2 implies that in a steady state evolutionary equilibria only asset
prices with constant relative market capitalization and constant dividend yield of
the market portfolio can exist, i.e, prices are of the form
pt,k = Dt/y
M · ρk, (B.1)
where yM > 0 is the dividend yield and ρk > 0, k ∈ K, with
∑
k∈K ρk = 1, are
relative prices. Further, by Lemma B.1 the real interest rates r and b are such that
equations (B.4) and (B.5) admit feasible operation fee rates f j ∈ (0, 1) of margin
traders and f i ∈ (0, 1) of brokers. When studying the optimization problems of the
agents, we will assume that asset prices and interest rates satisfy these conditions.
31Formula (A.1) is well defined: when Bjt := i
j
t(1 −
∑
k∈K µ
j
t,k) < 0, we have∑
k∈K max(µ
j
t,k, 0) > 1.
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Lemma B.1 In any evolutionary equilibrium the following holds:
1. For each margin trader j ∈M
µj =
1
mj
· pt
pt
or µj = − 1
mj
· pt
pt
; (B.2)
2. For each broker i ∈ N with price impact (i.e., if (3.6) holds)
λi =
pt
pt
, (B.3)
otherwise it is arbitrary;
3. For every j ∈M and t ≥ 0
(1+r)·min(mj−δj , 0)+(1+b)·max(mj−δj , 0)+δj ·
(
Dt
pt
+1
)
=
mj
1− f j (B.4)
with δj = 1 if µj = 1
mj
· ptpt and δ
j = −1 if µj = − 1
mj
· ptpt ;
4. For every i ∈ N and t ≥ 0
ri0f
i +
∑
j∈M(i)
rj0f
j =
(
ri0[1− f i] +
∑
j∈M(i)
rj0[1− f j ]
) · Dt
pt
. (B.5)
Proof of Lemma B.1: 1. Applying the result gjt = g
D
t (Proposition 3.2) to the
wealth dynamics (2.10) of a margin trader j ∈M leads to
gDt+1 = (1− f j) ·RMt+1(µj)
for every t ≥ 0. Rearranging the terms and accounting for pt+1,k/pt,k = gDt+1,
1 + rt = g
D
t+1(1 + r) and 1 + bt = g
D
t+1(1 + b) (Assumption 2.1), we obtain
∑
k∈K
{
(1−f j)
[
µjk
pt,k
Dt+µ
j+(1+r)·min(1−µj , 0)+(1+b)·max(1−µj , 0)
]
−1
}
Dt+1,k
Dt
= 0
(B.6)
with µj =
∑
l∈K µ
j
l . By Assumption 3.1 (i), the S×K dimensional matrixDt+1,·(st, ·)
has rank K, therefore for each k ∈ K the expression in curly brackets equals zero,
or equivalently,
µjk
pt,k
·Dt = 1
(1− f j) − µ
j − (1 + r) ·min(1− µj , 0)− (1 + b) ·max(1− µj , 0) (B.7)
for all k ∈ K. As the right-hand side of (B.7) is independent of the index k, so must
be the left-hand side. Consequently, the strategy µj is proportional to the relative
market capitalization and satisfies (B.2).
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2. Consider the dynamics of cumulative wealth of a broker i ∈ N and his clients
j ∈M(i). Summing (2.10) and (2.11), we have that
wit+1 +
∑
j∈M(i)
wjt+1 =
∑
k∈K
{[
(1−f i)wit+Bit
]
λik+
∑
j∈M(i)
(1−f j)wjtµjk
}
Dt+1,k + pt+1,k
pt,k
with Bit =
∑
j∈M(i)(1−f j)wjt
(
1−µjt,k
)
. By Proposition 3.2, wit+1 +
∑
j∈M(i)w
j
t+1 =
gDt+1(w
i
t+
∑
j∈M(i)w
j
t ). Inserting this into the equation above, rearranging the terms
and accounting for gDt+1 =
∑
k∈K Dt+1,k/Dt and
∑
k∈K λ
i
k = 1, we obtain that
∑
k∈K
{
wit
(
f i
Dt
−(1−f i) λ
i
k
pt,k
)
+
∑
j∈M(i)
wjt
(
f j
Dt
−(1−f j)µ
j
k +
(
1− µj)λik
pt,k
)}
Dt+1,k = 0.
(B.8)
By the same argument as in part 1 this implies that λik = pt,k/pt.
3. Follows from (B.7) by inserting the explicit expression (B.2) for µjk.
4. Follows from (B.8) by inserting the explicit expressions for µjk and λ
i
k and
accounting for wht /wt ≡ rh0 for all h ∈ N ∪M and t ≥ 0. 
B.2 Agents’ optimization problems
Consider now the optimization problem [M] of a margin trader j and [B] of
a broker i. For the time being we will replace the constraint (3.3) by a weaker
condition
0 ≤ fht ≤ 1 (B.9)
both for brokers and margin traders (boundary cases fht = 0 and f
h
t = 1 are not al-
lowed by definition). Margin traders optimize given prices and interest rates whereas
brokers take also the decisions of their clients as given.
Definition B.1 Consumption plan is feasible if it is nonnegative and can be achieved
from the initial endowment.
Both problems have a nonempty set of feasible consumption plans. If a trader j
would choose an investment strategy and an operation fee rate as in Lemma B.1
(equations (B.2) and (B.4)), the wealth under his management would grow at the
rate gDt > 0 assuring nonnegative consumption f
jwjt ≥ 0 in each period t. Analog-
ously, a broker i with an operation fee rate as in (B.5) and a strategy λi = pt/pt
would have a feasible consumption.
Lemma B.2 For each h ∈ N ∪M there is a constant Uh <∞, such that
E0
∞∑
t=0
(βh)tuh(ct) ≤ Uh <∞
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there exists a constant U
h
<∞, such that on any feasible consumption plan c.
Proof of Lemma B.2. By Proposition 2.1, in every period t ≥ 0 the aggregate
consumption equals the aggregate dividends Dt, therefore 0 ≤ cht ≤ Dt for all
h ∈ N ∪M , t ≥ 0. Further, by Assumption 3.1 (iv), gDt ≤ G. Hence, for the
logarithmic utility (ηh = 1) we have:
E0
∞∑
t=0
(βh)tuh(ct) ≤ E0
∞∑
t=0
(βh)t
[
log(D0) + t log(G)
]
≤ E0 log(D0) + β
h log(G)
1− βh ,
where we used that
∑∞
t=0 β
t = 11−β and
∑∞
t=0 tβ
t = β
(∑∞
t=0 β
t
)′
t
= β1−β . Analog-
ously, for a CRRA utility uh(c) = c
1−ηh
1−ηh with η
h 6= 1 we obtain:
E0
∞∑
t=0
(βh)tuh(ct) ≤ E0(D0)
1−ηh
1− ηh
∞∑
t=0
(βhG1−ηh)t = E0(D0)
1−ηh
1− ηh ·
1
1− βhG1−ηh
with
G =
G, ηh > 1,max [(βh)1/(ηh−1), G]+ 1, ηh < 1,
completing the proof. 
By Lemma B.2, we have that along any feasible consumption plan c the utility
function E0
∑∞
t=0(β
h)tuh(ct) of agent h ∈ N ∪ M is well defined (there exists a
limit of infinite sums) and bounded. Consequently, there exists a unique supremum
function (the value function)
V ht (w) = max
f,ξ
Et
∞∑
s=t
(βh)s−tuh(cs)
with ξ = µ for a margin trader h ∈M and ξ = λ for a broker h ∈ N . By the principle
of optimality32 the supremum functions satisfy the Bellman equation [BE]:
V ht (wt) = max
ft,ξt
Et
{
uh(ftwt) + β
hV ht+1
([
(1− ft)wt + 1h∈NBht
]
Rt+1(ξt) + 1h∈NI
h
t
)}
s.t. 0 ≤ ft ≤ 1,
∑
k∈K ξt,k = 1, ξt,k ≥ 0, k ∈ K, if h ∈ N,∑
k∈K ξt,k = 1/M, ξt,k ≥ 0, k ∈ K, if h ∈ML,∑
k∈K ξt,k = −1/M, ξt,k ≤ 0, k ∈ K, if h ∈MS
(B.10)
with Rt+1(ξt) = R
M
t+1(µt) if h ∈ M and Rt+1(ξt) = RBt+1(λt) if h ∈ N . These
Bellman equations are necessary for an optimum. Together with the transversality
32No other solution can lead to an improvement of optimal policy.
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condition,
lim sup
t→∞
(βh)tV ht (w
h
t ) ≤ 0, (B.11)
the Bellman equation [BE] is also sufficient for an optimum.33
Value functions inherit concavity and differentiability from the one-period util-
ities uh(·). Consequently, for any given h ∈ N ∪M and t ≥ 0 the Bellman equation
[BE] forms a convex optimization problem with linear constraints. Therefore the
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions:
uh
′
(cht )− βh · Et
{
uh
′
(cht+1) ·Rt+1(ξht )
}
+ νht,0 − νht,1 = 0, (B.12)
0 ≤ fht ≤ 1,
νht,0 ≥ 0, νht,0 · fht = 0,
νht,1 ≥ 0, νht,1 · (1− fht ) = 0.
and
[
(1− fht )wht + 1h∈NBht
]
· Et
{
uh
′
(cht+1)
[
Dt+1,k + pt+1,k
pt,k
− 1h∈ML(1 + r)gDt+1 − 1h∈MS (1 + b)gDt+1
]}
+ (1h∈MS − 1h∈ML∪N ) · νht,m + (1h∈MS − 1h∈ML∪N ) · νht,k = 0, (B.13)
1h∈N ·
∑
k∈K
ξht,k = 1h∈N ,
(1h∈ML − 1h∈MS ) ·
∑
k∈K
ξht,k = 1/M,
(1h∈ML∪N − 1h∈MS ) · ξht,k ≤ 0, νht,k ≥ 0, νht,kξht,k = 0, k ∈ K,
are necessary and sufficient for an optimum.34 In the above we used the envelope
theorem to obtain the differential
∂V ht
∂w
(wht ) = u
h′(cht ).
B.3 Necessary conditions for an equilibrium
By definition, fht ∈ (0, 1), hence νht,0 = νht,1 = 0 for each h ∈ N ∪M and t ≥ 0.
Further, fht ≡ fh, therefore u
h′(cht+1)
uh′(cht )
= (cht+1/c
h
t )
−ηh = (wht+1/wht )−η
h
= (gDt+1)
−ηh ,
where we used the result of Proposition 3.2 for the last equality. Conditions (B.1) on
33See, e.g., Stokey (1989), for details.
34The KKT conditions are sufficient for a convex optimization problem with linear constraints.
If additionally the Slater’s condition is satisfied (there is a feasible point in the relative interior of
the objective function), the KKT conditions become necessary for an optimum.
In our case Slater’s condition is valid. For a margin trader j ∈ M solve (B.4) with respect
to f j to obtain f j∗ > 0, and a pair (f j∗, µj∗) with µj∗ as in Lemma B.1 generates strictly positive
consumption. For a broker i ∈ N solve (B.5) to obtain f i∗ > 0, and a pair (f i∗, λi∗) with λi∗t = pt/pt
gives strictly positive consumption (assuming that all margin traders follow (f j∗, µj∗)).
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asset prices give
Dt+1,k+pt+1,k
pt,k
=
(
dt+1,k · yM/ρk + 1
)
gDt+1 for the return on asset k
with dt,k = Dt,k/Dt the relative dividends at t. Finally, Lemma B.1 defines the
investment strategies of the agents. Applying all above to the KKT conditions (B.12)
and (B.13) simplifies them to:
βh · Et
[
(gDt+1)
−ηh ·Rt+1(ξht )
]
= 1 (B.14)
and
1h/∈N0 ·Et
{
(gDt+1)
1−ηh
(
dt+1,k · yM/ρk − 1h∈ML · r− 1h∈MS · b
)}
− ν˜ht,m = 0 (B.15)
with N0 the set of brokers without price impact (condition (3.6)) and a constant
ν˜ht ∈ R.
The KKT condition (B.15) implies that Et(dt+1,k/ρk) does not depend on in-
dex k. Consequently, the asset prices are proportional to the expected relative
dividends, i.e., (3.4) holds.
The KKT condition (B.14) leads to the result (3.7) on operation fees of margin
traders: by Proposition 3.2, gDt+1 = g
j
t+1 = (1 − f j) · RMt+1(µj), or equivalently,
RMt+1(µ
j) = gDt+1/(1 − f j) for every j ∈ M . Inserting this into (B.14) gives (3.7).
That f j = fL for all j ∈ML and f j = fS for all j ∈MS follows from equation (B.4)
as mj =M for all j ∈M .
The KKT condition (B.14) also gives the result (3.5) on the aggregate asset
prices: RBt+1(λ
i) =
∑
k∈K
Dt+1,k+pt+1,k
pt,k
λik = g
D
t+1
∑
k∈K(y
M · dt+1,kEtdt+1,k + 1)λik. Insert-
ing the last expression into (B.14), using that
∑
k∈K λ
i
k = 1 and that there is no
correlation between (gDt+1)
1−ηh and dt+1,k (by Assumption 3.1 (iv)), one obtains the
equality (3.5).
Conditions (3.10) and (3.11) on interest rates follow from the clause (B.4) of
Lemma B.1. The result (3.9) on operation fee rates of brokers follows from equa-
tions (B.5) and (3.5). Finally, condition (3.12) on initial endowments arises from
the segregation rule (2.7).
B.4 Sufficiency of conditions for an equilibrium
Consider asset prices defined by equations (3.4)–(3.5) and interest rates as in
(3.10)–(3.11). These prices are strictly positive market clearing prices (equation
(2.14) is satisfied), such that wealth of each agent grows at the rate gDt+1 (fol-
lows from wealth dynamics (2.10) and (2.11)), brokers have positive total asset
demand (2.12) and the segregation rule works (inequality (2.7) holds). Moreover,
for these prices and interest rates the given investment strategies and fees solve
optimization problems [M] and [B]: the KKT conditions (B.12)–(B.13) and the
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transversality condition (B.11) are satisfied.35 Consequently, the strategies, fees
and interest rates determine an evolutionary equilibrium. It is in a steady state as
the fees and strategies are constant.
C Market clearing prices
The t-period market clearing asset prices can be found as a solution of linear
equations:
pt = At · (pt +Dt) + vt,
where At is a square K ×K matrix with the kth row and lth column element
at,(k,l) =
∑
i∈N
(1− f it )λit,kxit−1,l +
∑
j∈M
κjt,kx
j
t−1,l
and vt is a K-dimensional column vector with
vt,k =
∑
j∈M
[
(1+rt−1) ·min(Bjt−1, 0)+(1+bt−1) ·max(Bjt−1, 0)
] · [κjt,k−(1−f i(j)t )λi(j)t ],
where i(j) ∈ N is a broker with relation to margin trader j. The K-dimensional
vector κjk is given by:
κjt,k = (1− f jt )
(
µjt,k +
[
1−
∑
s∈K
µjt,s
]
λ
i(j)
t,k
)
.
The margin account balance Bjt−1, the asset portfolio x
j
t−1 of a trader and that of a
broker, xit−1, are given by expressions (2.5), (2.3) and (2.6) respectively.
35 For the transversality condition, by Lemma B.2 we have: lim supt→∞(β
h)tV ht (w
h
t ) =
lim supt→∞ Et
∑∞
s=t(β
h)suh(chs ) = 0.
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not suitable. The expansion coefficients can be inferred directly from market option
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1 Introduction
The risk-neutral measure, commonly referred to as the martingale measure or
the state-price density is a fundamental concept in the modern financial theory. It
provides an arbitrage-free method of pricing financial instruments based on a subset
of market quoted prices. Semi-parametric density expansion approaches impose only
structural assumptions on the functional form of the risk-neutral density (RND) and
require few data for calibration, but often lack convergence for heavy-tailed return
distributions. In this paper we propose a framework, which unifies a class of earlier
density expansion approaches. The framework enables to derive a closed-form option
pricing formula, which accounts for possibly heavy tailed return distributions and
allows for efficient calibration of the RND directly to market quoted European option
prices.
We introduce the generalized Hermite expansion of the RND of logarithmic re-
turns of the underlying in the orthogonal basis of generalized Hermite polynomials
around the Gaussian distribution with zero mean and finite variance. The classical
Black and Scholes (1973), Merton (1973) model, the Gram-Charlier Type A expan-
sion (Corrado and Su, 1996, 1997, Corrado, Su, et al., 1996), which is a modified
version of the traditional Edgeworth series expansion (Jarrow and Rudd (1982)), and
the Gauss-Hermite expansion (Necula, Drimus, and Farkas, 2016) are special cases
of the generalized Hermite expansion. We extend the results in Necula, Drimus,
and Farkas (2016) and derive a closed-form pricing formula for European options
under the generalized Hermite expansion. Our analytical results can be applied to
both traditional light-tailed return distributions as well as to heavy-tailed return
distributions.1
The expansion coefficients can be computed from the probability density func-
tion, the characteristic function of logarithmic returns or calibrated directly to mar-
ket data on prices of European options. Consequently, the method can be employed
when neither the density nor characteristic function is known in closed form, such as
non-affine stochastic volatility models, e.g., Kaeck and Alexander (2012), Andersen,
Fusari, and Todorov (2015). Calibration of expansion coefficients to market data
is conducted for a given maturity and various strike prices. Linear structure of the
option pricing formula allows to use quadratic programming for calibration. The
procedure can be applied to recover the whole term-structure of the RND as well
as its dynamics over time.2 The amount of data needed for calibration for one ma-
turity (and one observation date) is determined by the number of terms (expansion
coefficients) used in the expansion, usually sufficient in the range of 20–30.
1Heavy tails (relative to Gaussian distribution) of the RND implied by option data have been
documented in, e.g., Bates (2003), Aı¨t-Sahalia and Lo (1998), Jackwerth (2000).
2Since options are the most liquid derivatives and the whole cross-section of option prices is
available at each observation date, they allow for a natural inference for both time and state specific
preferences.
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Convergence of the generalized Hermite expansion is guaranteed by a semi-
parametric assumption on the tails of the RND. It requires that the standardized
RND decays on its tails as o(x) · e−ξ x
2
2 , where o(x)→ 0 when x→ ±∞. The para-
meter ξ may take values in [0,∞], depending on the choice of Hermite polynomials
and the target distribution employed in the expansion. Thus, the Gram-Charlier
Type A expansion (Corrado and Su, 1996, 1997, Corrado et al., 1996) requires that
the tails of the RND decrease faster than e−
x2
4 at infinity, whereas for the Gauss-
Hermite expansion (Necula et al., 2016) the parameter ξ equals zero, which allows
for heavy tailed as well as fat tailed distributions.
The semi-parametric generalized Hermite expansion provides a plausible altern-
ative to both parametric and non-parametric methods to recover the RND from
option prices. It imposes assumptions on the functional form of the RND’s tails,
but does not require explicit specification of dynamics of the underlying.3 Truncat-
ing the infinite series after sufficiently many but finite number of expansion terms
makes the generalized Hermite expansion suitable to account for stylized facts, such
as non-flat “smile” and “smirk” patterns in BSM implied volatilities. Computation-
ally efficient, the generalized Hermite expansion requires significantly less data for
calibration than other model-free but data intensive non-parametric methods, such
as, e.g., Breeden and Litzenberger (1978), Aı¨t-Sahalia and Lo (1998), Aı¨t-Sahalia
and Duarte (2003).
As an important practical application, we calibrate the model to prices of S&P 500
European options in 2007-2008 and 2014–2015. We show that these prices can be
explained well by the RND, whose (standardized) tails are heavier than of standard
normal distribution but are not fat, i.e., decrease to zero faster than at the power
law. This result is qualitatively different to findings in, e.g., Birru and Figlewski
(2012) and Hamidieh (2017), who, respectively, use the Generalized Extreme Value
(GEV) and the Generalized Pareto (GP) distributions for the tails of the same RND
and discover presence of fat tails prior and during the fall of 2008.
Our quantitative results on the value of the tail parameter ξ are subject to the
estimation methodology, but our qualitative results are significant in the context
of rising interest on the tails of options implied RNDs. In particular, the asset
pricing literature has recently focused on the informative content of RND’s tails for
future returns.4 Evidence on the predictive power of tails of options implied RNDs
3The inconsistency between the Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973) model (BSM) and
empirical evidence encouraged development of various extensions relaxing restrictive assumptions
of the BSM and considering more sophisticated dynamics of the underlying process. Examples
include the jump-diffusion, pure jump models of Merton (1976), Kou (2002), Bates (1991), Madan,
Carr, and Chang (1998); the stochastic-interest-rate option models of Merton (1973), Amin and
Jarrow (1992); the stochastic-volatility models of Heston (1993), Hull and White (1987), Stein and
Stein (1991); stochastic-volatility and stochastic-volatility jump-diffusion models of Bates (1996),
Scott (1997); the models based on the Generalized Hyperbolic process or other pure-jumps Levy
processes (Bibby and Sørensen, 1996) or the models with several factors with jumps both in the
dynamics of the underlying and in volatility (Andersen et al., 2015).
4Whether the RND, hence agents’ beliefs may have information content for future returns is
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has been documented, among others, in Bollerslev and Todorov (2011), Vilkov and
Xiao (2013), Orosi (2015), Chen, Hsieh, Huang, and Bank (2017). The common
approach consists in constructing a tail loss measure using the tails of the RND
recovered from market option prices by appending a certain parametric distribution,
usually a traditional fat-tailed GEV or the GP distribution, to the central part of
the RND. This measure is then used as a predictive variable. To this regard, our
empirical study suggests that no reliable information on the tails of the RND outside
of the minimum and maximum traded strike prices can be obtained from market
option data: the results depend strongly on the parametric model employed in
tails’ estimation. A similar inference with respect to insufficiency of the GEV and
GP distributions to explain physical rather than risk neutral density of returns in
DJIA and Nasdaq Composite indices has been made in Malevergne, Pisarenko, and
Sornette (2006).
The prototypes of the generalized Hermite expansion have long history in option
pricing literature. The first application of Edgeworth series expansion to option
pricing is due to Jarrow and Rudd (1982), who expanded the RND of the terminal
price of the underlying in the orthogonal basis of “probabilist” Hermite polynomials
around the log-normal distribution. The expansion was truncated after four terms,
so that the corresponding approximate option pricing formula incorporated three
adjustments to the classical Black and Scholes (1973), Merton (1973) pricing formula
accounting for differences in variance, skewness and kurtosis of the underlying and
the log-normal distributions. In a subsequent work Corrado and Su (1996, 1997),
Corrado et al. (1996) adopted the Jarrow-Rudd framework and derived an option
pricing formula using a Gram-Charlier Type A series expansion of the RND of
logarithmic returns of the underlying around the Gaussian distribution. Jurczenko,
Maillet, and Negre´a (2004), Corrado (2007) adjusted the results of Corrado and
Su (1997) to account for martingale restriction, whereas Rompolis and Tzavalis
(2007) obtained a Gram-Charlier Type C expansion, an exponential form of Gram-
Charlier Type A series expansion, which guaranteed positivity of the approximating
probability measure.
A slight modification of the Gram-Charlier Type A series expansion was proposed
by Madan and Milne (1994), who derived an expansion of the payoff function of the
contingent claim for Hilbert spaces with finite bases. The approach was adopted by
Abken, Madan, and Ramamurtie (1996a), Abken, Madan, and Ramamurtie (1996b)
to the family of Hermite polynomials, who employed the methodology to price, re-
spectively, Eurodollar futures options and European options on the S&P 500, with
expansion truncated after four terms. A different target distribution, namely the
Gamma distribution, was considered in Brenner and Eom (1997) with the expansion
itself debatable. The underlying assumptions of perfect foresight and rational expectations have
been long ago questioned by financial literature, giving rise to a class of behavioural models, see,
e.g., Hens and Schenk-Hoppe´ (2009), Hommes (2013), for overview.
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in the basis of Laguerre instead of Hermite polynomials. In a latter work, Filipovic´,
Mayerhofer, and Schneider (2013) introduced a generic framework to perform dens-
ity expansions using orthonormal polynomial basis in weighted L2-spaces for affine
models.5 By the example of the Heston model the authors also showed a compu-
tational advantage of the Gram-Charlier Type A expansion relative to a bilateral
Gamma density weight.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the gen-
eralized Hermite expansion of the risk-neutral density. In Section 3 we derive a
pricing formula for European call options in the context of the generalized Hermite
expansion and develop the calibration procedure of expansion coefficients to market
quoted option prices. In Section 4 we proceed with the empirical exercise on tails
of the model implied risk-neutral density. The final section summarizes the results
and conclusions.
2 Density expansions based on generalized Hermite poly-
nomials
2.1 Generalized Hermite polynomials
The generalized Hermite polynomials H
(α)
n (x) with α ∈ (0, 1] are defined recurs-
ively by
H
(α)
n+1(x) =
x
α
H(α)n (x)−
n
α
H
(α)
n−1(x) (2.1)
with H
(α)
0 (x) = 1 and H
(α)
1 (x) =
x
α .
The polynomials (2.1) form an orthogonal basis in the weighted Hilbert space L2α
of measurable functions f on the real line R with weighting function
w(α)(x) := e−
x2
2α
and finite L2α-norm given by
||f ||2L2α :=
∫
R
|f(x)|2w(α)(x)dx <∞
(see, e.g., Andrews, Askey, and Roy (1999)). Accordingly, every function f(x) ∈ L2α
can be approximated by an infinite sum
∞∑
n=0
a(α)n ·H(α)n (x)
5As opposed to the methodology of this paper, Filipovic´ et al. (2013) restrict the weighting
function of the L2 Hilbert space to coincide with the target distribution.
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with convergence holding in L2α, i.e.,
lim
M→∞
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣f(x)− M∑
n=0
a(α)n ·H(α)n (x)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
L2α
= 0.
The so-called “probabilists” and “physicists” Hermite polynomials, subsequently
denoted by Hen(x) and Hn(x) respectively, are the two special cases of generalized
Hermite polynomials H
(α)
n (x). For α = 1 we recover the “probabilists” polynomials
Hen(x), which have been extensively used in the option pricing literature, among
others, in the seminal papers of Jarrow and Rudd (1982), Corrado and Su (1996),
Corrado et al. (1996) and Corrado and Su (1997). For α = 0.5 we recover the
“physicists” polynomials Hn(x) employed more recently in Necula, Drimus, and
Farkas (2016).
An explicit form of the generalized Hermite polynomial of the n-th order can be
obtained either as the n-th derivative of the corresponding weighting function:
H(α)n (x) = (−1)n · e
x2
2α · d
ne−
x2
2α
dxn
, (2.2)
or by rescaling one of the standard Hermite polynomials:
H(α)n (x) = α
−n
2Hen
(
x√
α
)
= (2α)−
n
2Hn
(
x√
2α
)
.
Differentiation with respect to x reduces the order of the generalized Hermite poly-
nomial by one with
H(α)′n (x) =
n
α
H
(α)
n−1(x). (2.3)
The orthogonality condition implies that∫
R
H(α)n (x) ·H(α)m (x) · e−
x2
2αdx =
√
2pi · n! · α−n+ 12 · δnm (2.4)
for every n,m ∈ N, where δnm = 1 if n = m and δnm = 0 otherwise.
2.2 Generalized Hermite expansions
Consider now an underlying asset with price St in period t, which pays dividends
continuously. Denote by pτ (x) the risk-neutral density (RND) of its logarithmic
return log(St+τ/St) over horizon τ .
6 Let µτ and σ
2
τ be, respectively, the mean and
the variance of the probability distribution pτ (x).
6The RND of logarithmic returns log(St+τ/St) might also depend on the observation date t. We
will omit the index t for simplicity of notation, but all results in Sections-2.2–3.1 hold for time-
dependent RNDs too. In particular, in the empirical study of Section 4 the RND is recovered for
each observation date t and option maturity τ .
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Assumption 2.1 The risk-neutral density pτ (x) has finite mean |µτ | < ∞ and
finite variance σ2τ <∞.
Denote by
p˜τ (x) := στ · pτ (µτ + x · στ )
the standardized density of the logarithmic return. Let z(β)(x) be the density func-
tion of centred normal distribution with finite variance β > 0:
z(β)(x) :=
1√
2piβ
e
−x2
2β .
When β = 1, the function z(β)(x) corresponds to the density function of standard
normal distribution with zero mean and unit variance.
Assumption 2.2 There exist α ∈ (0, 1] and β > 0, such that the ratio p˜τ (x)
z(β)(x)
has a
finite L2α-norm, i.e., ∫
R
[
p˜τ (x)
z(β)(x)
]2
· w(α)(x)dx <∞.
Assumption 2.2 implies that the ratio p˜τ (x)
z(β)(x)
can be expanded in the orthogonal
basis of generalized Hermite polynomials H
(α)
n (x) with
p˜τ (x)
z(β)(x)
=
∞∑
n=0
a(α,β)τ,n ·H(α)n (x),
where
(
a
(α,β)
τ,n
)
n∈N is a sequence of real coefficients and convergence holds in L2α. The
expansion
p˜τ (x) = z
(β)(x) ·
∞∑
n=0
a(α,β)τ,n ·H(α)n (x)
holds in L2α as well.7 Written in terms of the original density pτ (x), we therefore
obtain:
pτ (x) =
1
στ
· z(β)
(
x− µτ
στ
)
·
∞∑
n=0
a(α,β)τ,n ·H(α)n
(
x− µτ
στ
)
, (2.5)
to which we will further refer as the generalized Hermite expansion.
The expansion coefficients a
(α,β)
τ,n can be computed from the probability dens-
ity function p(x) using the orthogonality property (2.4) of polynomials H
(α)
n (x) as
7Formally, since e
− x2
β ≤ 1, we have
∣∣∣∣pτ (x)− z(β)(x) · ∞∑
n=0
a(α,β)τ,n H
(α)
n (x)
∣∣∣∣2
L2α
=
1
2piβ
∫
R
[
p˜τ (x)
z(β)(x)
−
∞∑
n=0
a(α)τ,nH
(α)
n (x)
]2
e
− x2
β w(α)(x)dx
≤ 1
2piβ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ p˜τ (x)z(β)(x) −
∞∑
n=0
a(α,β)τ,n H
(α)
n (x)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣2
L2α
.
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follows:
a(α,β)τ,n =
√
2piαn−
1
2
n!
·
∫
R
pτ (x) ·H(α)n
(
x− µτ
στ
)
· z˜(α,β)
(
x− µτ
στ
)
dx, (2.6)
where
z˜(α,β)(x) :=
√
β
2pi
e
−x2
2
(
1
α
− 1
β
)
. (2.7)
As the risk-neutral density pτ (x), the expansion coefficients (2.6) depend on hori-
zon τ (and observation date t).
Necessary conditions on the risk-neutral density. The generalized Hermite
expansion (2.5) requires that Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 are satisfied. Assumption 2.1
is a standard assumption on existence of the first two moments of the RND, whereas
Assumption 2.2 imposes a certain structure on the tails of the RND. As follows from
Proposition 2.1 below, if the RND satisfies Assumption 2.2 and has neither extreme
events in its center, nor oscillating behaviour on its tails, then the tails of the RND
decrease to zero faster than e
x
2
(
1
2α
− 1
β
)
.
Proposition 2.1 Assume that p˜τ (x) satisfies Assumption 2.2 and there exists a ∈ R,
such that p˜τ ≤ C on [−a, a] and p˜τ (x) is uniformly continuous on (−∞,−a]∪[a,∞).
Then
p˜τ (x) = o(x) · e
x2
2
(
1
2α
− 1
β
)
with o(x)→ 0 for x→ ±∞.
Proof of Proposition 2.1: The result follows immediately from Lemma A.1 in
Appendix A. 
The traditional Gram-Charlier expansions employed in the literature assume
that α = 1 and β = 1, i.e., the expansion is done with the “probabilists” polyno-
mials Hen(x) and around the standard normal probability density. In this case the
condition (2.5) becomes rather problematic, as it requires the standardized dens-
ity p˜τ (x) to decrease in the tails faster than e
−x2
4 . This will rule out many of the
heavy tailed distributions encountered in practice. In contrast, for the case of the
Gauss-Hermite expansion (with α = 0.5 and β = 1) the condition (2.5) is auto-
matically satisfied if, e.g., the density function is bounded.8 In general, we notice
that for any given β > 0 decreasing α allows for heavier tails. Analogously, for any
given α ∈ (0, 1], increasing β allows for heavier tails.
2.2.1 Characteristic function representation
When using series expansions to approximate risk-neutral densities, one has to
determine the martingale restriction associated with that expansion. The follow-
8If p˜(x) ≤ C for every x ∈ R, then ∫R[p˜(x)]2dx ≤ C · ∫R p˜(x)dx = C.
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ing result on characteristic function representation allows to derive the martingale
restriction for generalized Hermite expansions.
Proposition 2.2 Consider a probability density function pτ (x) with mean µτ , stand-
ard deviation στ and generalized Hermite expansion coefficients
(
a
(α,β)
τ,n
)
n∈N for β > 0
and α ∈ (β/2, 1]. Then the characteristic function of pτ (x) can be computed as
ϕτ (u) = e
iuµτ−u
2σ2τ
2 ·
∞∑
n=0
a(α,β)τ,n · in ·G(α,β)n (uστ ), (2.8)
where G
(α,β)
n (x) is a sequence of polynomials of order n, determined by the recursive
relationship:
G(α,β)n (x) = x ·
β
α
·G(α,β)n−1 (x)−
β − α
αβ
·G(α,β)′n−1 (x)
with G
(α,β)
0 (x) = 1 and G
(α,β)
1 (x) = x · βα .9
Proof of Proposition 3.2: See Appendix A.1.
Corollary 2.1 In the settings of Proposition 2.2, given that r and q are, respect-
ively, annualized continuously compounded interest rate and dividend yield, the mar-
tingale restriction associated to the generalized Hermite expansion (2.5) is:
eµτ−(r−q)τ+
σ2τ
2 ·
∞∑
n=0
a(α,β)τ,n · in ·G(α,β)n (−iστ ) = 1.
Proof of Corollary 2.1. The martingale condition requires Et (e−rτSt+τ ) =
e−qτSt, where Et is the expectation under the risk-neutral probability measure pτ .
Since Et(e−rτSt+τ ) = e−rτ ·St ·ϕτ (−i), the result follows immediately from Propos-
ition 2.2. 
Consequently, when the expansion is truncated after first M + 1 terms, the
martingale restriction becomes a linear constraint eµτ−(r−q)τ+
σ2τ
2 ·∑Mn=0 a(α,β)τ,n · in ·
G
(α,β)
n (−iστ ) = 1 on the expansion coefficients. In a similar manner the character-
istic function representation (2.8) allows to derive linear constraints, assuring that
the total mass of the approximating distribution equals to one as well as that its
mean and variance are equal to the mean and variance of the original risk-neutral
density pτ (x).
10
9For the Gram-Charlier expansion (β = α = 1) the sequence G
(α)
n (x) becomes the standard
monomial sequence 1, x, x2, . . .. Analogously, for the Gauss-Hermite expansion (β = 1, α = 0.5)
we have the identity G
(α)
n (x) = H
(α)
n (x), i.e., the sequence of polynomials consists of the classical
“physicists” Hermite polynomials.
10a) Formula (2.8) implies that when the generalized Hermite expansion (2.5) is truncated after
first M + 1 terms, the unit mass condition
∫
R p(x)dx = ϕτ (0) is equivalent to
∑M
n=0 a
(α,β)
τ,n · in ·
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3 Option pricing under generalized Hermite expansions
The generalized Hermite expansion allows to obtain a closed-form pricing formula
for European options on a given underlying.11 The pricing formula (3.1), among
other cases, accounts for the classical Black-Scholes formula as well as the pricing
rules inferred under the Edgeworth/Gram-Charlier expansions.
Theorem 3.1 Assume that the log-return risk-neutral measure for time horizon τ
is characterized by an annualized mean µ, an annualized standard deviation σ and
generalized Hermite expansion coefficients
(
a
(α,β)
τ,n
)
n∈N with β > 0 and α >
β
2 .
Then the premium at time t of a European call option with strike price K and
maturity t+ τ is given by
C
(
K, τ, St, r, q, µ, σ, a
(α,β)
n
)
= St · e−qτ ·Π(α,β)1 −K · e−rτ ·Π(α,β)2 , (3.1)
where St is the spot price of the underlying, r is the annualized risk-free interest rate
and q is the annualized continuously compounded dividend yield. The terms Π
(α,β)
1
and Π
(α,β)
2 are given by
Π
(α,β)
1 := e
(
µ−(r−q)+σ2β
2
)
τ ·
∞∑
n=0
a(α,β)τ,n · I(α,β)n ,
Π
(α,β)
2 :=
∞∑
n=0
a(α,β)τ,n · J (α,β)n ,
where I
(α,β)
n and J
(α,β)
n are determined by the recurrence equations
I
(α,β)
n+1 =
β
α
·H(α)n (−d2) · z(β)(−d2 − σβ
√
τ) +
σβ
√
τ
α
· I(α,β)n +
β − α
α
· n
α
· I(α,β)n−1 ,
J
(α,β)
n+1 =
β
α
·H(α)n (−d2) · z(β)(−d2) +
β − α
α
· n
α
· J (α,β)n−1
with I
(α,β)
0 = N
(
d2√
β
+σ
√
βτ
)
, I
(α,β)
1 =
β
α ·z(β)(−d2−σβ
√
τ)+ βασ
√
τ ·N ( d2√
β
+σ
√
βτ
)
,
J
(α,β)
0 = N
(
d2√
β
)
, J
(α,β)
1 =
β
α ·z(β)(−d2), d1 = log(St/K)+(µ+σ
2)τ
σ
√
τ
, d2 = d1 − σ
√
τ , and
N (·) the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution.
Proof of Theorem 3.1: See Appendix A.2. 
Theorem 3.1 states that the price of a European call option can be found as a
G
(α,β)
n (0) = 1. b) Given that the approximating density has unit mass (and the expansion is
truncated after M + 1 terms), the condition µτ = −i ·ϕ′τ (0) on mean is equivalent to
∑M
n=0 a
(α,β)
τ,n ·
in · G(α,β)′n (0) = 0. Analogously, given that conditions on unit mass and mean are satisfied, the
condition σ2τ = −ϕ′′τ (0) + (ϕ′τ (0))2 on variance becomes
∑M
n=0 a
(α,β)
τ,n · in ·G(α,β)
′′
n (0) = 0.
11Once parameters α and β are chosen, the corresponding generalized Hermite expansion gives
a unique closed-form option pricing formula. Since parameters α and β can be varied, there is, in
fact, a continuum of option pricing formulas.
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weighted infinite sum of generalized Hermite expansion coefficients (2.6) as
C
(
K, τ, St, r, q, µ, σ, a
(α,β)
n
)
=
∞∑
n=0
a(α,β)τ,n ·
[
St · e
(
µ−r+σ2β
2
)
τ · I(α,β)n −K · e−rτ · J (α,β)n
]
.
(3.2)
The corresponding price of a put option is uniquely determined by the call-put
parity. To compute a cross section of option prices (3.2) on a given date, for a given
maturity, but for a range of strikes, one needs to recalculate weights (in square
brackets in (3.2)) but not the expansion coefficients. On the other hand, if another
option maturity or observation date is considered, then new expansion coefficients
must be obtained first.
A practical application of the pricing formula (3.2) requires truncation of its
infinite sum after a finite number of expansion terms, which results in a so-called
“truncation error”. Proposition 3.1 below provides an upper bound on this error
when only first M + 1 terms are taken into account. This gives an estimate on the
speed at which the truncation error decreases when more terms are included in the
expansion. In particular, when, e.g., the second derivative of the ratio p˜τ (x)
z(β)(x)
exists
almost everywhere and belongs to the weighted Hilbert space L2α (i.e., k = 2), the
truncation error is of order 1√
M
· O(x) with |O(x)| ≤ C for all x ∈ R and C ≥ 0.
The latter implies that doubling the number of terms would reduce the truncation
error by ca. 30%.
Proposition 3.1 In the settings of Theorem 3.1, if there exists k ∈ N, k ≥ 2, such
that p˜τ (x)
z(β)(x)
∈ Ck(R) and ∂k
∂xk
p˜τ (x)
z(β)(x)
∈ L2α, then
∣∣C(K, τ, St, r, q, µ, σ, a(α,β)n )− CM(K, τ, St, r, q, µ, σ, a(α,β)n )∣∣
≤ (St · e(µ−r)τ · κ(α,β)1 +K · e−rτ · κ(α,β)2 ) · κ(α,β)3,M ,
where
CM
(
K, τ, St, r, q, µ, σ, a
(α,β)
n
)
=
M∑
n=0
a(α,β)τ,n ·
[
St · e
(
µ−r+σ2β
2
)
τ · I(α,β)n −K · e−rτ ·J (α,β)n
]
and
κ
(α,β)
1 :=
[
N
(
d2
√
(2α− β)/α/β + 2σ
√
τβα/(2α− β)
)]1/2 · exp{αβσ2τ
2α− β
}
,
κ
(α,β)
2 :=
[
N
(
d2
√
(2α− β)/α/β
)]1/2
,
κ
(α,β)
3,M :=
[
αk+1/2√
2piβ(2α− β) · (k − 1) · (M − (k − 2)) · . . . ·M
]1/2
·
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∂k∂xk p˜(x)z(β)(x)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
L2α
.
Proof Proposition 3.1: See Appendix A.2. 
59
3.1 Calibration of expansion coefficients
The option pricing formula (3.1) requires knowledge of the generalized Hermite
expansion coefficients (2.6) as well as the mean and the standard deviation of the
RND of logarithmic returns over a given option horizon.
If the RND, or alternatively, its characteristic function were known, the two
moments and the expansion coefficients could be computed directly using formu-
las (2.6) and/or (2.8) respectively. In most cases, however, neither the RND nor the
characteristic function are available. In the following we propose two methods to
estimate the required parameters.
3.1.1 IV method
The so-called IV method infers the generalized Hermite expansion coefficients
from a continuum of out-of-the-money (OTM) European call and put market option
prices, C(K, τ, St) and P (K, τ, St), with given maturity τ and across strikes from
zero to infinity. The moments µτ and στ are estimated from the same option data
using the method in Bakshi, Kapadia, and Madan (2003).
Proposition 3.2 In the settings of Theorem 3.1, the generalized Hermite expansion
coefficients can be computed as:
a(α,β)τ,n =
√
2pi · αn− 12
n!
[
z˜(α,β)(d2(Ft)) ·H(α)n (−d2(Ft))+ (3.3)
+erτ
(∫ ∞
Ft
G(α,β)n (K) · C(K, τ, St)dK +
∫ Ft
0
G(α,β)n (K) · P (K, τ, St)dK
)]
,
where
G(α,β)n (K) =
z˜(α,β)(d2(K))
K2σ2τ
{
β − α
αβ
[
d22(K)
β − α
αβ
− σ√τ · d2(K)− 1
]
H(α)n (−d2(K))
+
n
α
[
2
β − α
αβ
d2(K)− σ
√
τ
]
H
(α)
n−1(−d2(K)) +
n(n− 1)
α2
H
(α)
n−2(−d2(K))
}
,
Ft = St · e(r−q)τ , d2(K) = log(St/K)+µτσ√τ and z˜(α,β)(x) is given in (2.7).
Proof of Proposition 3.2: See Appendix Appendix A.3. 
Formula (3.3) is based on the result from Bakshi et al. (2003) that any pay-
off function with bounded expectation can be spanned by a continuum of OTM
European calls and puts. In practice, however, only a finite number of strikes is
traded, creating truncation and discretization errors to (3.3).
To circumvent the issue, one can employ curve fitting methods to implied volat-
ilities. This approach has been intensively used in the literature, among others
by Aı¨t-Sahalia and Lo (1998), Jiang and Tian (2005) and Carr and Wu (2009). The
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prices of listed options are first translated into volatilities implied by the Black and
Scholes model to obtain a grid of implied volatilities at different moneyness levels.
A smooth function is then fitted into the grid.12 Finally, the classical Black and
Scholes formula is applied again to convert the interpolated implied volatilities to
call and put option prices, which are then used in computing the integral in (3.3).13
3.1.2 FIT method
The so-called FIT method is an alternative to the IV method, which allows to
overcome truncation and discretization errors. The expansion coefficients (a
(α,β)
τ,n )Mn=0
as well as the two (annualized) moments µ and σ are calibrated simultaneously by
minimizing the total square error between model implied and market quoted option
prices:
min
(a
(α,β)
τ,n )
M
n=0,µ,σ
N∑
i=1
∣∣C(Ki, τ, St)− CM (Ki, τ, St, r, q, µ, σ, a(α,β)τ,n )∣∣2, (3.4)
where N the number of listed option prices with time to maturity τ , Ki and
C(Ki, τ, St) strike and call option prices of observation i, CM (Ki, τ, St, r, q, µ, σ, a
(α,β)
τ,n )
model implied option prices (3.2) with expansion truncated after M + 1 terms.14
The linear structure of pricing formula (3.2) as well as of martingale restriction
and constraints on unit mass, mean and standard deviation of the approximat-
ing RND (see discussion after Corollary 2.1) allow to employ quadratic program-
ming with linear constraints to solve optimization problem (3.4). Formally, the FIT
method can be implemented as follows:15
1. Select the highest order M = 2k of expansion coefficients with k ∈ N;16
2. Compute initial estimated of (annualized) mean µ and standard deviation σ
from observed option prices using the Bakshi et al. (2003) approach;
12E.g., Jiang and Tian (2005) suggest using cubic splines for curve-fitting of implied volatilities
between the maximum and the minimum available strike prices Kmax and Kmin: the obtained
implied volatility is smooth everywhere and fits exactly the implied volatility grid. For moneyness
below the lowest available moneyness level in the market, the implied volatility at the lowest strike
price Kmin is used. Analogously, for moneynes above the highest available moneyness, the implied
volatility at the highest strike Kmax is used. The implicit assumption of this method is that the
RND is normal on its tails.
13The curve fitting procedure employs the classical Black and Scholes formula exclusively as a tool
for a one-to-one mapping between option prices and implied volatilities. It makes no assumptions
on validity of the Black and Scholes model for the underlying process.
14Put option prices should be first converted to call option prices using the call-put parity.
15The calibration procedure can only be performed for option maturities with at least M + 4
observations for different strike prices: there are (M + 1) + 2 unknown parameters (expansion coef-
ficients, the mean and the standard deviation) to be calibrated. Option maturities with insufficient
price data should be excluded from analysis.
16Condition M = 2k (M even) is necessary to avoid real roots of the approximating RND: the
approximating density 1
στ
·z(β)
(
x−µτ
στ
)
·∑Mn=0 a(α,β)τ,n ·H(α)n (x−µτστ ) can be positive on its both tails
(i.e., when x→ ±∞) only when M is even.
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3. Compute expansion coefficients (a
(α,β)
n )Mn=0 by minimizing the total square er-
ror (3.4) with linear constraints (that account for the martingale restriction,
unit mass and model implied mean and standard deviation);
3. Update values for µ and σ by µ˜ = −i · ϕ′M (0)τ and σ˜2 = 1τ
(−ϕ′′M (0)+(ϕ′M (0))2)
with ϕM (0) defined in (2.8) and truncated after first M + 1 terms;
4. Repeat steps 3 − 4 until convergence in µ and σ achieved (or the maximum
number of iterations exceeded);
5. Remove real roots if there are any: recompute expansion coefficients by solv-
ing (3.4) with (linear) constrains on positiveness of approximating density.
Remark 3.1 The FIT method can be employed even if no initial estimates of µ
and σ are known: set values of µ ∈ R and σ > 0 arbitrary, then adjust them
simultaneously to calibrating the expansion coefficients.
Remark 3.2 The choice of α is irrelevant for the FIT method.
The choice of α is irrelevant for the FIT method as it effectively searches for a
polynomial of a given degree M , which approximates the ratio p˜τ (x)
z(β)(x)
with the best
fit to market option prices. For different values of α (but given β) the FIT method
recovers expansion coefficients of the same polynomial by equivalently rewriting it
in the corresponding basis of generalized Hermite polynomials H
(α)
n .
4 Empirical study: Model implied tails of the RND
In the empirical study of this section we calibrate the model to market data on
European options on the S&P 500 index. We find that market quoted option prices
can be explained well by a (standardized) RND, whose tails converge to zero at the
speed of a negative power of squared exponent (Definition 4.1 states it formally).
This underlying RND can have heavier tails than the classical normal density but
is never fat tailed, as opposed to the generalized extreme value and the generalized
Pareto distributions recently employed in the option pricing literature to reconstruct
the tails of the RND, e.g., Birru and Figlewski (2012), Vilkov and Xiao (2013).17
Definition 4.1 Function f(x) is of order e−ξ
x2
2 on the tails if
f(x) = o(x) · e−ξ x
2
2 , (4.1)
17We recall that in the scope of this paper the RND is the risk-neutral density of logarithmic
returns of the underlying, rather than the risk-neutral density of the terminal price of the underlying,
as in Birru and Figlewski (2012), Vilkov and Xiao (2013). If the RND of logarithmic returns is
of order e−ξ
x2
2 on the tails, then the RND of the terminal price of the underlying is not fat-tailed
either: it exhibits a faster than the power law decay on its tails.
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where o(x) → 0 with x → ±∞ and for every ε > 0, o(x) · eεx2 → ∞ with x → +∞
or x→ −∞. The value ξ = ξ(f) is the tail parameter of function f .
The tail parameter ξ(f) determines the negative power of squared exponent at
which the heaviest tail of function f converges to zero. Accordingly, for any ε > 0 the
function e−(ξ+ε)
x2
2 decreases faster than the heaviest tail of f(x), whereas e−(ξ−ε)
x2
2
decays slower than both tails of f(x).
For options implied RNDs (negatively skewed and leptokurtic), the tail para-
meter ξ(p˜τ ) takes values in [0, 1) and corresponds to the left tail of the RND.
4.1 Calibration of the tail parameter
Assume now that the standardized risk-neutral density p˜t,τ of logarithmic returns
log(St+τ/St) satisfies condition (4.1) with tail parameter ξ(p˜t,τ ) ≤ 1. This tail
parameter can be inferred from market option prices, quoted at date t and for
option maturity τ as:
ξˆt,τ = 1− 1
2α∗
, (4.2)
where
α∗ = lim sup{α ∈ [0.5, 1] | lim
M→∞
∣∣∣∣R(α)M (x)∣∣∣∣L2α exists and is finite } (4.3)
with approximating polynomials R
(α)
M (x) obtained by fitting model implied prices
(3.2) with β = 1 (standard normal distribution as the target distribution) to quoted
option prices, and the infinite sum in (3.2) truncated after M + 1 terms.
The intuition behind formula (4.2) is the following. For every ε > 0, the ratio
p˜t,τ (x)
e−
x2
2
belongs to the weighted Hilbert space L2α(ε) with α(ε) = 12(1−ξ(pt,τ )) − ε.
Therefore, the approximating polynomials,
R
(α(ε))
M (x) :=
M∑
n=0
a(α(ε))τ,n ·H(α(ε))n (x),
converge to
p˜t,τ (x)
e−
x2
2
in L2α(ε), i.e., the limit limM→∞
∣∣∣∣R(α)M (x)∣∣∣∣L2α exists and is finite.
On the other hand, for any ε < 0, the ratio
p˜t,τ (x)
e−
x2
2
has an infinite L2α(ε)-norm,
therefore the norms of approximating polynomials,
S
(α)
M :=
(√
2piα(ε) ·
M∑
n=0
n! · α(ε)−n · [a(α(ε))n,τ ]2
)1/2
, (4.4)
are expected to diverge.18 The Gauss-Hermite expansion (α = 0.5), which holds for
any bounded RND, ensures that the tail parameter (4.2) is well defined.
18We note that the expansion coefficients (a
(α(ε))
τ,n )
M
n=0 calibrated by the FIT method are not
precisely the generalized Hermite expansion coefficients (2.6): equality holds in the limit M → ∞
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Remark 4.1 Convergence in (4.3) can only be measured empirically. The tail para-
meter (4.2) is therefore subject to the highest order M of approximating polynomials
as well as the selected benchmark for convergence.
In the following we restrict our attention to M ≤ 40.19 Based on the analytical
results in Myller-Lebedeff (1907) and Necula et al. (2016), we employ convergence of
Gauss-Hermite approximating polynomials as the benchmark for convergence of L2α-
norms for a general case with α > 0.5. Approximating polynomials for α > 0.5 are
obtained by first searching the approximating Gauss-Hermite polynomials of a given
order and then expanding them in the corresponding basis of the generalized Hermite
polynomials H
(α)
n (x).
4.2 Data description
The study is based on the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) market
for S&P 500 (SPX) index options. Options written on this index are the most
actively traded European style contracts and have been in the focus of many existing
investigations.
SPX options expire on the third Friday of the expiration month, with expiration
months up to 12 near-term months. The multiplier is $100, the strike price intervals
are 5 points and 25 points for far months. SPX are AM settled options, trading in
SPX will ordinarily cease on the business day (usually a Thursday) preceding the
exercise date.20
The sample period is from January 1st, 2014 to December 31st, 2015. SPX
options for this period are liquid, and tail parameters for both short and long option
maturities can be retrieved.21 The daily data for option prices (best bid and best
ask), the trading volume, the spot price (closing), the dividend yield and the term
structure of interest rates are collected from Option Metrics. The interest rates for
corresponding option maturities are obtained by linear interpolation between the
two closest (in maturity) zero-coupon rates on the zero curve for a given observation
date.22 If the zero curve for a given observation date is not available, then the zero
curve for the closest previous observation date is used.
only. Alternatively, one could construct approximating polynomials using the generalized Hermite
expansion coefficients computed by formula (3.2) (IV method). In the latter case, however, the
expansion coefficients, hence the norms of approximating polynomials, would be consistently under
or overestimated due to truncation and discretization errors in (3.2), see discussion after Proposi-
tion 3.2.
19The calibration procedure is run in MATLAB. We noticed that inclusion of more expansion
terms makes the results on high order expansion coefficients unstable, which stems from the limited
MATLAB precision.
20AM settlement means stop trading on Thursday evening, but the settlement price is not de-
termined until Friday AM.
21In Appendix B we also provide results for the sample period from January 1st, 2007 to December
31st, 2008. The results are qualitatively the same, but the tail parameter for long option maturities
could not be recovered.
22The Actual/365 day-count convention is used both for zero coupon and dividend yields.
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Table 4.1: Sample properties of S&P 500 index options in 2014-2015.
Moneyness S/K
Days-to-expiration
≤ 60 (60, 180] > 180 Subtotal
Calls OTM ≤ 0.94 0.58 2.41 27.42
(0.57) (0.90) (3.67)
[296.10] [159.54] [47.06] [109.69]
{11084} {21668} {50235} {82987}
(0.94, 0.97] 2.76 14.11 82.41
(0.73) (1.47) (5.13)
[1049.46] [430.38] [90.67] [571.12]
{11466} {10222} {8421} {30109}
ATM (0.97, 1.00] 14.24 37.06 114.46
(1.26) (1.94) (5.77)
[2414.80] [493.66] [127.43] [1193.61]
{12334} {9831} {7673} {29838}
(1.00, 1.03] 47.38 72.09 146.33
(2.27) (2.38) (6.09)
[1397.23] [774.50] [139.15] [860.02]
{11717} {9507} {7604} {28828}
ITM (1.03, 1.06] 93.99 112.95 181.06
(3.03) (2.80) (6.48)
[71.81] [32.99] [28.42] [47.31]
{10526} {8723} {7036} {26285}
> 1.06 451.73 478.78 679.02
(3.45) (3.60) (7.43)
[5.59] [4.62] [2.90] [4.15]
{87170} {88187} {134008} {309365}
Puts ITM ≤ 0.94 252.65 272.69 422.79
(3.81) (3.92) (7.91)
[16.38] [12.73] [1.90] [7.12]
{12983} {18347} {42792} {74122}
(0.94, 0.97] 99.43 117.19 208.09
(3.35) (3.25) (6.58)
[61.83] [16.50] [10.55] [31.06]
{10441} {10210} {8421} {29072}
ATM (0.97, 1.00] 47.85 76.50 176.65
(2.57) (2.57) (6.46)
[765.66] [259.16] [74.59] [419.48]
{12197} {9831} {7673} {29701}
(1.00, 1.03] 21.12 51.66 149.13
(1.51) (2.18) (6.11)
[3094.02] [1016.05] [201.45] [1653.91]
{11880} {9507} {7604} {28991}
OTM (1.03, 1.06] 11.09 35.91 127.81
(1.22) (1.99) (5.86)
[1919.26] [452.80] [136.40] [973.28]
{11024} {8723} {7036} {26783}
> 1.06 2.00 6.38 31.79
(0.66) (1.03) (3.50)
[457.38] [179.56] [50.92] [201.46]
{100142} {110256} {154205} {364603}
Subtotal {302964} {315012} {442708} {1060684}
NOTES: The reported numbers are the average $ quoted bid-ask mid point prices, the average $
bid-ask spreads (best bid minus best ask price) in parenthesis, the average trading volumes per
contract per day in square brackets and the total number of observations in curly brackets. The
sample period is from January 1st, 2014 to December 31st, 2015 with total of 1, 060, 684 options.
S denotes the spot S&P 500 index level and K is the strike price. OTM, ATM and ITM stand for
out-of-the-money, at-the-money and in-the-money options respectively.
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The beginning data sample contains 1, 282, 632 observations of call and put op-
tion prices. Option prices are taken as midpoints of best bid-ask quotations to avoid
bid-ask bounce problems in transaction prices. Observations with mid prices less
than 1/8 are dropped and the data is filtered so that basic arbitrage constraints,
C(K, τ, St) > max(St · e−qτ −K · e−rτ , 0),
P (K, τ, St) > max(K · e−rτ − St · e−qτ , 0),
are observed. Based on these criteria, we eliminate 221, 948 observations (mostly
deep in-the-money puts and calls) and this is the starting point of our analysis.
Table 4.1 describes the distribution of sampled option data along moneyness and
maturities. A call (put) option is said to be out-of-the-money (OTM) if St/K ≤ 0.97
(St/K > 1.03), at-the-money (ATM) if St/K ∈ (0.97, 1.03] and in-the-money if
St/K > 1.03 (St/K ≤ 0.94). Applying a finer partition, the data is further sub-
divided into six moneyness categories. By time-to-expiration we classify the options
as short-term (≤ 60 days to expiration), medium-term ((60 − 180] days) and long-
term (> 180 days). For each moneyness-maturity category the summary statistics
are reported for the average mid prices, the average bid-ask spread (best bid minus
best ask price), the average trading volume and the total number of observations.
There are in total 1, 060, 684 observations, with 31.64% (9.73%) ITM call (put)
options, 5.53% (5.53%) ATM calls (puts) and 10.66% (36.90%) OTM call (put)
option observations. The average option prices vary from $0.58 for short-term deep
OTM call options to $679.02 for long-term deep ITM calls, with the average bid-ask
spread deviating from $0.57 (for short-term deep OTM call options) to $7.91 (for
long-term deep ITM puts). The average trading volume is not persistent across the
moneyness-maturity classes either, starting with 1.90 contracts per day for long-term
deep ITM put options and surging to 3094.02 for short-term ATM puts.
For each moneyness class we observe that ITM options are very infrequently
traded relative to ATM and OTM options. Thus the average trading volume (across
all maturities) of ITM calls (puts) is 7.53 (13.86) contracts per day in contrast to
ATM and OTM call (put) options with the average volume of 504.81 (355.33). This
reflects a strong demand for protective puts and calls, as well as signals that ITM
option prices are notoriously unreliable.
To account for this issue, we follow the approach in Aı¨t-Sahalia and Lo (1998) and
replace the prices of all illiquid options by prices implied by the put-call parity at the
relevant strikes and maturities. Specifically, for each moneyness-maturity category
we first discard the option data of the less liquid option type in the category (e.g., for
St/K ∈ (0.97, 1.00] and > 180 days to expiration the put option data is discarded).
The call option prices which are illiquid are reconstructed using liquid put option
prices P (K, τ, St) with the corresponding strike K and maturity τ using the call-put
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Table 4.2: MSE of the Gauss-Hermite expansion on June 19th, 2015.
Days-to-exp.\ M 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40
≤ 60 3.82 2.69 2.44 2.12 1.89 1.80 1.54 1.40 1.29 1.20 1.11 1.11 1.01 0.95 0.92 0.93
(60, 180] 7.80 4.47 3.47 2.22 1.98 1.37 1.27 0.98 0.92 0.76 0.70 0.62 0.57 0.54 0.48 0.48
> 180 44.81 15.73 8.85 2.02 6.71 2.74 3.41 1.76 1.90 1.46 1.26 0.99 0.87 0.72 0.65 0.57
all 50.91 18.06 10.28 2.51 7.73 3.23 3.97 2.09 2.24 1.73 1.50 1.19 1.05 0.87 0.80 0.70
NOTES: The reported numbers are the average mean square errors (MSE) between model implied
and quoted (bid-ask average) option prices relative to the average option price in a given maturity
class, in percent. Gauss-Hermite expansion (α = 0.5, β = 1) truncated after M = 10− 40 terms,
FIT method. The averages are computed for option data on June 19th, 2015 and across option
maturities τ < 60, τ ∈ (60, 180] and τ > 180 days to expiration.
parity:
C˜(K, τ, St) = P (K, τ, St) + e
−qτ · St − e−rτ ·K.
The put option prices are then removed from the sample. In such a way, for each
observation date and option maturity we obtain the whole cross section of call option
prices inferred from liquid ATM and OTM calls and puts.23
4.3 Case study: Triple witching on June 19th, 2015
We illustrate the calibration procedure by the example of June 19th, 2015. This
is a triple witching date, i.e., one of the four dates in a year, when the contracts
for stock index futures, stock index options and stock options expire simultaneously.
These dates are associated with escalated trading activity and market liquidity, as
traders close, roll out or offset their expiring positions. We extend the analysis for
the whole sample of option data in next Section 4.4.
Table 4.2 reports the average mean squared errors (MSE) between model implied
and quoted option prices for the Gauss-Hermite expansion truncated after M = 10−
40 terms. The averages are computed across option maturities τ < 60, τ ∈ (60, 180]
and τ > 180 days to expiration. We observe convergence of MSEs for short (τ ≤ 60)
and medium (τ ∈ (60, 180]) option maturities with the average MSE for M = 40 of
less than 1% of the average call option price in the corresponding maturity class.
Convergence of MSEs for long option maturities (τ > 180) has not fully established
by M = 40, but the model already explains market option prices well with the
average MSE of less than 0.6% of the average call option price in the class.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the L2α-norms of approximating polynomials for α in [0.5, 1]
in logarithmic scale.24 We observe that for α = 0.5 (the Gauss-Hermite expansion)
23Even though we discard the data on illiquid options, the information embedded in these options
partially transfers into the final dataset through continuously compounded dividend yields used in
the call-put parity. Continuously compounded dividend yields q reported by Option Metrics are
calculated using three months of call and put option data across all strikes and expirations.
24Recall that approximating polynomials for α > 0.5 are obtained by expansing the Gauss-
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Figure 4.1: L2α-norms of approximating polynomials on June 19th, 2015.
NOTES: The plotted values are the L2α-norms (4.4) of approximating polynomials implied
by S&P 500 options on June 19th, 2015 in logarithmic scale. FIT method, β = 1,
α = 0.5, 0.6, 0.65, 0.7 and 0.75. Option maturities of 28–910 days.
the norms of approximating polynomials converge. Calibrating the model to higher
orders M of approximating polynomials does not increase their norms significantly,
which signals convergence of approximating norms to a finite number. On the other
hand, for higher values of α, such as α = 0.7 or α = 0.75, we see no convergence
of approximating norms within the given range of M . The norms of approximating
polynomials increase exponentially with M .25
Figure 4.2 exhibits exponential growths of L2α-norms of approximating polyno-
mials for α ∈ [0.5, 1]. The growth rates g(α)t,τ (for given observation date t and option
maturity τ) are estimated from the linear model:
log(S
(α)
t,τ (M)) = a+ g
(α)
t,τ ·M + εt,τ,M (4.5)
with S
(α)
t,τ (M) the L2α-norms of approximating polynomials defined in (4.4), εt,τ,M
independent standard normal random variables and polynomial orders M in the
range of 10 − 30, 10 − 40 and 20 − 40. Figure 4.2 suggests that for each option
maturity there is a threshold value α∗ = α∗(τ), such that for every α > α∗ the
exponential growth rates of approximating norms significantly differ from zero, i.e.,
Hermite approximating polynomials in the corresponding basis of generalized Hermite polynomials.
25Of course, our inferences on convergence are subject to the highest order (M = 40) of ap-
proximating polynomials used in calibration. It might be that after increasing M to, e.g., 100, we
would observe convergence of approximating norms for α = 0.75 or, alternatively, divergence of
approximating norms for α = 0.55.
68
Figure 4.2: Exponential growths of L2α-norms of approximating polynomials on
June 19th, 2015.
NOTES: Exponential growths of L2α-norms (4.4) of approximating polynomials implied by S&P
500 options on June 19th, 2015. FIT method, β = 1. The growths are estimated from the linear
model (4.5) with M = 10− 30, 10− 40 and 20− 40 and for option maturities of 28–910 days.
the L2α-convergence of corresponding approximating polynomials fails. The pattern
is robust to the range of Ms employed in estimation of exponential growths.
Since the L2-convergence of Gauss-Hermite approximating polynomials is well
established, see, e.g., Myller-Lebedeff (1907), we employ the exponential growths of
Gauss-Hermite approximating norms as the benchmark for empirical convergence of
approximating norms for other α > 0.5. Table 4.3 outputs these average growths as
well as their average standard errors estimated from M = 10−30, 10−40 and 20−40.
As expected, we find that for both short, medium and long option maturities the
exponential growths decrease with the range of Ms, which implies establishment of
convergence of the Gauss-Hermite approximating norms.
Finally, Table 4.4 reports the thresholds α∗ and the corresponding tail para-
meters ξˆ = 1 − 12α∗ (formula (4.2)), based on the empirical L2α-convergence of
approximating polynomials benchmarked by 1, 2, and 3 average standard devi-
ations of Gauss-Hermite exponential growths (over all option maturities) in excess
to the Gauss-Hermite exponential growth for a given option maturity. We find that
for all option maturities on June 19th, 2015, the tail parameter ξˆ is in the range
of [0.15, 0.35] (vs ξ = 1 for normally distributed tails of the RND). Accordingly, the
tails of the model implied RND are heavier than normally distributed, but are not
fat, as the parameter ξˆ never reaches zero.
We note that the tail parameter ξˆ increases (implying lighter tails) with the
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Table 4.3: Exponential growths of L2-norms of Gauss-Hermite approximating
polynomials on June 19th, 2015.
Days-to-exp. ≤ 60 (60, 180] > 180 all
M 10-30 10-40 20-40 10-30 10-40 20-40 10-30 10-40 20-40 10-30 10-40 20-40
av. gr., 10−3 2.15 1.74 1.28 3.49 2.21 0.90 4.27 2.62 0.94 3.86 2.43 0.97
av. std., 10−3 0.56 0.33 0.14 0.81 0.53 0.09 0.92 0.59 0.17 0.85 0.55 0.15
NOTES: The reported numbers are average exponential growths and their average Newey-West
standard errors estimated from the linear model (4.5) with α = 0.5 and M = 10− 30, 10− 40
and 20− 40. The averages are computed for option data on June 19th, 2015 and across option
maturities τ < 60, τ ∈ (60, 180] and τ > 180 days to expiration.
convergence benchmark (here 1, 2, or 5 std) and decreases (implying heavier tails)
when polynomials of higher orders are used in the estimation procedure. Indeed, the
closer the convergence benchmark (here, 1, 2, or 5 std) to the exponential growth
of Gauss-Hermite approximating norms, the smaller the identified threshold α∗, i.e.,
the heavier the tails of the model implied RND. Monotonicity of the tail parameter
on the highest polynomial order M results from L2-convergence establishing for
higher orders of M only. It is unclear, which of the two effects is stronger, implying
that the estimated tail parameters might differ quantitatively, but also qualitatively
(if ξˆ = 0) if the model were possible to calibrate for M > 40.
4.4 Time series of tail parameters
We now apply the procedure of Section 4.3 to recover the time-series of tail
parameters (4.2) between January 1st, 2014 and December 31st, 2015.
Tables 4.5 and 4.6, respectively, report the average mean square errors of the
Gauss-Hermite expansion and the average exponential growths with standard devi-
ations of the L2-norms of Gauss-Hermite approximating polynomials. The results
are qualitatively the same as for the case study on June 19th, 2015.
Figure 4.3 plots the time-series of tail parameters (4.2), based on the empir-
ical L2α-convergence of approximating polynomials benchmarked by 2 and 5 average
standard deviations of Gauss-Hermite exponential growths (for all observation dates
and option maturities) in excess to Gauss-Hermite exponential growths for each
given observation date and option maturity. The exponential growths are estimated
with M = 10− 40 and M = 20− 40. The tail parameter is averaged within a class
of short (τ ≤ 60), medium (τ ∈ (60, 180]) and long (τ > 180) option maturities.
We observe that for all observation dates and all option maturities the tail para-
meter is within the range of [0.1, 0.3], which signals heavier than normally distributed
tails of the model implied RND, but no fat tails. The convergence benchmark (here,
2 or 5 std) and the range of M employed in estimation of exponential growths have
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Table 4.5: MSE of the Gauss-Hermite expansion in 2014-2015.
Days-to-exp.\ M 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40
≤ 60 6.50 4.13 3.52 2.91 2.05 1.65 1.52 1.33 1.24 1.12 1.04 0.97 0.93 0.88 0.84 0.82
(60, 180] 10.35 6.28 3.97 2.89 2.18 1.41 1.14 0.78 0.68 0.52 0.48 0.40 0.37 0.33 0.32 0.29
> 180 35.65 17.35 12.99 6.19 6.28 3.61 3.60 2.49 2.04 1.50 1.26 0.97 0.85 0.71 0.64 0.56
all 23.73 12.05 8.92 4.74 4.45 2.69 2.58 1.84 1.55 1.18 1.02 0.82 0.74 0.65 0.59 0.54
NOTES: The reported numbers are the average mean square errors (MSE) between model implied
and quoted (bid-ask average) option prices relative to the average option price in a given maturity
class, in percent. Gauss-Hermite expansion (α = 0.5, β = 1) truncated after M = 10− 40 terms,
FIT method. The averages are computed for the sample period from January 1st, 2014 to
December 31st, 2015 and across option maturities τ < 60, τ ∈ (60, 180] and τ > 180 days to
expiration.
Table 4.6: Exponential growths of L2-norms of Gauss-Hermite approximating
polynomials in 2014-2015.
Days-to-exp. ≤ 60 (60, 180] > 180 all
M 10-30 10-40 20-40 10-30 10-40 20-40 10-30 10-40 20-40 10-30 10-40 20-40
av. gr., 10−3 3.80 2.52 1.23 4.22 2.61 0.96 4.43 2.74 1.02 4.26 2.66 1.04
av. std, 10−3 0.73 0.41 0.13 0.89 0.48 0.14 0.95 0.62 0.21 0.89 0.55 0.18
NOTES: The reported numbers are the average exponential growths and their average
Newey-West standard errors estimated from the linear model (4.5) with α = 0.5 and M = 10− 30,
10− 40 and 20− 40. The averages are computed for the sample period from January 1st, 2014 to
December 31st, 2015 and across option maturities τ < 60, τ ∈ (60, 180] and τ > 180 days to
expiration.
the same effect as in the case study on June 19th, 2015.
Figure 4.4 also plots the tail parameters estimated using the expansion coeffi-
cients calibrated with the IV method (Section 3.1.1) instead of the FIT method. We
observe that the IV method consistently underestimates the tail parameter relative
to the FIT method, i.e., implies heavier tails of approximating RND.26 Nevertheless,
even when calibrated with the IV method, the model never detects presence of fat
tails in the risk-neutral density implied by S&P 500 options in 2014–2015.
5 Conclusion and outlook
Approximating the risk-neutral density using the generalized Hermite expansion
yields a closed form option pricing formula as given in Theorem 3.1. The formula
embeds the classical Black and Scholes (1973) formula, the option pricing formula
based on the Gram-Charlier Type A expansion as in Corrado (2007) and the option
26As discussed in Section 3.1.1, the inconsistency results from truncation and discretization errors
in formula (3.2).
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pricing formula based on the Gauss-Hermite expansion obtained recently in Necula
et al. (2016).
We derived four alternative methods for obtaining the expansion coefficients.
Specifically, one can obtain the coefficients of the generalized Hermite expansion
from the probability distribution function using formula (2.6), from the characteristic
function using the results in Proposition 2.2, or calibrate them to market option
prices using either results in Proposition 3.2 (IV method) or by minimizing the total
square error between model implied and quoted option prices (FIT method). Unlike
the particular case of Edgeworth expansions studied previously in the literature, a
key advantage of the generalized Hermite expansion is its applicability to heavy-
tailed return distributions, an aspect of key importance in option markets.
We also employed the generalized Hermite expansion to analyse convergence of
the tails of the RND implied by European options on the S&P 500 price index.
Subject to the estimation procedure, we found that the RND with tails heavier than
of normal distribution but not fat, can explain the market option data well.
Our quantitative results on the tails of options implied RND depend on the
estimation methodology, hence should not be misinterpreted as the true information
on the RND tails embedded in option prices. Firstly, we could not increase the
highest polynomial order M beyond 40 because of computational issues arising.
Secondly, the estimated tail parameter relies on the convergence benchmark, which
ideally should be set as close as possible to zero. Thirdly, our option data is limited
to minimum and maximum traded strike price, whereas extending strikes interval
may potentially impact tails behaviour of the model implied RND.
Given the above, it would be interesting to further explore the effects of the
highest polynomial order, the convergence benchmark and the strikes interval on
the tails of the model implied RND. Moreover, one could employ the generalized
Hermite expansion to alternative derivatives and investigate whether the qualitative
results on the tails of the RND would hold in the general case too.
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Appendix
A Proofs of the main results
Lemma A.1 If f(x) is uniformly continuous on x ∈ [a,∞) and ∫∞a f(x)dx con-
verges, then
lim
x→∞ f(x) = 0.
Proof of Lemma A.1: Consider ε > 0. Since f is uniformly continuous, there
exists δ = δ(ε) ∈ (0, 1), such that
|f(x)− f(y)| < ε/2 for any x, y with |x− y| < δ.
On the other hand, since∫ ∞
a
f(x)dx =
∫ ([a/δ]+1)δ
a
f(x)dx+
∞∑
k=[a/δ]+1
∫ (k+1)δ
kδ
f(x)dx
converges, we have limk→∞
∫ (k+1)δ
kδ f(x)dx = 0. The latter implies that there ex-
ists N > 0, such that
∣∣∣∣ ∫ (k+1)δkδ f(x)dx∣∣∣∣ < εδ2 for all k ≥ N .
Consider now x0 ≥ (N + 1)δ. There exists k ≥ N , such that x0 ∈ [kδ, (k + 1)δ].
By uniform continuity it follows that |f(x)− f(x0)| < ε/2 for all x ∈ [kδ, (k + 1)δ].
Therefore, ∣∣∣∣ ∫ (k+1)δ
kδ
f(x)dx
∣∣∣∣ ≥ δ(|f(x0)| − ε/2).
On the other hand, since
∣∣∣∣ ∫ (k+1)δkδ f(x)dx∣∣∣∣ < εδ2 , the latter implies that |f(x0)| < ε.
Consequently, limx→∞ f(x) = 0, completing the proof. 
A.1 Characteristic function representation
Proof of Proposition 3.2: By definition of characteristic function we have:
ϕτ (u) =
∫
R
eiuxpτ (x)dx =
∫
R
eiu(µτ+στy)pτ (µτ + στy)στdy = e
iuµτ
∫
R
eiuστyp˜τ (y)dy,
where p˜τ is the standardized risk-neutral density function, and the second equality
holds by the change of variable x = µτ + στy.
Denote by R
(α,β)
m (x) the partial sums of the generalized Hermite expansion with
R(α,β)m (x) :=
m∑
n=0
a(α,β)τ,n ·H(α)n (x). (A.1)
Recall that p˜τ (x) = limm→∞ z(β)(x) ·R(α,β)m (x) with convergence holding in L2α. Let
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us now show that limm→∞∆m = 0, where
∆m := lim
m→∞
∫
R
eiuστy
[
p˜τ (y)−R(α,β)m (y) · z(β)(y)
]
,
which will allow to compute the integral in ϕτ (u) term by term. We have
|∆m| ≤
∫
R
∣∣∣∣ p˜τ (y)z(β)(y) −R(α,β)m (y)
∣∣∣∣ z(β)(y)dy ≤ ∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ p˜τ (y)z(β)(y) −R(α,β)m (y)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
L2α
·
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ z(β)(y)w(α)(y)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
L2α
,
where the second inequality is the Hoelder’s inequality with p = q = 2. The left
norm converges to 0 as m→∞. The right norm is finite with
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ z(β)(y)w(α)(y)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣2
L2α
=
∫
R
[
z(β)(x)
w(α)(x)
]2
w(α)(x)dx =
1
2piβ
∫
R
e
−x2
2
(
2
β
− 1
α
)
dx <∞
for any α > β2 . This implies that limm→∞∆m = 0 does hold.
Consequently, we can compute the characteristic function as
ϕτ (u) = e
iuµτ ·
∞∑
n=0
a(α,β)τ,n ·
∫
R
eiuστx · z(β)(x) ·H(α)n (x)dx := eiuµτ ·
∞∑
n=0
a(α,β)τ,n · Ln(u),
(A.2)
where Ln(u) denote the integral terms. It is straightforward to see that differenti-
ation with respect to u under the integral sign in Ln(u) is allowed and leads to
L′n(u) = iστ
∫
R
xeiuστx · z(β)(x) ·H(α)n (x)dx.
Using the recursive property (2.1), the differentiation property (2.3) as well as in-
tegration by parts, we derive a recursive relationship for the sequence Ln(u):
Ln(u) =
∫
R
eiuστx · z(β)(x) ·
(
x
α
H
(α)
n−1(x)−H(α)
′
n−1(x)
)
dx
=
1
iστα
· L′n−1(u) +
∫
R
eiuστx
(
iuστ · z(β)(x)− x
β
z(β)(x)
)
H
(α)
n−1(x)dx
= iuστ · Ln−1(u) + 1
iστ
· β − α
αβ
· L′n−1(u). (A.3)
Finally, we let Ln(u) = i
n · e−u
2σ2τ β
2 ·G(α,β)n (στu). Upon differentiation this yields to
L′n(u) = i
n · e−u
2σ2τ β
2 · (− u · σ2τ · β ·G(α,β)n (uστ ) + στ ·G(α,β)′n (uστ )).
Inserting the latter into the recursive relationship (A.3) and rearranging the terms
gives:
G(α,β)n (uστ ) = u · στ ·
β
α
·G(α,β)n−1 (uστ )−
β − α
αβ
·G(α,β)′n−1 (uστ )
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for any u ∈ R, or equivalently,
G(α,β)n (x) = x ·
β
α
·G(α,β)n−1 (x)−
β − α
αβ
·G(α,β)′n−1 (x).
It is straightforward to check that G
(α,β)
0 (x) = 1, G
(α,β)
1 (x) = x · βα and G
(α,β)
n (x) is
a polynomial of degree n, which completes the proof. 
A.2 Closed-form option pricing formula
Proof of Theorem 3.1: By the standard risk-neutral valuation approach we
have:
C
(
K, τ, St, r, q, µ, σ, a
(α,β)
n
)
= e−rτ
∫ ∞
log(K/St)
(St · ex −K) · pτ (x) · dx
= e−rτ
∫ ∞
−d2
(St · eµτ+σ
√
τy −K) · p˜τ (y) · dy
with the second equality holding by the change of variable x = µτ + σ
√
τy.
We compute the two terms in the expression above separately. Let us first check
that limm→∞∆m = 0, where
∆m := lim
t→∞
∫ ∞
−d2
eσ
√
τy · [p˜τ (y)−R(α,β)m (y) · z(β)(y)]dy
with R
(α,β)
m (x) defined in (A.1). We have:
|∆m| ≤
∫ ∞
−d2
eσ
√
τy
∣∣∣∣ p˜τ (y)z(β)(y) −R(α,β)m (y)
∣∣∣∣z(β)(y)dy
≤
(∫ ∞
−d2
∣∣∣∣ p˜τ (x)z(β)(x) −R(α,β)m (x)
∣∣∣∣2w(α)(x)dx · ∫ ∞−d2 e2σ
√
τx
[
z(β)(x)
w(α)(x)
]2
w(α)(x)dx
)1/2
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ p˜τ (x)z(β)(x) −R(α,β)m (x)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
L2α
· κ(α,β)1
with κ(α,β)1 =
(
1
2piβ
∫∞
−d2 e
2σ
√
τxe
−x2
2
(
2
β
− 1
α
)
dx
)1/2
< ∞ for α > β2 . Since R
(α,β)
m
converge with m→∞ to p˜(y)
z(β)(y)
in L2α, this proves that condition limm→∞∆m = 0
does hold.
Consequently, we are allowed to interchange the integral and the infinite series
to obtain:
e−rτ
∫ ∞
−d2
St · eµτ+σ
√
τy · p˜τ (y) · dy = St · e
(
µ−r+σ2β
2
)
τ ·
∞∑
n=0
a(α,β)n · I(α,β)n ,
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where
I(α,β)n := e
−σ2βτ
2
∫ ∞
−d2
eσ
√
τx · z(β)(x) ·H(α)n (x)dx
= e−
σ2βτ
2
∫ ∞
−d2−σβ√τ
eσ
√
τ(x+σβ
√
τ) · z(β)(x+ σβ√τ) ·H(α)n (x+ σβ
√
τ)dx
=
∫ ∞
−d2−σβ√τ
H(α)n (x+ σβ
√
τ)z(β)(x)dx.
To establish the recurrence relation for the sequence I
(α)
n , we use the properties (2.1),
(2.4) and integration by parts to obtain:
I
(α,β)
n+1 =
∫ ∞
−d2−σβ√τ
(
x+ σβ
√
τ
α
·H(α)n (x+ σβ
√
τ)−H(α)′n (x+ σβ
√
τ)
)
· z(β)(x)dx
= −β
α
∫ ∞
−d2−σβ√τ
H(α)n (x+ σβ
√
τ) · z(β)′(x)dx
+
∫ ∞
−d2−σβ√τ
[
σβ
√
τ
α
·H(α)n (x+ σβ
√
τ)−H(α)′n (x+ σβ
√
τ)
]
· z(β)(x)dx
=
β
α
·H(α)n (−d2) · z(β)(−d2 − σβ
√
τ) +
σβ
√
τ
α
· I(α,β)n +
β − α
α
· n
α
· I(α,β)n−1 .
We proceed in a similar way to compute the second term of the option price as
e−rτ
∫ ∞
−d2
K · p˜τ (y)dy = e−rτ ·K ·
∞∑
n=0
a(α,β)n · J (α,β)n ,
where
J (α,β)n :=
∫ ∞
−d2
H(α)n (x) · z(β)(x)dx.
To establish the recurrence relation for the sequence J
(α,β)
n , we use again the prop-
erties (2.1), (2.4) and integration by parts to obtain:
J
(α,β)
n+1 =
∫ ∞
−d2
(x
α
·H(α)n (x)−H(α)
′
n (x)
)
· z(β)(x)dx
=
β
α
·H(α)n (−d2) · z(β)(−d2) +
β − α
α
· n
α
· J (α,β)n−1 .
Getting explicit expressions for I
(α,β)
0 , I
(α,β)
1 and J
(α,β)
0 , J
(α,β)
1 completes the proof. 
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Proof of Proposition 3.1: Similarly to the proof of Theorem 3.1, we have:
St · e−qτ · |Π(α,β)1 −Π(α,β)1,M | = e−rτ
∣∣∣∣∫ ∞−d2 St · eµτ+σ
√
τx · [p˜τ (x)dx− z(β)(x)R(α,β)M (x)]dx∣∣∣∣
≤ e−rτ ·
∫ ∞
−d2
St · eµτ+σ
√
τx · ∣∣p˜τ (x)− z(β)(x)R(α,β)M (x)∣∣dx
≤ St · e(µ−r)τ ·
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ p˜τ (x)z(β)(x) −R(α,β)M (x)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
L2α
· η(α,β)(σ)
with
[η(α,β)(σ)]2 :=
∫ ∞
−d2
[
eσ
√
τx z
(β)(x)
w(α)(x)
]2
w(α)(x)dx
=
√
α
2piβ(2α− β) · exp
{
4αβσ2τ
2α− β
}
·N
(
d2
√
2α− β
αβ
+ 2σ
√
ταβ
2α− β
)
.
Analogously,
|Π(α,β)2 −Π(α,β)2,M | ≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ p˜τ (x)z(β)(x) −R(α,β)M (x)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
L2α
· η(α,β)(0).
From the orthogonality property (2.4) of Generalized Hermite polynomials it follows
that ∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ p˜τ (x)z(β)(x) −R(α,β)M (x)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣2
L2α
=
∫
R
∣∣∣∣ ∞∑
n=M+1
a(α,β)τ,n H
(α)
n (x)
∣∣∣∣2w(α)(x)dx
=
∞∑
n=M+1
[
a(α,β)τ,n
]2 ∫
R
[
H(α)n (x)
]2
w(α)(x)dx
=
√
2piα
∞∑
n=M+1
[
a(α,β)τ,n
]2 · n! · α−n. (A.4)
For the expansion coefficients a
(α,β)
τ,n from formula (2.6) we obtain:
|a(α,β)τ,n | =
1√
2piα
αn
n!
·
∣∣∣∣ ∫
R
p˜τ (x)
z(β)(x)
·H(α)n (x) · e−
x2
2αdx
∣∣∣∣
=
αn−
1
2√
2pi · n! ·
∣∣∣∣ ∫
R
p˜τ (x)
z(β)(x)
· d(e− x22α )(n−1)∣∣∣∣
=
αn−
1
2√
2pi · n! ·
∣∣∣∣ ∫
R
∂
∂x
p˜τ (x)
z(β)(x)
· (e− x22α )(n−1)dx∣∣∣∣
=
αn−
1
2√
2pi · n! ·
∣∣∣∣ ∫
R
∂k
∂xk
p˜τ (x)
z(β)(x)
· (e− x22α )(n−k)dx∣∣∣∣
=
αn−
1
2√
2pi · n! ·
∣∣∣∣ ∫
R
∂k
∂xk
p˜τ (x)
z(β)(x)
·H(α)n−k(x) · e−
x2
2αdx
∣∣∣∣,
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where we used (2.2) and (2.5) to get p˜τ (x)
z(β)(x)
(
e−
x2
2α
)(l)∣∣∣∣
±∞
= 0 for l = 1, 2, . . .. Further,
by the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality we have:
|a(α,β)τ,n | ≤
αn−
1
2√
2pi · n! ·
∣∣∣∣H(α)n−k(x)∣∣∣∣L2α ·
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∂k∂xk p˜τ (x)z(β)(x)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
L2α
≤ α
n+k
2
− 1
4
(2pi)1/4
·
√
(n− k)!
n!
·
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∂k∂xk p˜τ (x)z(β)(x)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
L2α
.
Inserting the latter into (A.4) yields:∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ p˜τ (x)z(β)(x) −R(α,β)M (x)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣2
L2α
≤ αk ·
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∂k∂xk p˜τ (x)z(β)(x)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣2
L2α
·
∞∑
n=M+1
(n− k)!
n!
,
where
∞∑
n=M+1
(n− k)!
n!
=
∞∑
n=M+1
1
(n− (k − 1)) · . . . · n
=
1
k − 1
∞∑
n=M+1
[
1
(n− (k − 1)) · . . . · (n− 1) −
1
(n− (k − 2)) · . . . · n
]
=
1
k − 1 ·
1
(M − (k − 2)) · . . . ·M
with the series converging for any k ≥ 2. Accounting for
|C(K, τ, St, r, q, µ, σ, a(α,β)n )− CM(K, τ, St, r, q, µ, σ, a(α,β)n )|
≤ St · e−qτ · |Π(α,β)1 −Π(α,β)1,M |+K · e−rτ · |Π(α,β)2 −Π(α,β)2,M |
and rearranging the terms completes the proof. 
A.3 Calibration of expansion coefficients
Proof of Proposition 3.2: Denote by ρτ (·) the risk-neutral density of St+τ . Mak-
ing the change of variable S = St · ex in (2.6), we obtain:
a(α,β)τ,n =
√
2pi · αn− 12
n!
∫ ∞
0
ρτ (S)H
(α)
n
(
− log (St/S) + µτ
σ
√
τ
)
z˜(α,β)
(
log (St/S) + µτ
σ
√
τ
)
dS
=
√
2pi · αn− 12
n!
· E[z˜(α,β)(d2(St+τ )) ·H(α)n (−d2(St+τ ))],
where E is the expectation under the measure ρτ . Excluding the constant scaling
factor in front, we recognize a
(α,β)
τ,n as the (undiscounted) value at time t of the payoff
H(St+τ ) = z˜
(α,β)(d2(St+τ )) ·H(α)n (−d2(St+τ )) ,
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received at time t+ τ . Following Bakshi et al. (2003), we now expand the payoff in
a continuum of OTM European vanilla call and put options using as a cutoff point
the forward price Ft = St · e(r−q)τ to obtain:
z˜(α,β)(d2(St+τ )) ·H(α)n (−d2(St+τ )) =
[
z˜(α,β)(d2(Ft)) ·H(α)n (−d2(Ft))−H ′S(Ft) · Ft
]
+H ′S(Ft) · St+τ +
∫ Ft
0
H ′′SS(K) · (K − St+τ )+dK
+
∫ ∞
Ft
H ′′SS(K) · (St+τ −K)+dK,
or after taking the expectation of both left and right parts:
E
[
z˜(α,β)(d2(St+τ )) ·H(α)n (−d2(St+τ ))
]
= z˜(α,β)(d2(Ft)) ·H(α)n (−d2(Ft))
+ erτ ·
∫ Ft
0
H ′′SS(Ft) · P (K, τ, St)dK
+ erτ
∫ ∞
Ft
H ′′SS(K) · C(K, τ, St)dK,
where we used that P (K, τ, St) = e
−rτ · Et(K − St+τ )+ and C(K, τ, St) = e−rτ ·
Et(St+τ −K)+. Finally, we use that
H ′′SS(K) =
z˜(α,β)(d2(K))
K2σ2τ
· β − α
αβ
·
{[
d22(K)
β − α
αβ
− σ√τd2(K)− 1
]
H(α)n (−d2(K))
+
n
α
·
[
2 · β − α
αβ
· d2(K)− σ
√
τ
]
H
(α)
n−1(−d2(K)) +
n(n− 1)
α2
H
(α)
n−2(−d2(K))
}
to complete the proof. 
B Empirical study for 2007-2008
Table B.1: MSE of the Gauss-Hermite expansion in 2007-2008.
Days-to-exp.\ M 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40
≤ 60 4.32 2.18 2.00 1.56 1.46 1.34 1.27 1.22 1.18 1.15 1.13 1.11 1.09 1.08 1.06 1.06
(60, 180] 11.31 5.26 5.14 3.96 1.49 1.21 1.15 1.09 1.02 1.06 1.04 1.06 1.04 1.03 1.01 1.03
> 180 43.86 15.36 24.84 12.44 20.95 13.02 7.99 3.39 3.51 2.74 2.78 2.85 2.66 2.52 2.62 2.47
all 48.12 17.12 26.70 13.63 21.52 13.02 7.55 3.27 3.11 2.39 2.24 2.18 1.83 1.52 1.35 1.21
NOTES: The reported numbers are the average mean square errors (MSE) between model implied
and quoted (bid-ask average) option prices relative to the average option price in a given maturity
class, in percent. Gauss-Hermite expansion (α = 0.5, β = 1) truncated after M = 10− 40 terms,
FIT method. The averages are computed for the sample period from January 1st, 2007 to
December 31st, 2008 and across option maturities τ < 60, τ ∈ (60, 180] and τ > 180 days to
expiration.
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Table B.2: Exponential growths of L2-norms of Gauss-Hermite approximating
polynomials in 2007-2008.
Days-to-exp. ≤ 60 (60, 180] > 180 all
M 10-30 10-40 20-40 10-30 10-40 20-40 10-30 10-40 20-40 10-30 10-40 20-40
av. gr., 10−3 2.71 1.95 1.19 2.83 1.82 0.86 3.12 2.37 1.42 2.90 1.99 1.13
av. std, 10−3 0.49 0.32 0.10 0.62 0.40 0.12 0.88 0.60 0.27 0.68 0.40 0.13
NOTES: The reported numbers are the average exponential growths and their average
Newey-West standard errors estimated from the linear model (4.5) with α = 0.5 and M = 10− 30,
10− 40 and 20− 40. The averages are computed for the sample period from January 1st, 2007 to
December 31st, 2008 and across option maturities τ < 60, τ ∈ (60, 180] and τ > 180 days to
expiration.
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Table B.3: Sample properties of S&P 500 index options in 2007-2008.
Moneyness S/K
Days-to-expiration
≤ 60 (60, 180] > 180 Subtotal
Calls OTM ≤ 0.94 2.68 7.96 34.26
(1.00) (1.65) (3.26)
[716.98] [349.22] [143.38] [391.32]
{24886} {19404} {29391} {73681}
(0.94, 0.97] 9.44 32.06 102.94
(1.38) (2.57) (3.83)
[2539.70] [872.63] [276.31] [1555.46]
{7656} {3900} {3809} {15365}
ATM (0.97, 1.00] 21.23 49.89 124.14
(1.93) (2.71) (3.69)
[4053.17] [1818.41] [379.27] [2602.08]
{8075} {4239} {3777} {16091}
(1.00, 1.03] 44.30 73.80 147.75
(2.49) (2.75) (3.77)
[1891.51] [867.42] [234.97] [1214.19]
{7510} {4065} {3755} {15330}
ITM (1.03, 1.06] 74.37 101.15 169.55
(2.62) (2.84) (3.65)
[428.70] [138.12] [51.66] [254.58]
{6481} {3595} {3498} {13574}
> 1.06 219.55 266.06 377.53
(2.85) (2.96) (3.85)
[64.73] [25.51] [8.27] [33.90]
{30095} {17431} {30483} {78009}
Puts ITM ≤ 0.94 236.56 271.54 369.43
(3.48) (3.54) (4.51)
[103.85] [76.45] [24.28] [64.25]
{23577} {17638} {28747} {69962}
(0.94, 0.97] 70.93 87.58 132.63
(2.72) (2.86) (3.82)
[547.81] [382.55] [186.87] [411.87]
{7143} {3887} {3809} {14839}
ATM (0.97, 1.00] 39.89 63.31 110.35
(2.48) (2.74) (3.67)
[2557.59] [1867.79] [492.64] [1884.18]
{7904} {4240} {3775} {15919}
(1.00, 1.03] 22.12 47.51 94.62
(1.97) (2.65) (3.66)
[5252.61] [2079.04] [722.92] [3311.99]
{7591} {4065} {3754} {15410}
OTM (1.03, 1.06] 13.49 36.65 79.74
(1.64) (2.63) (3.52)
[3735.75] [1477.50] [515.12] [2334.52]
{6742} {3595} {3499} {13836}
> 1.06 4.37 12.56 33.02
(1.03) (1.68) (2.92)
[1649.84] [803.01] [253.61] [946.80]
{36984} {20183} {33322} {90489}
Subtotal {174644} {106242} {151619} {432505}
NOTES: The reported numbers are the average $ quoted bid-ask mid point prices, the average $
bid-ask spreads (best bid minus best ask price) in parenthesis, the average trading volumes per
contract per day in square brackets and the total number of observations in curly brackets. The
sample period is from January 1st, 2007 to December 31st, 2008 with total of 432, 505 options.
S denotes the spot S&P 500 index level and K is the strike price. OTM, ATM and ITM stand for
out-of-the-money, at-the-money and in-the-money options respectively.
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Chapter III
Testing the Stochastic Disorder Model on
Stock Markets
Abstract. This paper examines real-time applications of quickest disorder detection
techniques to stock market timing. The focus is on the stochastic disorder model
by Shiryaev, Zhitlukhin, and Ziemba (2014, 2015), Zhitlukhin and Ziemba (2016)
and their optimal stopping rule. The model uses sequential price data to identify
a directional change in the market trend and determines the optimal exit moment
from a long position in a bubble-like market. Together with the sensitivity analysis
of the exit rule’s signals with respect to model parameters, we study out-of-sample
performance of the entry-exit investment strategy that exploits signals from the rule.
Using daily historical data on the S&P 500, we find that the entry-exit strategy
underperforms the buy-and-hold strategy over the whole testing period 1965–2016,
but outperforms it in the fall of 1987 and during the bear market of 2007–2009.
Keywords: Bubbles; market timing; quickest disorder detection.
JEL classification: C53; G17.
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1 Introduction
This paper investigates real-time applications of the optimal stopping rule (here-
after, exit rule) by Shiryaev and Zhitlukhin (2012a), Shiryaev, Zhitlukhin, and
Ziemba (2014, 2015) and Zhitlukhin and Ziemba (2016) to stock market timing.
We give insights into the economics of the exit rule and conduct a detailed sensit-
ivity analysis of its signals with respect to model parameters. We then employ the
results to develop a fully-fledged investment strategy that exploits signals from the
exit rule to enter and exit the market. Out-of-sample performance of the strategy
is tested on the historical data on daily prices of the S&P 500 index in 1965–2016.
The innovative approach of Shiryaev et al. (2014, 2015), Zhitlukhin and Ziemba
(2016) consists in utilization of the mathematical theory of quickest disorder detec-
tion for the problem of a timely exit from a bubble-like market.1 Their notion of the
bubble-like market refers exclusively to the behaviour of a price process, namely to
presence of directional changes in the price trend. In this respect the methodology
differs from the classical literature that focuses on economic reasons of the bubble-
like price behaviour and makes predictions by testing for presence of rational and
behavioural bubbles, e.g., Johansen, Sornette, and Ledoit (1999), Li and Xue (2009),
Phillips, Wu, and Yu (2011), Wu (1997). The approach of Shiryaev, Zhitlukhin, and
Ziemba (2014, 2015), Zhitlukhin and Ziemba (2016), in turn, can be applied to any
market, as perception of market trends is subjective, and almost any price pattern
can be considered as experiencing the bubble-like behaviour.
The exit rule determines the optimal moment to liquidate the underlying based
exclusively on the price process, while sequentially observing it. It requires forming a
prior opinion on current and future market regimes (drift and volatility), selecting an
observation window and assessing the probability of a regime change within given
observation window. The mathematical foundations of the exit rule are given in
Shiryaev and Zhitlukhin (2012a,b) and Zhitlukhin (2014).
Empirical tests in Shiryaev et al. (2014, 2015), Zhitlukhin and Ziemba (2016)
revealed potential of the exit rule for market timing and risk management purposes.
The authors applied the rule on several historical crises and crashes and found that
in the majority of cases the exit rule could capture about 70-80% of the maximum
(pre-crash) return.2
This paper extends the previous empirical studies by running out-of-sample tests
of the exit rule’s performance. Unlike the original works, we apply the exit rule
to multiple market scenarios, also when no crash/directional change occurs within
1The history of quickest disorder detection methods goes back to pioneering works of Shewhart
in 1920s, and the first results by Page, Roberts, Shiryaev and Stewhart in 1950-1960s, see Shiryaev
(2010) for an overview. The theory found its successful application in production quality control,
radiolocation and information security, but only recently has drawn attention of financial literature,
see, e.g., Shiryaev (2002) for an overview of major results.
2See Ziemba, Lleo, and Zhitlukhin (2017) for an overview of the results.
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the observation period. The dynamic structure of the entry-exit strategy allows
to overcome sample as well as look-ahead biases of past studies. Our in-sample
sensitivity tests, on the other hand, assess the value of information on the present
and the future of the underlying for performance of the exit rule in market timing.
The study therefore provides a different perspective on real-time applications of
the exit rule, when the future price pattern is known neither quantitatively nor
qualitatively.
We find that the exit rule’s signals vary significantly with the forward-looking
observation window as well as with the certainty of belief that a change in the price
trend would occur within the given observation window. The pattern is particularly
pronounced for the observation window. Thus, the closer is the latest observation
date to the actual change of the price trend, the shorter is the delay of the signal and
the higher is the realized return. The result is intuitive as the observation window
together with the probability of a structural break within this time horizon provide
quantitative information regarding the actual moment of the upcoming change. We
also find that mistakes in estimation of current and future market regimes, that
correspond to qualitative information regarding the change, have significantly less
effect on the signal.
Our second line of research provides a methodology to calibrate model paramet-
ers of the exit rule in order to apply it in a dynamic manner, so that one can benefit
from price appreciation and depreciation. By using the same exit rule in a repetitive
manner we also account for optimality of the exit rule on average only, as opposed
to optimality on a given price realization, which has been analysed in the previous
works.
We find that the entry-exit strategy based on the exit rule generates positive
returns in-sample, but most of these returns disappear out-of-sample. The law
Sharpe ratio of the strategy indicates high volatility of its returns. The entry-
exit strategy cannot outperform the buy-and-hold strategy over the whole testing
period from 1965 to 2016 either in- or out-sample. But the strategy outperforms
the buy-and-hold rule during the major bear markets in the fall of 1987 and during
2007–2009.
Our out-of-sample tests suggest that the exit rule reacts in a timely manner
to sharp price declines such as the Crash of 1987, which complies with findings in
Zhitlukhin and Ziemba (2016). In normal markets however delays in the exit rule’s
signals are so long that most of returns, that were realized during a favourable mar-
ket trend, get lost because the position remains unadjusted during the subsequent
unfavourable market period until the rule signals to exit. Moreover, if the strategy
misidentifies the prevailing market regime, it takes long until it can coordinate with
the actual market regime.
Based on our empirical results we conclude that the exit rule cannot be used as
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a single investment instrument. Its ability to identify significant market corrections,
on the other hand, suggests its potential applicability for insurance purposes.
Related literature on quickest disorder detection techniques in the context of
stock market timing includes papers by, e.g., Gapeev (2010), Nguyen, Tie, and Zhang
(2014), Sokko (2015), Zhitlukhin and Shiryaev (2013). Zhitlukhin and Shiryaev
(2013), Sokko (2015) consider alternative penalty functions, respectively, linear and
exponential penalty functions as well as that minimizing the expected delay of the
signal. Gapeev (2010) derives an optimal stopping rule for a multiple disorder
problem. Nguyen et al. (2014) study optimal trading rules under a switchable mean-
reversion model. This paper contributes to the literature by exploring practical
rather than theoretical applications of the methodology.
Technical trading and prediction of future price dynamics based exclusively on
the information from observed market prices have been also addressed in Glabadan-
idis (2014, 2015). The studies document the market timing abilities of the moving
average (MA) strategy and show that, unlike the entry-exit strategy of this paper,
the MA strategy outperforms the buy-and-hold strategy. Jiang, Zhou, Sornette,
Woodard, Bastiaensen, and Cauwels (2010), Zhang, Sornette, Balcilar, Gupta, Oz-
demir, and Yetkiner (2016), in turn, focus on the informative content of both market
trend and volatility. They show that superexponential price behaviour together with
increased market volatility correspond to presence of a bubble, hence imply an up-
coming crash. Similar to findings of this paper, their approach to predict future
market corrections however does not produce a stable estimate of the actual mo-
ment of the bubble burst (Forro´, 2015).
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 looks into the economics of the
exit rule and illustrates the influence of model parameters on its signals. Section 3
conducts the sensitivity analysis. Section 4 proceeds with out-of-sample tests of the
entry-exit strategy. The final section summarizes the main results and conclusions.
2 Stock market model and the optimal exit rule by
Zhitlukhin and Ziemba (2016)
In this section we make a short summary and provide an economic interpretation
of the stochastic disorder model of a stock market by Shiryaev et al. (2014, 2015),
Zhitlukhin and Ziemba (2016). The exit rule arises as the solution of the expected
utility maximization problem of a trader who holds a subjective opinion on the
market.
Agent’s opinion on the market. An agent (trader) thinks of the market in
terms of risk factors.3 He observes each risk factor as a sequence of prices St at
3A risk factor may be an individual asset, a basket of assets or the overall market.
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discrete times t = . . . ,−1, 0, 1, . . ..
At time t = 0 the trader selects a certain risk factor and forms an opinion on
it.4 The opinion contains a view on the current regime of the factor as well as a
forward looking statement. It sounds as follows: “Currently the market experiences
4% annual trend and 20% annual volatility. Within 5 years, with 75 % probability,
the trend will change to -5% and the volatility to 25%” (here the risk factor is the
overall market). The opinion contains:
(a) a view on the current regime of the factor (current trend µ1 = 4% and volat-
ility σ1 = 20%),
5
(b) a view on the future regime of the factor (future trend µ2 = −5% and volatil-
ity σ2 > 0 = 25%),
(c) forward looking time horizon T (which corresponds to the notion of “future”,
5 years),
(d) certainty of beliefs p (75%).
The trader is certain about both current (µ1, σ1) and future (µ2, σ2) regimes of
the risk factor, but is uncertain whether the change of regime will happen within
horizon T and if so, when.
Under assumption of independent and normally distributed one-period logar-
ithmic returns, the trader’s opinion on the risk factor may be formally stated as
follows:
Xt := log
St
St−1
=
µ1 + σ1 · ξt, t < θ,µ2 + σ2 · ξt, t ≥ θ (2.1)
with ξt independent standard normally distributed random variables. The moment θ
of change of regime (disorder moment) is unobservable by the trader. It is independ-
ent of ξt, t = 0, 1, . . ., and occurs between t = 1 and t = T with probability p, equally
likely for each t ∈ [1, T ], i.e.,
P(θ = t | θ ≤ T ) = 1/T for each t = 1, . . . , T, (2.2)
P(θ ≤ T ) = p.
Agent’s decision problem. At time t = 0, based on the subjective opinion
(µ1, σ1, µ2, σ2, T, p), the trader decides to invest amount w0 in the risk factor S.
The intention is to keep the position (in full) until future time T (determined by the
forward looking horizon of the agent’s opinion on the risk factor) or liquidate it (to
the full) at some τ < T .
4The choice of the risk factor is itself an opinion of the trader.
5As the current trend (and, to a lesser extent, volatility) is difficult to measure, it is considered
an opinion. E.g., if the trend is estimated as mean of past one-period logarithmic returns, the value
varies significantly with the range of past data employed in estimation.
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The decision to liquidate (exit) at time τ = t′ with t′ ∈ [0, T ] depends on realized
market prices (Sl)l≤t′ up to time t′ (τ ∈ M(S)).6 The optimality criteron is to
maximize the expected utility from terminal wealth wτ :
τ∗η = arg max
τ∈M(S)
E0 Uη(wτ ) (2.3)
with
wτ =
w0 · (Sτ/S0), in case of a long position (µ1 > 0),w0 · (1− (1− S0/Sτ )/M), in case of a short position (µ1 < 0)
(M stands for margin requirement), E0 the expected value at time 0 given dynam-
ics (2.1)–(2.2) and CRRA instantaneous utility Uη(·) with risk aversion η,
Uη(w) =
 11−ηw1−η, η ∈ [0, 1) ∪ (1,∞),ln(w), η = 1.
τ∗η = 0 means that the trader makes no investment in the risk factor, whereas τ∗η = T
implies that the position is held until latest observation time T .
Optimal exit rule from a long position. When µ1 > 0, the problem (2.3)
becomes
τ∗η = arg max
τ∈M(S)
E0 Uη(Sτ ). (2.4)
Zhitlukhin (2014) finds the solution in the form of
τ∗η = inf{0 ≤ t ≤ T | pit ≥ b∗η(t)} (2.5)
with
pit = P(θ ≤ t | S0, . . . , St) (2.6)
the posterior probability that a change of regime occurred by t, and b∗η(t) = b∗η(µ1, σ1,
µ2, σ2, T, p; t) a decreasing time-dependent threshold (see Appendix A for details).
7
The exit rule (2.5) determines the optimal moment to exit from a long position
in the risk factor as the first moment when the posterior probability pit hits the time-
dependent threshold b∗η(t). The threshold function b∗η is computed at time t = 0 and
kept until the end of the observation period (t = T ). The posterior probability pit is
recomputed sequentially with help of Bayesian updating using new price realizations.
The time-dependent structure of the threshold b∗η(t) accounts for unconditional
6Formally, τ is a stopping time with respect to the price sequence St.
7In two special cases the problem (2.4) is degenerate. Namely, when 2µ1 < −σ21 · (1 − η), the
trader’s expected utility decreases with holding time independent of presence of regime change,
therefore τ∗η ≡ 0. Analogously, when 2µ1 ≥ −σ21 · (1 − η) and 2µ2 ≥ −σ22 · (1 − η), the trader’s
expected utility increases with holding time, hence τ∗η ≡ T .
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probability of regime change to be increasing in t. The latter also implies that the
exit rule becomes more sensitive to drops in the risk factor’s price towards the end
of the observation period (i.e., t = T ). A similar price drop at the beginning of the
observation period would be often taken for market volatility rather than a change
of regime.
Optimal exit rule from a short position. When µ1 < 0 and η = 0 (i.e., the
trader maximizers the expected return on investment), the problem (2.3) is identical
to (2.4) with µ˜1 = −µ1 and µ˜2 = −µ2. Hence it admits solution (2.5) with the
corresponding adjustment in market regimes. No solution is known for the general
case η 6= 0.
2.1 Application of the exit rule to market timing
The first application of the exit rule to market timing is due to Shiryaev et al.
(2014, 2015), Zhitlukhin and Ziemba (2016). The authors tested the exit rule on
historical price data during major bubbles and crashes, such as the Great Crash
in the DJIA in 1929, the 1987’s crash of S&P 500, the internet bubble crash of
2000–2002, the AAPL bubble in 2009–2012. They found that in the majority of
cases the rule could provide a timely signal to liquidate the position soon after the
bubble burst, and closing the position on this date would capture about 70–80% of
the maximum pre-crash return.
2.1.1 Fragility of the exit rule’s signals
The main difficulty related to real-time applications of the exit rule (2.5) consists
in selecting values of 7 model parameters, namely (µ1, σ1), (µ2, σ2), (T, p) and η,
which are necessary to set-up the rule. Table 2.1 lays out dependence of the threshold
function and the posterior probability on model parameters. Thus, all 6 market-
related variables, (µ1, σ1), (µ2, σ2), (T, p), affect both the threshold function and the
posterior probability. The risk aversion η, which defines the optimality criterion,
influences only the threshold function.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the effect of model parameters on signals from the exit
rule (2.5) by the example of the 1987’s crash in the S&P 500. The benchmark
specification of the exit rule (in red) is the entry (t = 0) on October 1st, 1986 (red
square), the latest exit (t = T ) on December 31st, 1987, the current drift µ1 and
volatility σ1 estimated from 1 year of past data, µ2 = −µ1, σ2 = σ1, p = 75% and
η = 3/2.8 Liquidating a long position in the S&P 500, formed on October 1st, 1986,
on the corresponding exit date captures 90, 6% of the maximum return.
When the latest exit date is shifted by 1 year forward (to December 31st, 1988),
the exit rule signals only after the market has fully collapsed, realizing 66, 8% of the
8A negative power utility with η = 3/2 has been employed in Zhitlukhin and Ziemba (2016).
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Table 2.1: Model parameters required for specification of the exit rule.
Param. Description b∗η pit
µ1 Mean of 1-period log. returns prior to regime change 3 3
σ1 Standard deviation of 1-period log. returns prior to regime change 3 3
µ2 Mean of 1-period log. returns after regime change 3 3
σ2 Standard deviation of 1-period log. returns after regime change 3 3
T Forward looking observation window 3 3
p Probability that regime change happens within [1, T ] 3 3
η Constant relative risk aversion 3 7
NOTES: Parameters required for computing the threshold function b∗η (A.2) and updating the
posterior probability pit (A.1).
maximum return. Lowering the probability p also reduces the performance. In both
cases the effect is likely due to decreased unconditional probability of regime change,
hence decreased sensitivity of the exit rule to price fluctuations. On the contrary,
a change µ2 = −2µ1 increases the performance to 91, 9% of the maximum return
being captured by the rule. Finally, lowering the estimation horizon for the current
regime (µ1, σ1) to 6 months instead of 1 year results in underestimation of drift µ1
and overestimation of volatility σ1, with the exit rule reacting already to the price
decline of summer 1987.
Our example therefore suggests that signals from the exit rule depend signific-
antly on its specification. This dependence may be because of one or several reasons.
Firstly, except for the case η = 0 (expected return maximization), “beating the mar-
ket” is not an objective of the exit rule (see equation (2.3)). Secondly, the model
parameters (µ1, σ1), (µ2, σ2), which refer to current and future market regimes, can-
not be estimated with certainty. The observation window T and probability p are
also subjective opinions of a trader. Finally, the exit rule (2.5) maximizes expec-
ted, hence average utility, which implies that the signal it produces is not necessary
optimal on a given price realization. Empirical studies of the following sections
investigate these issues.
3 Sensitivity analysis: Which information matters and
how?
In this section we conduct a sensitivity analysis of the exit rule’s signals with
respect to 6 model parameters (µ1, σ1), (µ2, σ2) and (T, p), which refer to the trader’s
opinion on the present and the future of the risk factor. To this aim, we follow
Zhitlukhin and Ziemba (2016) approach and assess the quality of the exit rule’s
signals by their ability to timely detect the moment of a bubble burst. We address
the following questions:
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Figure 2.1: Signals from the exit rule (2.5) for the 1987’s crash in the S&P 500.
NOTES: The S&P 500 index in 1985–1987 and 6 signals from the exit rule (2.5) with different
parameters specifications, logarithmic scale. The entry date (red square) is on October 1st, 1986,
for all 6 cases. The benchmark specification (in red) is the latest exit on December 31st, 1987,
estimation of regime (µ1, σ1) from 1 year of past data, µ2 = −µ1, σ2 = σ1, p = 75% and η = 3/2.
5 other signals are obtained by a) setting µ2 = −2µ1 (diamond), b) estimating (µ1, σ1) from 6
months of past data (upturned triangle), c) moving the latest exit to December 31st, 1988 (green
square) d) decreasing p to 50% (star) e) changing trader’s risk aversion to η = 0 (circle).
- Which information is most important?
- Is it always better to be correct or certain mistakes improve the performance?
- What is the value of information?
Similar to the study in Zhitlukhin and Ziemba (2016), we run the tests in a
controlled framework with ex post identified bubble periods and ex post estimated
market regimes (µ1, σ1) and (µ2, σ2). For each entry point we determine a benchmark
exit point (bubble peak), to which the signal from the exit rule is then compared.
Throughout the remainder of the paper we restrict our attention to the case η = 0,
i.e., when the optimality criterion of the exit rule (2.5) is to maximize the expected
return on investment.
Data. The study is conducted on the S&P 500 index price data. The daily data
on average bid-ask closing prices is from the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP) and spans the period from January 1st, 1965 to December 31st, 2016.
3.1 Identifying bubble-like periods in past data
Following the methodology in Zhitlukhin and Ziemba (2016), we consider any
market, where the price process exhibits directional changes in its trend, to be
a bubble-like market. This notion of the bubble-like market is well in line with
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thinking of a trader that attempts to benefit from bull and bear market periods by
entering into a long, respectively, short position in the underlying.
Perception of the market as being in a bull or bear period is subjective to such a
trader. It is determined by the average holding time of the trader, i.e., for how long
on average he keeps a position before liquidating it. The more often this investor
would like to trade (i.e., the shorter is the average holding time), the finer is the
corresponding price split into bull and bear periods, and the greater is the trader’s
sensitivity to market fluctuations, or equivalently, the lower is the accepted market
volatility.
Appendix B describes the precise procedure to identify bull and bear periods
in past price data based on average holding time Tav (hereafter, average period
duration, or average regime duration). Bull (bear) periods are defined as price
realizations between each local price minimum (maximum) and the following local
price maximum (minimum). These price locals are subjective to the trader. The
main idea behind their identification is that the long-term drift is generally positive
in bull periods and negative in bear ones. It changes its sign from positive (negative)
to negative (positive) after the price process exhibits a local maximum (minimum)
and starts to decrease (increase). Accordingly, a local price maximum (minimum)
can be found as the price maximum (minimum) within each period when the drift
remains positive (negative). By setting instead two thresholds, one positive and one
negative, both different from zero, one can control for frequency of identified locals.
The further the thresholds are from zero, the fewer price locals are detected, i.e.,
the longer is the corresponding average holding time of the trader.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the split of the S&P 500 price data between January 1st,
1965 and December 31st, 2016 into bull and bear periods based on average regime
duration Tav of 1 year. White and highlighted background areas are, respectively,
subjective bull and bear market periods. The bottom panel exhibits cumulative
excess (to market) returns of two strategies that adjust their positions according
to the prevailing market regime. The LS-strategy holds the S&P 500 long during
bull periods and shorts it in bear ones. The L-Only strategy holds the S&P 500
long in bull periods and liquidates it in bear ones with subsequent investment into
the risk-free asset with zero interest rate. Both strategies generate positive excess
returns.
Table 3.1 reports annualized means and standard deviations of one-period log-
arithmic returns across all bull and bear periods in the S&P 500, that are identified
based on average holding times of 1 month, 3 months, 6 months and 1 year. As
expected, we observe that the finer is the data split, the more pronounced are the
market drifts of bull and bear periods and the greater is the volatility. Bear periods
generally exhibit higher volatility than bull periods.
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Figure 3.1: Bull and bear periods in the S&P 500.
NOTES: Bull (white) and bear (pink) periods in the S&P 500 index between January 1st, 1965
and December 31st, 2016 based on average holding time Tav of 1 year.
Top panel: The S&P 500 index and its local price maximums (red squares) and minimums (blue
triangles), logarithmic scale.
Bottom panel: Cumulative logarithmic returns on LS and L-Only strategies in excess to returns
on the S&P 500. The LS (L-Only) strategy holds the S&P 500 long in bull periods and shorts
(liquidates) it in bear. Margin requirement of 100%, zero interest rates, no transaction costs.
Positive and negative bubbles. The data split into bull and bear periods al-
lows to identify so-called bubble periods in the price data. We further refer to a
combination of a bull and the subsequent bear period as a positive bubble, and to a
combination of a bear and the following bull period as a negative bubble. The data
split into positive and negative bubbles is subject to the average holding time Tav.
Benchmark exit dates. After the data is split into bull and bear periods, each
entry date can be assigned a unique benchmark exit date. We define the benchmark
exit date as the first moment following the entry date when the underlying changes
its regime (from bull to bear and vice versa).
Benchmark exit dates correspond to local price minimums and maximums at-
tributed to a given data split. Intuitively, the benchmark exit date is the optimal
moment to close the position that has been formed on the entry date, as it delivers
the (locally) highest return.9
3.2 Importance of forward looking information (T, p)
Our first study analyses importance of forward looking information (T, p) for
timing the bubble burst. Namely, we investigate how varying each of parameters T
9Closing the position on the benchmark exit date is more profitable to the trader than on any
previous date, as then he can exploit the advantageous mode of the risk factor to the full. Closing
after the benchmark exit, on the other hand, would make the trader subject to the disadvantageous
risk factor’s mode. However, if the position is closed long after the benchmark exit, it might happen
that the risk factor is already again in the advantageous mode, and the cumulative realized return
is higher than the benchmark return.
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Table 3.1: Market regimes for different data splits into bull and bear periods.
Tav\mkt.char. µp σp |µn| σn
1m. 0.75 13.88 1.13 16.99
3m. 0.44 14.01 0.86 19.39
6m. 0.35 13.87 0.54 19.71
1y. 0.26 13.50 0.45 21.56
NOTES: The reported values are the annualized mean µp (µn) and standard deviation σp (σn) of
1-period logarithmic returns across all bull (bear) periods in the S&P 500 between January 1st,
1965 and December 31st, 2016. Bull and bear periods are identified based on average period
durations of 1 month, 3 months, 6 months and 1 year.
and p affects performance of the exit rule (2.5) on individual bubbles, given that
current and future market regimes (µ1, σ1) and (µ2, σ2) are known. Intuitively, the
two parameters T and p should have the highest impact on the exit rule’s signals as
they refer to quantitative information on the moment of the bubble burst (peak).
We run the exit rule (2.5) on a set of bubble periods identified ex post in the
S&P 500 price data based on average holding times of 1 month, 1 quarter, 6 months
and 1 year. Current and future market regimes (µ1, σ1) and (µ2, σ2) are estimated
as mean and standard deviation of 1-period logarithmic returns, respectively, on left
and right bubble slopes.10
For each bubble period we employ 1 entry date on the left slope of the bubble
with
tentry = tBS + 0.2 · (tBP − tBS),
where tBS , tBP denote, respectively, the start and the peak of the bubble.
11
For every entry date we consider 5 latest observation dates,
tlatest(tentry, tBP , x) = tentry + x · (tBP − tentry) (3.1)
with multiplier x = 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. The multiplier x determines “closeness” of latest
observation date tlatest to target benchmark exit date tBP in relative terms, i.e.,
independently of (calendar) duration tBP − texit of initial market regime (µ1, σ1).
The cases x = 1 and x ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5} differ conceptually. When x = 1, the exit rule
10Assume that for a given data split a positive (negative) bubble (tBS , tBP , tBE) has been iden-
tified. It means that the market is in a bull (bear) period between tBS and tBP (left bubble slope)
and in a bear (bull) period between tBP and tBE (right bubble slope); tBS , tBE are local price
minimums (maximums) and tBP is a local price maximum (minimum). We note that tBP does
not necessarily coincide with the moment of statistical regime change. This is the moment of a
directional change in the price trend on a given price realization. Analogously to Zhitlukhin and
Ziemba (2016), we employ tBP as an approximation of the moment of statistical regime change.
11Considering tentry to the right of the start of a bubble period (i.e., tBS + 0.2 · (tBP − tBS)
instead of tBS) helps to overcome sample bias of the entry date to always be a local price maximum
or minimum.
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is expected to signal on the latest observation date, as no change of regime occurs
within the observation period. On the other hand, when x ≥ 2, the exit rule is
expected to signal soon after tBP .
Probability p takes values in {20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, 100%}.
The results are given in Table 3.2. The reported numbers are the average ratio of
return on the exit rule to the benchmark return in percent, the average lost return of
the exit rule relative to the past local maximum in percent, and the average relative
false alarm and delay in percent.12 The data is sorted based on the multiplier x
(equation (3.1)) and the probability p. The averages are computed within each
multiplier-probability class. Table 3.3 outputs the same statistics for the case of
ex post estimated market regimes being perturbed by random and independent
mistakes of up to 50%.
We find that the exit rule is sensitive to both the observation window T (mul-
tiplier x) and the probability p. The average relative delay varies from 0% to more
than 150%, the average relative false alarm is between 0.2% and 45% and the av-
erage lost return changes from less than 0.5% to more than 13%, depending on the
data split. We observe three pronounced patterns of the exit rule’s performance, all
robust to mistakes in market regimes.
Firstly, when the benchmark exit date coincides with the end of the observation
period, i.e., x = 1, performance of the exit rule, as measured by the average per-
centage of the benchmark return, the average lost return relative to the past local
maximum as well as the average relative false alarm, decreases with the probabil-
ity p of regime change. The result is intuitive: The benchmark exit date is the global
maximum within the observation period, hence the later is the signal, the better is
the performance of the exit rule. At the same time, the lower is the probability p,
the less sensitive is the exit rule to price fluctuations, hence the later is the signal.
Secondly, when the benchmark exit is within the observation period (i.e., the
multiplier x > 1), the exit rule’s performance, as measured by the average lost
return relative to the past local maximum as well as the average relative delay and
the average relative false alarm, increases with the certainty of beliefs p. For all
configurations of (Tav, x) we observe that the average delay is significantly longer
than the average false alarm, implying that the exit rule consistently “overshoots”
the benchmark exit date. Increasing the probability p of regime change within the
same observation window makes the exit rule react to market corrections faster.
Thirdly, for each given level of p, we observe that the closer is the latest obser-
12The return on the signal from the exit rule is defined as retexit = Sexit/Sentry with Sexit (Sentry)
the price of the underlying on the exit (entry) date. The benchmark return is retBP = SBP /Sentry,
where SBP is the local price maximum (minimum) of a positive (negative) bubble. The lost return
relative to the past local maximum is retlost = (Sl.max − Sexit)/Sl.max = 1 − retexit/retl.max with
Sl.max = max{St | t ∈ [tentry, texit]} for positive bubbles and Sl.max = min{St | t ∈ [tentry, texit]}
for negative bubbles. The returns are computed in assumption of zero transaction costs. The
relative false alarm (delay) is the ratio of the false alarm (delay) in calendar days, max(tBP−texit, 0)
(max(texit − tBP , 0)), to tBP − tentry in calendar days.
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Table 3.4: Distribution of optimal (T, p) when benchmark exit is outside of
observation window.
opt. crit. % Bench. Loss l.max
Tav\p 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
1m. 34.71 32.27 23.36 9.08 0.59 32.83 30.52 22.26 9.70 4.69
(35.00) (29.08) (21.24) (10.94) (3.74) (31.80) (26.86) (20.25) (12.38) (8.70)
3m. 31.38 29.76 24.39 13.33 1.14 30.52 28.93 23.69 13.20 3.66
(29.88) (26.21) (22.87) (15.86) (5.18) (28.21) (25.64) (22.28) (16.03) (7.85)
6m. 31.63 29.59 22.79 13.61 2.38 30.10 28.76 22.07 14.05 5.02
(32.72) (25.37) (20.59) (14.71) (6.62) (28.13) (24.31) (20.14) (15.28) (12.15)
1y. 31.88 29.71 18.84 16.67 2.90 30.07 27.97 18.18 17.48 6.29
(29.50) (24.46) (19.42) (15.83) (10.79) (28.06) (23.74) (20.14) (15.83) (12.23)
NOTES: Distribution of optimal (T, p) for data splits based on average regime durations Tav of
1 month, 3 months, 6 months and 1 year and for two optimality criteria, the ratio of return on the
exit rule to the benchmark return (% Bench.) and the lost return of the exit rule relative to the
past local maximum (Loss. l.max). The reported values are frequencies in percent of each
pair (T, p) to be optimal for given Tav and optimality criterion. Values in round brackets are the
corresponding frequencies for the case of mistakes in market regimes.
vation date to the benchmark exit date, the better is the exit rule’s performance,
as measured by the average lost return relative to the past local maximum. At the
same time, the lower is the average relative delay and the higher is the average false
alarm, implying that the rule signals earlier on average.
Distribution of optimal (T, p). Tables 3.4 and 3.5 report distributions of op-
timal (T, p) for the case when the benchmark exit is outside, respectively, within the
observation window. The two optimality criteria are the ratio of return on the exit
rule to the benchmark return and the lost return of the exit rule relative to the past
local maximum.
The results generally confirm conclusions of the previous section. We also find
that influence of probability p diminishes with the observation horizon. While the
distribution is monotonous on p for x = 2, it flattens for x = 5 (Table 3.5). Analog-
ously, influence of T increases with certainty of beliefs p.
Value of optimal (T, p). Table 3.6 quantifies the value of optimal (T, p) for per-
formance of the exit rule. Thus, the optimal values increase the ratio of return on
the exit rule to the benchmark return in the range from 4% to 11% percent on av-
erage, depending on the data split. They also reduce the lost return relative to the
past local maximum by 3.5% – 9.5% on average.
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Table 3.5: Distribution of optimal (T, p) when benchmark exit is within obser-
vation window.
opt. crit. % Bench. Loss l.max
Tav mult.\p 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
1m. 2 4.07 5.15 6.54 10.10 17.57 4.63 5.59 6.81 10.12 19.12
(4.61) (4.77) (5.73) (7.77) (12.27) (4.83) (4.94) (6.00) (8.44) (15.02)
3 3.25 3.35 3.71 4.64 6.49 3.41 3.46 3.81 4.88 6.56
(3.86) (3.80) (3.70) (4.98) (6.32) (3.72) (3.50) (3.72) (4.72) (6.53)
4 3.25 3.04 2.89 3.09 4.02 3.00 2.95 2.75 3.20 4.12
(3.91) (3.59) (3.75) (3.86) (4.34) (3.56) (3.50) (3.87) (4.25) (4.56)
5 4.89 3.92 3.66 3.19 3.19 3.71 2.95 3.00 2.90 3.05
(5.14) (4.82) (4.50) (4.34) (3.91) (3.77) (3.72) (3.72) (3.66) (3.98)
3m. 2 4.43 5.14 5.67 10.46 19.33 5.68 5.86 6.22 11.72 21.85
(4.29) (5.22) (5.97) (7.84) (12.13) (5.04) (5.37) (6.83) (7.32) (12.03)
3 3.19 3.19 3.19 4.08 5.85 3.55 3.73 3.55 3.91 5.68
(4.85) (3.36) (2.61) (3.92) (6.34) (3.90) (3.90) (3.25) (4.39) (6.99)
4 4.43 3.72 2.84 2.84 3.72 3.55 3.20 2.49 2.66 3.73
(3.92) (3.54) (3.36) (2.80) (4.10) (3.90) (3.58) (3.41) (4.23) (4.55)
5 4.08 4.43 4.26 2.66 2.48 2.13 2.66 3.20 2.31 2.31
(5.60) (5.97) (5.41) (4.48) (4.29) (3.74) (4.07) (4.55) (4.39) (4.55)
6m. 2 5.71 5.71 5.11 7.21 15.32 6.71 6.71 6.12 7.87 15.74
(5.97) (5.60) (7.09) (6.34) (10.07) (4.86) (5.56) (6.94) (6.94) (9.72)
3 4.20 3.90 3.60 4.20 4.20 4.08 3.79 3.50 4.08 4.37
(2.99) (3.73) (3.36) (4.10) (5.22) (4.51) (4.17) (3.82) (4.17) (6.25)
4 4.80 4.80 3.60 3.30 3.60 3.79 4.37 4.08 3.79 3.50
(2.99) (3.73) (2.99) (2.99) (4.10) (2.43) (3.47) (2.78) (3.13) (4.17)
5 4.20 4.50 4.80 3.60 3.60 3.21 3.21 3.79 3.50 3.79
(6.34) (4.48) (5.97) (5.22) (6.72) (3.13) (4.51) (5.21) (6.94) (7.29)
1y. 2 5.41 4.50 3.60 11.71 21.62 6.48 5.56 4.63 14.81 25.93
(3.25) (4.88) (8.13) (8.94) (11.38) (4.86) (6.94) (5.56) (8.33) (11.81)
3 4.50 4.50 0.90 1.80 2.70 2.78 3.70 2.78 2.78 3.70
(4.07) (1.63) (1.63) (0.81) (5.69) (4.17) (2.78) (4.86) (4.17) (3.47)
4 4.50 5.41 4.50 2.70 0.90 2.78 3.70 2.78 2.78 2.78
(4.88) (4.88) (5.69) (5.69) (7.32) (2.78) (4.17) (5.56) (6.25) (6.94)
5 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 2.70 1.85 1.85 2.78 3.70 1.85
(5.69) (3.25) (3.25) (4.07) (4.88) (3.47) (2.08) (2.78) (4.17) (4.86)
NOTES: Distribution of optimal (T, p) for data splits based on average regime durations Tav of
1 month, 3 months, 6 months and 1 year and for two optimality criteria, the ratio of return on the
exit rule to the benchmark return (% Bench.) and the lost return of the exit rule relative to the
past local maximum (Loss. l.max). The reported values are frequencies in percent of each
pair (T, p) to be optimal for given Tav and optimality criterion. Values in round brackets are the
corresponding frequencies for the case of mistakes in market regimes.
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Table 3.6: Value of optimal (T, p).
opt. crit. % Bench. Loss l.max
Tav\∆stat. % Bench. Loss l.max R. F.Alarm R. Delay % Bench. Loss l.max R. F.Alarm R. Delay
1m. 4.51 -3.31 0.53 -0.28 3.74 -3.65 1.72 -30.51
(4.75) (-2.99) (-3.28) (14.96) (3.40) (-3.40) (1.91) (-31.28)
3m. 6.59 -5.18 -1.76 -18.24 5.47 -5.56 1.05 -45.48
(7.80) (-4.24) (-5.38) (1.03) (4.75) (-4.43) (3.97) (-35.13)
6m. 7.28 -5.92 -0.22 -30.47 4.12 -6.84 0.87 -58.79
(9.12) (-5.50) (-5.55) (-34.15) (4.70) (-6.41) (2.93) (-61.36)
1y. 11.53 -8.38 -1.98 -35.29 8.52 -9.48 0.16 -54.48
(9.65) (-5.90) (-10.22) (-16.63) (2.84) (-5.67) (9.19) (-36.47)
NOTES: The reported numbers are the average differences between statistics computed for the
exit rule with the optimal (T, p) and their reference values computed with T = 3 · (tBP − tentry)
and p = 80%. The optimality criteria are the ratio of return on the exit rule to the benchmark
return and the lost return of the exit rule relative to the past local maximum. Values in round
brackets correspond to the case of mistakes in market regimes.
3.3 Importance of information on market regimes
Tables 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 suggest that mistakes in market regimes have no effect
on the dependence of performance of the exit rule on forward looking parameters T
and p.
Value of information on market regimes. Table 3.7 quantifies the value
of information on market regimes for performance of the exit rule. The reported
numbers are the average differences between four statistics for the two cases when
the exit rule is specified by ex post estimated market regimes with, respectively,
without mistakes. Values are sorted based on the size of relative mistakes in each of
four characteristics µ1, σ1, µ2 and σ2.
Unlike the case of optimal (T, p), we find no directional effect of mistakes on
either the ratio of return on the exit rule to the benchmark return or the lost return
of the exit rule relative to the past local maximum. All types of mistakes increase
the average false alarm, but exhibit no clear pattern for the average delay. The
latter implies an increase in volatility of signals of the exit rule after mistakes were
added.
Comparing the results to that in Table 3.6, we find that mistakes in market
regimes have significantly less pronounced effect on the exit rule’s performance than
the observation window T and the probability of regime change p.
How severe a market correction should be for the exit rule to signal?
The lost return relative to the past local maximum characterizes how big a price
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correction should be for the exit rule to signal. Thus, Tables 3.2 and 3.3 suggest a
necessary average price correction between 3% and 10%, depending on data split.
We find no significant difference in sizes of required price drops and recoveries when
considering positive and negative bubbles separately.
3.4 Summary of the main findings
Our sensitivity analysis suggests that the forward looking observation window T
and the probability p of regime change determine most of variability of the exit
rule’s signals. The relation between the optimal T given p and vice versa depends
on whether the benchmark exit date is within the observation window T . For prac-
tical applications this implies that one should focus on joint calibration of para-
meters (T, p), whereas market regimes can be estimated, e.g., from past data. The
optimal specification of the exit rule reduces the price correction required for the
exit rule to signal by 3%–10% on average.
4 Dynamic application of the exit rule
In this section we examine out-of-sample performance of the investment strategy
that makes use of the exit rule’s signals to enter and exit the market.
Data. The study is conducted on the same price data on the S&P 500 index as
the sensitivity analysis in Section 3. To model the risk-free asset we employ daily
data on annualized yields on 3-months treasury Bills from the FRED Economic
Data (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Economic Data). We apply 50 basis points
transaction costs and use the margin requirement of 100% for a short position. Asset
loan is free of charge, but deposited initial margins and short sale proceeds earn no
interest.
Repetitive structure of the market. We extend the stochastic disorder model
(2.1) to multiple regime changes with 2 market regimes of 1-period logarithmic
returns:
Xt =
µp + σp · ξt, δt = 1,µn + σn · ξt, δt = −1.
The unobservable process δt determines whether the market is in a bull, (µp, σp), or
bear, (µn, σn), mode.
As before, we assume that perception of market regimes is subjective to a trader.
For a trader with average holding time Tav we approximate values µp, µn and σp,
σn by means and standard deviations of 1-period logarithmic returns across all
subjective bull, respectively, bear price periods (refer to Appendix B for details).
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Investment strategy. The strategy makes use of the repetitive structure of the
market. It employs signals from the exit rule to identify the prevailing market regime
(bull or bear). We consider 2 types of the entry-exit strategy. The “LS”-strategy
holds the S&P 500 long during identified bull periods and shorts it during bear
ones. The “L-Only” strategy invests everything into the risk-free asset during bear
periods.
The entry-exit strategy requires calibration to past data to identify the mar-
ket regime on the first trading day as well as to specify the two exit rules that it
employs.13 Market characteristics (µp, σp) and (µn, σn) are estimated subject to
average period duration Tav (characteristic of a trader). The market regime (bull
or bear) of the first trading date is approximated by the market regime on the last
date of the calibration period. Parameters (Tp, pp) and (Tn, pn) are selected as to
maximize the total return on the strategy during the calibration period.
Once calibrated, the strategy runs the exit rule to identify the moment of up-
coming change of regime. If the exit rule signals before the latest observation date,
the strategy updates the information on the current regime (from bull to bear and
vice versa) and sets up a new exit rule, which corresponds to the just identified
regime. If the exit rule signals on the latest observation date, the signal is ignored
and the same exit rule is run again. The procedure is repeated until the end of the
testing period.
4.1 Performance of the entry-exit investment strategy
Table 4.1 reports performance of the entry-exit investment strategy between
January 1st, 1975 and December 31st, 2016. The reported values are the total
annualized return in percent and the Sharpe ratio of the strategy. The buy-and-
hold strategy (B-H) is used as the benchmark strategy.
We consider four specifications of the entry-exit strategy, each corresponding to
a particular value of parameter Tav employed for data split in estimation of two
market regimes. The market regimes as well as parameters (Tp, pp), (Tn, pn) are
first calibrated using the data between January 1st, 1965 and December 31st, 1974,
and then recalibrated every 10 ∗ Tav observation days using the whole sample of
past data up to the current date. Probabilities pp, pn are optimized over the set of
values {20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, 100%}. Observation window Tp (Tn) is optimized over
the set x · T˜ , where the multiplier x takes values in [0.5, 5] with linear grid size of 0.5,
and T˜ denotes the average duration of bull (bear) periods identified while estimating
market regimes.
We find that all 8 entry-exit strategies generate positive returns in-sample, but
these returns decrease or even become negative when the strategy is run out-of-
13The exit rule parametrized by (µp, σp), (µn, σn), (Tp, pp) is used to identify a change of market
regime from bull to bear. The exit rule parametrized by (µn, σn), (µp, σp), (Tn, pn) is used to
identify a change of market regime from bear to bull.
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sample. Low Sharpe ratios indicate high volatilities of generated returns. We also
observe that neither of the entry-exit strategies can outperform the buy-and-hold
strategy over the whole period 1965–2016 either in- or out-of-sample.
Table 4.1 also reports performance of the strategies in four historical bear markets
during the testing period. We observe that the entry-exit strategy outperforms the
buy-and-hold strategy both during the Crash of 1987 and after the dot-com bubble
in 2000–2002, for all specifications and types. Even though in some cases the returns
on the entry-exit strategy are negative, the strategy does generate excess to market
returns.
Figure 4.1 plots signals from the “LS”-entry-exit strategy with Tav of 1 year
between January 1980 and December 2000. Highlighted areas denote bear market
periods as identified by the strategy. We observe that the entry-exit strategy can
generate positive returns in excess to the buy-and-hold strategy, if it identifies the
prevailing market trend correctly. In particular, the strategy timely detects the
Crash of 1987 and enters into a corresponding short position before the market
collapses. On the other hand, the strategy fails to detect the following directional
change in the market trend, and looses half of its realized returns during the after
crash market recovery.
Further, starting 1997 the strategy misidentifies the prevailing market regime
and enters into short positions during bull periods and long positions during bear
ones. This misalignment could not be corrected until the spring of 2003 and resulted
in persistent losses of the strategy. We recall that the strategy was recalibrated in
January 1995 and then only in January 2005, therefore underperformance of the
strategy during 1997–2003 might be due to inappropriate exit rule’s specifications.
In particular, because of a long bull period between 1991 and 1997, it could be
that the strategy was set to have low tolerance to market volatility. Hence, it
reacted many times to market movements in 1997–2003, consistently loosing not
only because of market regime’s misspecification but also on transaction costs.14
Figure 4.2 plots signals from the “LS”-entry-exit strategy with Tav of 3 months
between January 1980 and December 2009 as well as between January 1985 and
December 1990. This strategy also signals before the market collapse in 1987. It
manages to detect the following market recovery sooner than the strategy based
on Tav of 1 year, but nevertheless looses potential returns by producing misleading
signals in late autumn 1987 – winter 1988. Further, in 2008–2009 the strategy
detects correctly the negative market trend, which helped it to outperform the buy
and hold strategy in this period.
The example of the Crash of 1987 suggests that the exit rule might serve as an
insurance against significant market corrections. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show that the
exit rule reacts in a timely manner to sharp price declines, characteristic of market
14Because of technical challenges this issue is left for future research.
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crashes but not recoveries.
Long delays in the exit rule’s signals to identify directional changes from neg-
ative to positive market trends complicate its application as a single investment
instrument.
5 Conclusion and outlook
This paper tests in- and out-of-sample performance of the exit rule by Shiryaev
and Zhitlukhin (2012a), Shiryaev et al. (2014, 2015) and Zhitlukhin and Ziemba
(2016). We find that signals of the exit rule are very fragile, particularly in response
to varying the forward looking observation window. Our dynamic setting tests of
the exit rule suggest that it cannot be employed as a single investment instrument,
but has potential as an insurance against market corrections and crashes.
There are several aspects that go beyond the scope of this paper. Firstly, because
of technical challenges we could not recalibrate the entry-exit strategy sequentially
in response to new market information. In particularly, the entry-exit strategy with
Tav of 1 year was recalibrated only once in every 10 years. To this regard, it would
be interesting to investigate whether performance of the strategy would improve,
and if so, to which extent, if it were possible to recalibrate it more regularly.
Secondly, the entry-exit strategy does not take into account the posterior prob-
ability of the market to be in a bull or bear period conditional on all past prices, as
the exit rule employs only the price data starting from the beginning of its obser-
vation period. It might be that coordinating the signal from the exit rule with the
posterior probability of the market regime conditional on all past price data (as e.g.,
in Honda (2003)) would fasten alignment of the strategy’s position with the actual
market regime in case of misalignment.
Thirdly, one could explore applications of the exit rule in conjuncture with other
market predictors, that provide exogenous (to the exit rule) information on a reas-
onable observation window and the corresponding probability of correction. To this
aim, one could employ, e.g., real-time diagnostics of bubble presence by Ardila, San-
adgol, Cauwels, and Sornette (2017), Zhang et al. (2016), Watanabe, Takayasu, and
Takayasu (2007) or predictive statistics from Koivu, Pennanen, and Ziemba (2005),
Lleo and Ziemba (2016).
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Appendix
A Posterior probability pit and threshold function b
∗
η(t)
The posterior probability pit is given by
pit =
Ψt
Ψt + 1−G(t) , (A.1)
where Ψt is the Shiryaev-Roberts statistic, defined recurrently by
Ψ0 = 0,
Ψt =
(
p
T
+ Ψt−1
)
· σ1
σ2
· exp
{
(Xt − µ1)2
2σ21
− (Xt − µ2)
2
2σ22
}
, t = 1, . . . , T,
with
G(t) = P(θ ≤ t), pt = P(θ = t).
The threshold function b∗η(t), t = 0, . . . , T , is given by
b∗η(t) = inf
{
x ∈ [0, 1] | Vη
(
t, (1−G(t)) · x/(1− x)) = 0} (A.2)
with Vη(t, y), t = 0, . . . , T , y ∈ R, defined recursively by
Vη(T, y) ≡ 0,
Vη(t, x) =

max {0, µ2(x+ pt+1) + µ1(1−G(t+ 1)) + f1(t, x)}, η = 1,
max {0, (1− η)βt[(γ − 1)(x+ pt+1)
+(β − 1)(1−G(t+ 1))] + fη(t, x)}, η 6= 1,
where
β = exp
{
(1− η)µ1 + (1− η)
2σ21
2
}
, γ = exp
{
(1− η)µ2 + (1− η)
2σ22
2
}
and
fη(t, x) =
∫
R
Vη
(
t+ 1, (pt+1 + x) · σ1
σ2
· exp
{
(z − µ1)2
2σ21
− (z − µ2)
2
2σ22
})
(A.3)
× 1
σ1
√
2pi
exp
{
− (z − µ1 − (1− η)σ
2
1)
2
2σ21
}
dz.
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The threshold function b∗η(t) is decreasing in t.15
Computing the threshold function b∗η(t). To compute b∗η(t) one needs to
recover functions V (t, x) for every t = 0, . . . , T − 1. Each function V (t, ·) can be
approximated by a piecewise constant function V˜ (t, ·) with a step size ∆X on x.16
Obtaining functions V˜ (t, x) is computationally very expensive, as integrals (A.3),
or their centered versions (z → (z − µ1)/σ1 − (1− η)σ1),
fη(t, x) =
∫
R
V˜η
(
t+ 1,(pt+1 + x) · σ1
σ2
· exp
{
(z + (1− η)σ1)2
2
(A.4)
− (σ1z + (1− η)σ
2
1 + µ1 − µ2)2
2σ22
})
× 1√
2pi
e−
z˜2
2 dz,
must be evaluated multiple times. The main difficulty arises from infinite integration
limits in (A.4). Fixed truncation limits zmin and zmax lead to persistent underes-
timation of (A.4), with errors accumulating when t→ 0.17 Increasing zmin, zmax
in turn, requires more computational power.
The following method to compute the integral (A.4) allows to account for the
tradeoff between precision and computation time. Without loss of generality we
further assume that σ1 = σ2 = σ and µ1 > µ2, hence only the positive infinity tail
has to be approximated. The general case can be done analogously.
1. Select ∆Z (linear grid on z) and ε (integral precision);
2. Define
zmin = − σ
(µ1 − µ2) log
(
X
pt+1 + x
)
− σ(1− η)− µ1 − µ2
2σ
and
zmax = − σ
(µ1 − µ2) log
(
∆X
pt+1 + x
)
− σ(1− η)− µ1 − µ2
2σ
,
where X = inf{x ≥ 0 | V˜ (t+ 1, x) = 0};
3. Define ztrunc = zmin + min(∆Z, zmax − zmin);
4. Compute
f˜η(t, x) =
∫ ztrunc
zmin
V˜η(t+ 1, . . .)× 1√
2pi
e−
z2
2 dz;
15Zhitlukhin (2014) shows that V (t, x) is decreasing in both t and x. The latter gives
b∗η(t+ 1) = inf
{
x ∈ [0, 1] | Vη
(
t+ 1, (1−G(t+ 1)) · x/(1− x)) = 0}
< inf
{
x ∈ [0, 1] | Vη
(
t, (1−G(t+ 1)) · x/(1− x)) = 0}
< inf
{
x ∈ [0, 1] | Vη
(
t, (1−G(t)) · x/(1− x)) = 0} = b∗η(t).
16The choice ∆X of the linear grid step has been discussed in Zhitlukhin (2014).
17Let g(z) be the mapping from z to the right argument of V˜ in (A.4). If σ2 ≥ σ1, then
V˜ (t+ 1, g(z)) converges with z →∞ to max V˜ (t+ 1, ·) = V˜ (t+ 1, 0).
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5. Compute upper bound Eη(z
trunc) on the truncation error as
Eη(z
trunc) := V˜ (t+ 1, 0) · (N (zmax)−N (ztrunc))
≥
∫ zmax
ztrunc
Vη(t+ 1, . . .)× 1√
2pi
e−
z2
2 dz,
where N (·) is the CDF of the standard normal distribution;
6. If Eη(z
trunc) < ε · f˜η(t, x), approximate fη(t, x) by f˜η(t, x) + V˜ (t+ 1, 0) · (1−
N (ztrunc)); otherwise replace ztrunc by ztrunc + min(∆Z, zmax − ztrunc) and
repeat 2–4.
To keep integrals (A.4), and therefore truncation errors, of the same order across t
it is recommended to work with normalized versions of V (t, ·) (i.e., V (t, 0) ≡ 1).
B Ex post identification of bull and bear periods in
price data
The following procedure identifies (ex post) bull and bear periods in the risk
factor’s price data based on average duration Tav of periods.
The underlying idea is that the long term drift is positive in bull periods and
negative in bear ones. A change of regime therefore occurs at some time between
the moment when the risk factor exhibits a pronounced positive (negative) drift and
the subsequent first moment when the long-term drift becomes significantly negative
(positive). Small deviations of the drift from zero may be due to volatility rather
than a change of regime.
1. Compute moving averages, µma,t, of 1-period logarithmic returns from
1
4Tav of
past data (bottom panel in Figure B.1), remove observations with insufficient
data;
2. Find the quantile
p(Tav) = arg min
p∈(0,1)
|Tav − T (p)|,
where
T (p) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
(Bi(p)−Ai(p))
is the average duration of bull/bear periods [Ai(p), Bi(p)], i = 1, . . . , n, iden-
tified in the data based on quantile p (see 3. for periods’ identification);
3. Split the data into bull/bear periods based on the quantile p(Tav):
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– define Thpos(p) and Thneg(p) as quantiles of conditional empirical distri-
butions of µma with
P (µma < Thpos(p) | µma > 0) = p
and
P (µma > Thneg(p) | µma < 0) = p,
– define the hitting times
Ωhitpos(p) = {t | µma,t ≥ Thpos(p) and µma,t−1 < Thpos(p)},
Ωleavepos (p) = {t | µma,t ≥ Thpos(p) and µma,t+1 < Thpos(p)},
Ωhitneg(p) = {t | µma,t ≤ Thneg(p) and µma,t−1 > Thneg(p)},
∗ remove t ∈ Ωhitpos and θ(t) ∈ Ωleavepos , such that {s ∈ (θ(t), t) | s ∈
Ωhitneg(p)} = ∅ with θ(t) = max{s < t | s ∈ Ωleavepos (p)},
∗ remove t ∈ Ωleavepos and θ(t) ∈ Ωhitpos, such that {s ∈ (t, θ(t)) | s ∈
Ωhitneg(p)} = ∅ with θ(t) = min{s > t | s ∈ Ωhitpos(p)},
– for each t ∈ Ωhitpos determine a positive moving average period [a(t), b(t)] ∈
T posma (p) (blue areas in Figure B.1) with
a(t) = min{s ≤ t | µma,l ≥ 0 for all l ∈ [s, t]}
and
b(t) =
min{s ∈ [t, θ(t)] | µma,l ≤ 0 for all l ∈ [s, θ(t)]}, θ(t) defined,max{s | µma,s defined}, otherwise,
with θ(t) = min{s > t | s ∈ Ωhitneg},
∗ if ξ := min{t ∈ Ωleavepos } < min{t ∈ Ωhitpos}, let T posma (p) = T posma (p) ∪
[min{s | µma,s defined}, ξ],
– determine negative moving average periods as compliments to positive
moving average periods (red areas in Figure B.1),
– define the set of local price minimums (maximums) as price minimums
(maximums) within each negative (positive) moving average period (resp.,
red squares and blue triangles in Figure B.1),
– define each period between a local price minimum (maximum) and the
following local price maximum (minimum) as a bull (bear) period.
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Figure B.1: Identifying bull and bear periods in the S&P 500 price data.
NOTES: Top panel: The S&P 500 index and its local price maximums (red squares) and
minimums (blue triangles) based on average period duration Tav of 1 year, logarithmic scale.
Bottom panel: Annualized moving averages of 1-period logarithmic returns on the S&P 500
computed from past quarterly data.
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